Balance of Power

Some view balance of power as the most reliable basis for peace in an anarchic international system. Balance of power theory asserts that a rising hegemon will provoke other states to form protective alliances.

This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever-temporary balancing of interests and the ever-precarious settlement of conflicts. This school, then, sees in a system of checks and balances a universal principle for all pluralist societies. It appeals to historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, and aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than the absolute good.

Analysts of this approach such as Henry Kissinger (1994) recognize about a dozen periods in history of actual balance of power systems. Historically, balance of power prevents single power dominance, keeps wars short, and limits the victor’s gains. Professional armies rather than citizen levies tend to fight balance of power wars, not for great causes or national survival, but for strategic and policy reasons at the margins of empire. Citizens tend not to understand so often oppose them. Korea was the first instance of the Cold War. Subsequently, the US and the USSR intervened selectively and strategically around the world, often using proxies to avoid direct confrontation with one another and the risk of World War.

With the end of the Cold War, some conclude from the increasing number of democracies, growing global interdependence, the dominance of the United States, and the disruptions of sub-state actors that balance of power no longer is relevant. This view makes four assumptions. First, democracies do not attack one another, despite contrary examples that test the assumption (Chapter 12). Second, the United States is so powerful economically, militarily, and technologically that no challenge to it is likely to succeed, despite the rise of China. Third, the threat of Islamic terrorism will drive most other major powers into alliance to defeat it, despite resistance to US efforts. Fourth, globalization of trade and investment is so pervasive that attacking another country amounts to attacking oneself.