Accession of New Member States to the EU
The legal literature has correctly underlined the importance of the Copenhagen criteria in strengthening the ‘tight monitoring procedures detailing the satisfaction of the political conditions by candidate countries’ applying for accession to the EU.[63] The stability of democratic institutions was impacted by the growing importance of the Copenhagen criteria.
‘The EU’s political conditionality did not embrace all tasks of democratic consolidation.’[64] The working of democratic government and the competitive role of political parties on the basis of genuine and unrestricted pluralism were at the centre of the monitors’ attention.[65] The monitoring activity did not require a piecemeal examination of the details of the legislative reforms; rather, a general consideration of the relations between the state’s authorities, between those authorities and the citizens, and finally between the citizens themselves was needed. The concept of a living constitution revealed its utility again in this context. And conditionality was interpreted with some flexibility and understanding.Two cases of postponement of the accession of candidate states are exemplary. A Report of the European Commission, dated July 1977, declared that Slovakia ‘does not fulfill in a satisfying manner the political conditions set out by the European Council in Copenhagen’.
The document underlined ‘the instability of the Slovakia’s institutions, the lack of rootedness in political life and the shortcomings of its democracy’.[66] The refusal to consider the compliance of Latvia with the Copenhagen criteria as satisfying was considered an example of how broadly focused the EU’s conditionality was, if compared with the piecemeal approach of other international organisations.[67]
Considering the overall process of the enlargement of the Union, European authorities feared that many candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe would have found difficulties in implementing the Copenhagen criteria.
The troubled developments experienced by Romania and Bulgaria are well known. In these cases, the process was complicated by the activation of special procedures for monitoring. A generous attitude in welcoming the applications of some states would have increased the risks in the admission process. The Union’s authorities would have been deprived of the leverage of conditionality after the accession of the new members. The consideration of effective constitutional practices was considered no longer sufficient. The examination of specific legislative acts was acquiring primary importance. The way to piecemeal detailed negotiations was opened. It is true that in the case of Slovakia, the EU still preferred a flexible approach. The Councils of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission all modified their mindsets in the face of political and personal change in the composition of the Government of Slovakia. The substitution of the Dzurinda Cabinet for the Meciar Cabinet changed the relations between Slovakia and the EU notwithstanding that ‘the outcome of the political conditionality by the actual accession in May 2004 was one of imperfect implementation’.[68] The same conclusion was adopted with regard to the application of Latvia. This ‘new democracy could not be seen as a consolidated one by the time the Country joined the EU in 2004’.[69] However, the governing bodies of the EU made a positive decision. In the cases of both Slovakia and Latvia, the will of the political parties and the explicit acceptance of the European constitutional principles as leading guidelines of the national policies were considered decisive. The actual constitutional practices were seen as credible evidence of the satisfaction of the requirements for accession to the EU. The political and cultural attitudes of the concerned states guaranteed a future transformative modification of the existing legislation in conformity with the principles of the European constitutional heritage.A severe approach was taken by the EU in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania. To make the conditionality work, the behaviour of the concerned states was monitored both in the pre- and post-accession years.[70] A possible delay of the accession was not considered sufficient. The recognition of a gap between the desire for accession and the actual compliance with the necessary requirements suggested the adoption of ‘new mechanisms like sanctions and infringements procedures’.[71] These new mechanisms applied especially to Bulgaria and Romania, whose performances were subject to a monitoring process.
IV.