Conclusion

Various theories can explain the constitutional politics behind the adoption of unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrines: the will to protect higher law, the aim to correct flaws in the political process and to enhance democracy, the will to make sure certain policies or ideologies are preserved by the judiciary, or the will of hegemons to preserve their powers.

Of course, strategic theories are not enough. One must consider also the insti­tutional and social context. When other rigid mechanisms of checks and balances and distribution of amending power exist, there will be less need for judicial intervention. I have listed four factors that influence the need to adopt judicial supervision of constitutional amendments in a given society: flexibility or rigidity of the amending process, party or executive dominance, the political-democratic- amendment culture, and the existence or absence of effective supra-national institutions.

If, as Surya Deva claims, the basic structure doctrine should be regarded as “a wider system of checks and balances in times with serious democratic deficits in all institutions of governance,”^[1131] then when analyzing its development, one should

also take into consideration other institutional vices that create veto points, checks and balances, or distribution of powers. He notes that in India, “Modi has accomplished a highly centralised and opaque model of decision making with almost no effective checks on powers from any source (internal or external to the executive),” and that in “such a scenario, the doctrine of basic structure should be relevant in controlling the propensity of the government to destroy the core constitutional values embodied in Indian Constitution.”^[1132]

In light of Deva's approach, and returning to Israel, it is important to note that especially in the Israeli system of government, when basic laws are easily amended, where the legislature is composed of a single chamber, with govern­ment dominance in the legislation, there is a greater fear for abuse of constitu­ent authority by the Knesset and an increasing justification for judicial review to impose limits.