Index

Abe, S. 9, 23, 34, 36-37, 38, 45 Abeyratne, R. 202, 270, 282 Abhisit, V. 176 absolute constitution 47, 63 abstract review 23; see also judicial review abusive constitutionalism 169, 182-185, 248, 258

Adhikari, B.

Albert, R. 5, 7, 13, 15, 68, 69, 80, 195, 294

Ali, Z. 95, 97 al-Mahmood, A. 114, 115 ameen 10, 111, 115, 125-127, 130, 132

amendment(s) 4, 102, 111, 252, 275-276; “benign constitutional violation” and 61-62; codified unamendability 238-239; to the Constitution of Bangladesh 211; under the Constitution of India 113-114; to the Constitution of Pakistan 115-116, 123, 124; under the Constitution of Thailand (2007)

172- 173; constitutional treatment of in Nepal 140; deliberation ceiling/ floor 237-238; under the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 88, 89-90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 105-108; under the “five power” constitutional system 52-53; flexibility of 291-292; formal 52, 189;guoti and 61, 64-65, 66; incremental model of 157, 159-162; informal 190, 191; interpretive unamendability 239-240; judicial nullification 231, 232, 233, 234; judicial power and 91-92; judicial review 87; of Malaysia’s Land Acquisition Act 94-95; National Assembly and 160-161; under the People’s Republic of China constitutional system 56, 60-61, 62, 63-64; procedural irregularity and 234-235; Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912) 50, 51; public oversight 154; public scrutiny of 167; public sentiment towards 162; replacement and 169, 177, 181, 185, 187-188; royal assent and 106-108; self-interest of the ruling party and 211-212; subject-rule mismatch 235-237; supranational constitutional restrictions 241; temporal limitations 237-238; Thailand’s constitutional drafting council (2012) 176-178; tiering 5-6, 253

Arato, A. 133 Armitage, R. 32 Article 96 Association 37 Aryal, O. P. 146 Aso, T.

Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-Related Bills 42

Austin, G. 197

Awami League (AL) 20

Bangladesh 11, 12, 13, 18-19, 240; abolition of the caretaker government 219-224; basic structure doctrine (BSD) 210; Islam as state religion 218-219; non-party caretaker government (NPCTG) system 20, 212, 219, 220, 227; politics of unconstitutional amendment 212-214

Barak, A. 286, 288, 289 basic structure doctrine (BSD) 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 87, 88, 91, 92, 99-100, 109, 111, 112, 113, 121-122, 123, 127, 130-131, 131, 135, 140, 153, 190, 191, 209, 240, 268, 269, 275, 283; applicability of 244, 247; in Bangladesh 210-212; comparative law and 250-252; “contingent” view of244-245, 246, 248, 251; democracy and 196-198; governmental structure and 251-252; in India 194-198, 269-272; Indira Gandhi Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak and Others 97-99; informal amendment and 203-208; Islam and 114-115; in Israel 285-288; Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v State of Kerala 245-248; Maria Chin Abdullah v.

Director-General of Immigration 100­103; “necessary” view of244; royal assent and 106-108; Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat 94-99; in Singapore 248—250; uncodified constitutions and 254-256; see also institutional explanations for the development of BSD

“benign constitutional violation” 61-62 Beshara, C. J. 204-205

Bhatia, G. 206 Bhutto, B. 119, 124

Bilchitz, D. 291 Bluntschi, J. C. 48 Brazil 5, 234 Bui, N. S. 9, 242 Bush, G. W. 33

cases: Abdul Haque 217; Alma Nudo Atenza v Public Prosecutor 10, 88, 99-100, 104; ami Ullah Baloch v Abdul Karim Nowsherwani 126; Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh 12, 210-211, 216, 217, 218, 282-283; Bangladesh v. Asaduzzaman Siddiqui 283; Bank of Oman Ltd v East Trading Co. Ltd. 124; District Bar Association Rawalpindi v Federation of Pakistan 111-112, 117, 120-122, 123, 127, 131; Fazlul Quader Chowdhry v Muhammad Abdul Haque 113, 113n7; Federation of Pakistan v United Sugar Mills 117; First Judges 199, 200; Fourth Judges 7, 19, 194, 201-202, 269-272; Golak Nath v State of Punjab 195-196; The Government of the State of Kelantan v The Government of Malaya and Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj 91; Hakim Khan v Government of Pakistan 124, 125; I.C.

Chandrachud, C. 202

Chaudhry, I. M. 119, 120, 129

Chen, D. 62, 63, 64

China 8, 15, 45; “5-5” Constitution draft 52-53; Constitutional Outline by Imperial Order (1908) 48-49; guoti 9, 15; “New Democracy” 54; see alsoguoti; People’s Republic of China (PRC)

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) 54-55

Choudhry, S. 208

codified unamendability 13, 238-239; see also judicial nullification

Cold War, Article 9 controversy during 25-28

collective self-defense 32, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44

Colombia 7, 271 comparative law, basic structure doctrine (BSD) and 250-252

concrete review 23; see also judicial review

Constituent Assembly of Nepal 133 constituent power 4, 11, 14, 133, 169, 170, 181-182, 263; in Israel 288­290; judicial nullification and 233; see also democracy

constituted power 4, 233

Constitution of Bangladesh: 4th Amendment 215; 8 th Amendment 210-211, 214-219; eternity clause in 225-226

Constitution of Brazil, Article 39 234-235

Constitution of Germany, Article 79(3) 3

Constitution of India 245-248; amendability of 189-190; Article 124 200; Article 368 113, 189, 189n2, 190; Article 370 19, 191, 205-206, 207, 208; Forty-Second Amendment 116; judicial review 113-114; Preamble 192; Twenty-Fourth Amendment 113

Constitution of Japan: Article 9 23, 24-25, 26-28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36-37, 40, 44; Article 20 34; Article 96 26, 37

Constitution of Myanmar (2008) 253-254

Constitution of Nepal (1990) 136, 137, 281

Constitution of Nepal (2015) 13, 17, 17-18, 146, 148, 272; Article 274(1) 277; eternity clause 140, 265-268; see also Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007)

Constitution of Pakistan 214; Article 62(1)(f) 10, 111, 115, 126-127, 128-130; Article 175A 112, 121­122; Article 368(5) 116; Eighteenth Amendment 120; Eighth Amendment 115, 116, 118-119; Islam and 112; Islamic provisions 114-115, 127-130; judicial independence 112; Nineteenth Amendment 112, 122; Objectives Resolution 114-115, 118; Principles of Policy 114; Seventeenth Amendment 119; Thirteenth Amendment 119; Twenty-First Amendment 121

Constitution of South Africa 236

Constitution of Thailand (1997) 170-171,175-176

Constitution of Thailand (2007) 12, 170, 171-173, 179, 180-181, 185, 264, 291

Constitution of Thailand (2017) 260 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1954) 55; Preamble 55-56

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1975) 56-57; “Four Big Freedoms” 57

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1978) 57

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982) 58; amendment of 60-61, 62, 63-64; Article 1 59; Article 5 59; Article 11 58-59; Article 57 58; Article 62 58; Article 64 60 Constitution of the Republic of China (1946) 154, 154n3; Article 1 156; Article 27 158; “Fundamental National Policies” 53-54

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 248-249

Constitution of the United States, Ninth Amendment 76

Constitution of Vietnam (2013) 9, 70, 71-72, 81, 82; amendment process 67; Article 3 76; Article 4 78-79; Article 12 75; Article 14 75-76; Hoang’s account of its unconstitutionality 73-75; human rights and 75-76; international law and 82; land ownership and 77-78; Objectives Resolution 124;

popular sovereignty and 78-80; as unconstitutional 69-70 Constitutional Court of Taiwan 168;

J.Y.

J.Y. Interpretation No. 342 161; J.Y. Interpretation No. 499 153, 155­156, 161-162; J.Y. Interpretation No. 721 167; political retaliation against 162-163; politicization of 163-164; popular sovereignty and 165-166

Constitutional Democracy Association (CDA) 39-40, 41

constitutional monarchy 47, 48, 51,

89; royal assent and 106-108; see also

Japan; Malaysia; Thailand Constitutional Outline by Imperial

Order (1908) 48-49 constitutional politics 7, 133, 191,

257, 295; basic structure doctrine (BSD) and 192-198; in Malaysia 87, 108-109; Thailand 260; UCA as 14-20; unamendability 134 constitutional republic 51 constitutional supremacy, in Nepal

136-138,148-149 constitutionalism 13, 17, 19, 42, 63,

87, 174, 175, 226, 244; abusive 169, 182-185, 248, 258; civic 165; in Japan 23-25; liberal 68, 81; popular 165; Thai 255-256; unconstitutional constitutions and 81-82 constitution-making process 245, 249, 256, 263, 272; bargaining dynamics of 259-260; Constituent Assembly of Nepal and 133; first Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CA1) 139; High Level Political Committee (HLPC) 139; post-conflict 260, 264; see also first Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CA1); second Constituent Assembly of Nepal (CA2) constitutions 210; absolute 47, 63;

amendment power 4-5; constituent power 4, 11; entrenchment 255, 256; essential features 113, 122-123, 124­125, 129; eternity clauses 3, 6, 13, 140, 149, 257, 272; interpretations 52-53; post-conflict 260, 262; relative 47; uncodified 254-256; unconstitutional 9, 241-242; see also amendment(s); basic structure doctrine (BSD); unamendability constructive unamendability 15, 80 “contingent” view of BSD 244-245,

246, 248, 251 Corwin, E. 13, 274-276, 275 Cultural Revolution 56

Dam, T. S. 70-71 decisive model 11-12; see also

Bangladesh; India; Taiwan; Thailand deliberation ceiling/floor 237 democracy 13, 18-19, 112, 136,

179, 215; in Bangladesh 219, 225; basic structure doctrine (BSD) and 196-198, 244; judicial nullification and 232; Taisho 24; Thai-style 170,

173- 174, 175, 182, 261 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 31,

34, 35, 36 Deng, X.

Malaysia; Nepal; Pakistan Deva, S. 12, 19, 239, 270, 295, 296 Dhungel, S. 141 dictatorship of the proletariat 56, 62 discursive model 8-9, 15, 16; see also

China; Japan; Vietnam

Dixon, R. 6, 69, 82 doctrine of necessity 134, 141, 142, 145

Ecuador 236

Ely, J. H. 13; Democracy and

Distrust 278

emergency powers, Malaysia and 105-108

Ershad, H. M. 215 eternity clause(s) 3, 6, 13, 15, 135, 153,

226, 257, 258, 259, 263, 272; in the

Constitution of Bangladesh 225-226; in the Constitution of Nepal (2015) 140, 265-268; in the Constitution of Thailand (2017) 261-262 exclusionary unamendability 258 explanatory theories of unconstitutional constitutional amendments: Corwin’s higher law 276-278; Ely’s democracy and distrust 278-280; Ginsburg’s political and policy insurance 280-281; Hirschl’s hegemonic preservation 282-284

fazhi 60-61

Federal Constitution of Malaysia: amendment process 88, 89-90;

Article 4(1) 89, 96; Article 121(1) 88, 92, 93, 94-95, 98, 104; Article 150 105-106; Article 159 89; basic structure doctrine (BSD) and 94-99; Immigration Act 100; judicial review 97, 98, 103-104; royal assent as feature of 106-108

federalism 251, 252; in Nepal 266-267 first Constituent Assembly (CA1) 133, 134, 135, 138, 139, 150; aftermath of its dissolution 146-149; litigation over the dissolution of 140-146

formal amendment 52, 189; judicial appointments and 199-203

Gandhi, I. 97, 198

Gao, Q. 49, 62

Gardbaum, S. 260

Geertjes, G. 293

Germany 72, 253, 277

Ginsburg, T. 13, 172, 175, 280-281 Guidelines for US-Japan Defense

Cooperation 32

Gulf War 28, 29

guoti 9, 15, 46, 47, 48-49, 51, 52, 65, 65n100, 66, 240, 277; Mao on 54; under the People’s Republic of China constitutional system 64; in the PRC 59, 62, 63

Gyawali, C. K. 146

Hamid, A. 93

Harding, A. 13, 108, 288

Hasebe, Y. 42

Hatoyama, I. 25

Hayut, E. 287

hegemonic preservation theory 282 Higuchi, Y. 37

Hirschl, R.

Hoang, X. P. 9, 67, 68, 69-70, 80, 83; account of an unconstitutional constitution 73-75, 81, 82; constitutional writings 71-73; on human rights 75-76; on land ownership 77-78

Honduras 69, 82, 265

Hoque, R. 12, 13, 20, 246

Hosokawa, M. 29

Hossain, K. 216-217

Hua, G. 57

Huang, D. 279 human rights 25-26, 70, 72, 74, 83; under the Constitution of Vietnam (2013) 75-76; unconstitutional constitutions and 69

implicit unamendability 274-275 incremental model of constitutional reform 157, 159-162

India 6, 8, 10, 12, 18-19, 19, 111, 113, 135, 136, 231, 240; basic structure doctrine (BSD) 194-198; informal amendment 203-208; Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act (2019) 191; judicial appointments 7, 199-203; judicial independence 269; National Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC) 191, 194, 201, 203, 269-271; politics of legitimacy 192, 193, 194, 203; politics of supremacy 192-193, 194; President’s Orders 206-207; unamendable judicial supremacy in judicial appointments 268-272

informal amendment 9, 23, 24-25, 44, 52, 190, 191, 203-208

institutional explanations for the development of BSD: existence or absence of effective supra-national institutions 294-295; flexibility of the amendment process 291-292; party or executive dominance 292; political- democratic-amendment culture 293-294

Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) 17, 134, 135, 140, 149; 8th Amendment 141; Article 64 139, 144; Preamble 144

international law, unconstitutional constitutions and 82

interpretive unamendability 13, 239­240; see also judicial nullification

Islam 217, 251; ameen 115, 125-127, 130, 132; basic structure doctrine (BSD) and 114-115; Constitution of Pakistan and 112, 114, 116­117, 119-120; as essential feature of the Constitution of Pakistan 122-123, 129-130; as state religion of Bangladesh 218-219; see also ameen

Israel 276, 294, 296; Basic Law 284, 285; basic structure doctrine (BSD) 285-288; constituent power 288-289, 291; Declaration of Independence 289

Jangam, B. 144

Japan 8, 9, 15, 16; Basic Law on Education 34; Cabinet Legislation Bureau 24, 27, 29, 35, 36, 38, 41, 43; collective self-defense 32, 36, 38, 39, 40-42, 43; constitution reform debate 28-32; constitutionalism in 23-25; Counter-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001) 33; Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 27-28, 29, 30; National Security Council (NSC) 38, 41; Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Law (1992) 28; Protection of the People Law (2004) 33; Self­Defense Force (SDF) 26, 32, 36; US-dependent security normalization 32-35

Japan Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) 43

Jaran, P. 178 Jellinek, G. 52 Jiang, Z. 61 judicial activism 17, 44, 130, 134, 135, 140, 149, 150, 182-185, 193, 283, 285; of Taiwan’s Constitutional Court 157-160

judicial appointments 120-122; in India 199-203, 268-272

judicial independence 18, 116, 199, 211, 217, 282; Indian 269-272; of the Supreme Court of Pakistan 112 Judicial Interpretation No. 499 11-12 judicial nullification 13, 231, 232, 234, 243; codified unamendability

238- 239; constituent power and 233; democracy and 232; as “extraordinary” power 234; interpretive unamendability

239- 240; procedural irregularity

234- 235; subject-rule mismatch

235- 237; supranational constitutional restrictions 241; temporal limitations 237-238

judicial reasoning on unconstitutionality 155 judicial review 15, 16, 18, 24, 87, 88, 97, 98, 99, 100, 110, 153, 154, 278, 278, 280-281; abstract 23; abusive 258; concrete 23; of the Constitution of India 113-114; of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 100-102, 103-104, 105-106; Islam and 115, 116-117

Junejo, M. K. 119

J.Y. Interpretation No. 499 153, 164, 168, 278-279; judicial reasoning on unconstitutionality 155-156; popular sovereignty and 164-165, 166

Kamal, M. 216 Karki, S. 147

Kay, R. 277

Khan, G. I. 119

Khan, I. 130

Khwaja, J. S. 123

Kishi, N. 25, 28

Kobayashi, S. 37, 42

Koirala, S. 147

Koizume, J. 33, 34 kokutai 47-48

Komatsu, I. 38

Kramer, L. 165

Krishnaswamy, S. 197, 204

Laband, P. 52

L’alik, T. 291

land ownership, under the Constitution of Vietnam (2013) 77-78

Landau, D. 6, 7, 69, 82, 169, 248, 291 Lee, H. P. 10, 240, 283, 291, 292

Lee, T. 159

legal unamendability 80

Leghari, F. 119, 124 legitimacy: of the NPCTG system

222-223; politics of 12, 12, 190, 192, 194, 203

Li, N. 279

Liang, Q. 51 liberal constitutionalism 81

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 27-28,

29, 32, 34, 45; “new manifesto” 30 Lim, M. 101 locus standi 137

Maimun, T. 101

Malagodi, M. 11, 18, 242, 281 Malanjum, R. 10, 93, 95

Malaysia 8, 10, 16, 88; Barisan

Nasional coalition 87, 90, 106-109; basic structure doctrine (BSD) in 94-99, 100-108, 247; constitutional politics in 87, 108-109; emergency powers 105-108; judicial power 91-92; Land Acquisition Act (1960) 94-95; Malaysia Act (1963) 91;

National Security Council Act (2016) 106-107, 108; Pakatan Harapan coalition 109; Perikatan Nasional coalition 90, 105; Reid Commission 89; separation of powers 95-96, 97-99; see also Federal Constitution of Malaysia

Mao, Z. 57, 59, 62; onguoti 54 Masud, K. 128

Masuzoe, Y. 36 McElwain, K. M. 26 Mehta, P. B. 205

Meiji Constitution 24, 25; see also Constitution of Japan; Japan

Mitchell, R. 9, 277

Modi, N. 12, 19, 193, 198 Mohamad, M. 92 Mortarti, C. 277-278 Musharraf, P. 17, 119 Myanmar 236

Nakano, K. 9 Nariman, F. 197, 198, 208 National Council of Peace and Order

(NCPO) 186-187

Navot, S. 290 “necessary” view of BSD 244-245 Nelson, M. 10, 11, 17, 240, 246, 251, 283

Nepal 10, 11, 13, 17-18, 133, 134, 138-139; basic structure doctrine (BSD) 140; constitutional supremacy in 136-138, 148-149; constitutional treatment of amendments 140; ethnic groups 137n10; federalism 266-267; High Level Political Committee (HLPC) 139; litigation over the dissolution of the CA1 140-146; People’s War 136-137, 138; post­conflict constitution making 138-139, 149-150; pro-democracy movement 136; public interest litigation (PlL) 137, 144; unamendability of constitutional nationalism 263-268; see also first Constituent Assembly (CA1) Neupane, B. 144 “New Democracy” 54 Ngo, B. C. 70-71 non-partisan caretaker government

(NPCTG) 20

Nye, J. 32

Oder, B. E. 195

Ozawa, I. 28, 29, 35, 36, 38 pacifism 24; Article 9 of the

Constitution of Japan and 25-28 Pakistan 10, 11, 16, 17, 111, 114, 213;

judicial appointments 112, 120-122; see also Constitution of Pakistan Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) 119,

120, 127

Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 119,

120, 127 Pang, Y. 62 Peng, Z. 59, 62 People’s Republic of China (PRC):

“Anti-Rightist Movement” 56;

Common Program 55; Cultural Revolution 56; dictatorship of the proletariat 56, 62; discussion groups 55; “Four Big Freedoms” 57; “Four Cardinal Principles” 7n68, 57, 58; “fundamental laws” 62-63, 64; Great Leap Forward 56;guoti 59, 60-63, 64, 65, 66; Reform and Opening Up 57, 58; rule of law and 58-59; Special Administrative Regions (SARs) 63 political parties 35, 136, 138,

139-140, 145, 162, 201; abuse of the amendment process 292; unconstitutional constitutional amendments (UCA) and 212, 227; see also constitutional politics political question doctrine 138, 154 politics 7, 13, 28, 246; of legitimacy 12,

190, 192, 194, 203; of supremacy 12, 190, 192, 193; of unconstitutional constitutional amendments 212-214, 227; see also constitutional politics popular sovereignty 140, 158;

Constitutional Court of Taiwan and 165-166; Hoang on 78-80;

J.Y. Interpretation No. 499 and 164-165, 166 procedural irregularity 13, 234-235; see

also judicial nullification

Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912): amending 50;

Article 2 50; Article 54 50 public interest litigation (PIL) 136, 137,

144, 193, 227; see also cases

Rabbani, R. 127-128, 130 Rahman, Z. 218 Ramachandran, R. 196-197 Rasool, S. 127 Regmi, K. R. 134, 141, 144, 146, 147 relative constitution 47

Roznai, Y. 4, 13, 14, 69, 82, 197, 267 rule of law 99, 179, 180, 258; in the

PRC 58-59

Saeed, A. 126

salient features doctrine 10, 11, 16 Samak, S. 176

San Francisco Peace Treaty 26

Sarit, T. 174

Sasada, E. 42

Schmitt, C. 4, 47, 52, 61, 63, 277-278 Schocken, A. 285

Science Council of Japan 42

Sebli, A. R. 100, 102, 103 second Constituent Assembly (CA2)

134, 147

secularism 127, 204, 218-219, 251; see also Islam

separation of powers 4, 16, 18, 49, 51,

70, 104, 110, 135, 146, 147, 179; Malaysia and 95-96, 97-98, 99, 100, 101; see also judicial review

Shah, N. H. 124

Shaked, A. 284-285

Shan, F. 64

Shapiro, M. 163-164

Sharif, N. 11, 111, 112, 119

Shikai, Y. 50

Shrestha, K. 145, 147, 280

Sieyes, E. J. 4, 233

Singapore 254; basic structure doctrine (BSD) in 248—250; Independence Act (1965) 248-249

Smend, R. 52

social contract 89

socialism 9;guoti and 64-65 socialist regimes, unamendability and 15

Somchai, W. 176 sovereignty 18, 25, 50, 72; popular

78-80, 140, 158, 164-165 Soviet Union 55

Staatsformenlehre 48

state form 48

Su, N. 161

subject-rule mismatch 13, 235-237; see also judicial nullification

Suchinda, K. 175

Sun, Y. 50, 158

supranational constitutional restrictions

13, 241; see also judicial nullification Supreme Court Appellate Division

(SCAD) 12-13, 20

Supreme Court of India 6-7

Supreme Court of Nepal 134, 135, 136, 137-138; aftermath of the dissolution of the CA1 146-149; cases on the extension of the CA1 term 142-146; judicial activism 149, 150

Supreme Court of Pakistan, judicial independence 112

Suteu, S. 6, 13, 135, 248, 293

Taisho Democracy 24, 44

Taiwan 8, 18-19, 168; electoral reform 167; incremental constitutional reform 157; judicial activism in 157-160; Judicial Interpretation No. 499 11-12, 164, 278-279, 292; National Assembly 154, 157, 160-161; National Assembly as sunset agency 158-159; presidential election and constitutional politics 159-160; public scrutiny of constitutional revision 167; public sentiment towards frequent constitutional amendments 162; Wild Lily Movement 160-161; see also Constitution of the Republic of China (1946); Constitutional Court of Taiwan

temporal limitations 13, 237-238; see also judicial nullification

term limits 9, 69

Tew, Y. 10, 240, 283, 291, 292 Thailand 8, 13, 18-19, 169, 170, 280; abusive constitutionalism 182-185; amendment rules 172; Black May

174- 175; constituent power 177,

181- 182; constitutional drafting council 176-178; coups 174; judicial activism 182-185; Phue Tai Party (PT) 176, 177; senatorial election (2013) 178-179; treaty-making procedure 179-181; unamendability of its monarchy 259-263

Thai-style democracy 173-174, 175;

politics of unamendability and

182- 185

Thaksin, S. 3, 19, 171, 175, 176, 178, 179, 183, 185

tiering 5-6, 253 Tonsakulrungruang, K. 12, 18-19, 280,

281, 291

Tripathi, P. K. 197 Tushnet, M. 248 unamendability 134, 135, 149, 156, 169, 170, 176, 182, 188, 190, 213, 257, 272; abuse of258; codified 238­239; in communist regimes 15; of the Constitution of Bangladesh 225-226; of constitutional nationalism in Nepal 263-268; constructive 15, 80; implicit 274-275; informal 195; interpretive 239-240; of judicial supremacy in judicial appointments in India 268-272; legal 80; of Thailand’s monarchy 259-263; Thai-style democracy and 182-185; unconstitutional constitutions and 80-81

uncodified constitutions 254-256 unconstitutional constitutional amendments (UCA) 4, 11, 13, 68, 87, 111, 132, 133, 149, 153, 154, 189, 191, 210, 226, 243, 257; 8th Amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh 212, 214-219;

8th Amendment of the Interim Constitution of Nepal 141-142; 15th Amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh 212, 219-224; basic structure doctrine (BSD) 10, 12, 16, 17, 19-20; constitution reform debate in Japan 28-32; constitutional design and 5; constitutional dismemberments and 5; as constitutional politics 14-20; decisive model 11-12, 18-19; democratic foundations of 233; denotive model 10, 16, 135; discursive model 8-9, 15, 16; essential features and 124-125; eternity clauses and 6; guoti 9, 15; implicit unamendability and 6-7; informal amendments 9, 24-25, 44; Islamic provisions 117, 118-120; Israel’s Basic Law and 285; Judicial Interpretation No. 499 11-12; judicial rhetoric and 10; J.Y. Interpretation No. 499 155-156; models 11n41; politics of 212-214, 227; royal assent and 106-108; “salient features” doctrine 10-11; as theory 8; tiering and 5-6; see also basic structure doctrine (BSD); explanatory theories of unconstitutional constitutional amendments

unconstitutional constitutions 68,

69, 70, 72, 83; constitutionalism and 81-82; Hoang on 73-75, 77-78; international law and 82; unamendability and 80-81

United Kingdom 72

United Nations (UN) 35

United States 5, 26, 45, 72; military alliance with Japan 32-35; “Reverse Course” policies 28

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 78

Uribe, A. 7

US-Japan Joint Declaration on

Security— Alliance for the 21st

Century 32-33

US-Japan Security Treaty 26, 27, 28 Uzman, J. 293

Vietnam 8, 9, 15; Cung Viet Hien Phap (‘Lets’ Draw up the Constitution’) 70-71; Hoang’s account of an unconstitutional constitution 73-75; intellectuals 67-68, 70; Petition 72 70; see also Constitution of Vietnam (2013)

Wang, C. 51

Winkler, C. G. 26

Wu, J.C.H. 52

Xiao, J. 63

Xu, K. 64

Yadav, R. B. 147

Yeh, J.-R. 11, 279

Yingluck, S. 169, 175, 176, 178, 179,

180, 181, 183, 185

Yuan, S. 51, 52

Zhang, J. 52, 53

zhengti/guoti dichotomy 46-47, 51, 63; see alsoguoti

Zhou, Y. 62

zhuquan 50

Zia-ul-Haq, M. 111, 114, 118, 128

23 “The National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan... are composed of rep­resentatives or members that are directly or indirectly elected by the people. Their functions

78 The BSD has migrated to Indian through Heidelberg University Professor Dietrich Conrad, who delivered a lecture at Banaras Hindu University in India on implied limitations on the amendment power which formed the basis for the acceptance of the doctrine in the Supreme Court of India. See AG Noorani, ‘Sanctity of the Constitution: Dieter Conrad - The Man behind the “Basic Structure” Doctrine', in AG Noorani, Constitutional Questions and Citi­

91 One may compare this idea to the recent Miller 2 judgment of the UK Supreme Court. In this judgment, the Supreme Court stated that: “Although the United Kingdom does not have a single document entitled ‘The Constitution', it nevertheless possesses a Constitution, established over the course of our history by common law, statutes, conventions and prac­tice. Since it has not been codified, it has developed pragmatically, and remains sufficiently flexible to be capable of further development. Nevertheless, it includes numerous principles