CONCLUSION

My objective in this chapter has been to ‘propagate the myth’^[317] of legal pluralism, rather than to engage in internal debates over which is the true pluralist position.

That is not to suggest that these are the only possible versions of external and internal legal pluralism, or that there are no important differences between various schools of legal pluralist thought. (My own position, which I will defend in Part III, is closer to critical legal pluralism.) Accordingly, I have sought to outline the legal pluralist case that presents the clearest and strongest challenge to liberal legalism, and which focuses attention on the adequacy, or otherwise, of its foundational assumptions. The theoretical accounts of external and internal legal pluralism outlined above direct us to elements of both the traditional and critical schools in this regard. First, that we need to test interpretive approaches to constitutional law against the internal legal pluralist hypothesis that the modalities of adjudication militate against achieving coherence in practice. Secondly, that we should further test instrumental approaches to constitutional law against the external legal pluralist hypothesis that the effectiveness of rights constitutionalism is compromised by its location in a world of internormativity. To the extent that these hypotheses can be substantiated, they pave the way to constructing an alternative knowledge of constitutional law, better suited to understanding the operation of constitutional rights in an age of globalization.

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Source: Anderson Gavin W.. Constitutional Rights after Globalization. Hart Publishing,2005. — 155 p.. 2005

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