Questions of interpretation are central to contemporary constitutionalism.

Whether the language is English, French, Hindi or Afrikaans, constitutional courts around the world are dealing with similar sorts of questions: When consti­tutions protect ‘freedom of expression,’ does this include obscene expression, or racist speech, or commercial advertising? What amounts to ‘reasonable limits’ on the exercise of constitutional rights that can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’? When constitutions state that they apply to ‘legislatures’ and ‘governments’, does this include courts or private law actions? underlying, and informing, conventional responses to these questions is the core liberal legal­ist assumption that constitutional doctrine’s natural condition is systematic coherence.

In this chapter, I test liberal legalist assumptions of coherence against the claims of internal legal pluralism outlined in the previous chapter by discussing Ronald Dworkin’s ‘law as integrity’ thesis. Dworkin’s importance lies both in the influence of his work,^[320] and his argument that, notwithstanding that doctrine is often characterised by incoherence and that adjudication involves the making of political choices, we can (re)order constitutional law into a coherent norma­tive hierarchy which will determine the right answer to each controversy. As such, his work enables us to highlight and engage with some of the most press­ing general issues raised by the interpretive question. In this regard, I consider whether, if judges follow his theory, this will have the effect of securing doctri­nal coherence. I argue, with reference to Dworkin’s own explanation of US Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, that there is a serious theoretical problem here, as ‘law as integrity’ is equally capable of supporting contrary positions. I then elaborate how Dworkin’s failure to convince is indicative of two general difficulties, which I support with reference to case studies on free­dom of expression. First, constitutional theory cannot exclude the scope for doctrinal plurality that inheres in judges’ status as law-creating subjects, and secondly, in practice, adjudication is a highly fragmented, variegated and ad hoc activity. I conclude that a close examination of the argument for coherence confirms the insight of internal legal pluralism that jurisprudence is congenitally incoherent and disordered.