Conclusion
The cases of Ghana and Colombia depict the forms and role of constitutional advice in transitional societies. In Ghana, the task of constitution-making was given to domestic actors whose interests were at play and therefore monopolised the process.
In Colombia, where international actors and frameworks provided constitutional advice in addition to local stakeholders, the international actors added layers of substantial and practical complexity to the process. Ghana’s context evinces a traditional constitutional approach involving a consultative assembly without recourse to advice from any transitional justice mechanism during the drafting of the constitution. Subsequently, this led to a lopsided approach to transitional justice, which was adopted nearly a decade after the constitution came into force. The implementation of transitional justice mechanisms within a permanent constitution implies that the constitutional process in Colombia deviates from a traditional approach and, therefore, involves both international and domestic stakeholders. The result is a well carved transitional justice blueprint, albeit faced with different practical challenges, such as delays in their implementation that hamper their efficiency, and the existence of different applicable legal frameworksThe interactions between transitional justice mechanisms and constitutional advice in the above cases demonstrate the potential of constitutional advice in times of transition to shape transitional justice mechanisms towards the achievement of their goals, whilst transitional justice mechanisms can provide constitutional advice to shape the goals or implement the provisions of a constitution. Therefore, constitutional advice in transitional societies must adopt an inclusive and coordinated approach that enables both transitional justice actors and constitutional advisors to collaborate and support each other towards securing their goals.