CONCLUSIONS
This survey of constitutional developments in the Austrian federal system has demonstrated the increasing importance of Länder constitutions. While they played only a minor role for many years, this began to change in the early 1980s with the recognition that Länder constitutions could be venues for innovation and policy or institutional experimentation.
The effects of changes in Länder constitutions have been felt within the borders of the various Länder, beyond the borders of individual Länder as innovation in one Länd has encouraged emulation and experiment through the processes of horizontal federalism, and – to some extent – even at the federal level. For example, the decision to lower the voting age to sixteen, with the result that nearly every citizen has the right to vote in all elections and referenda on the federal, Land, or municipal level, was enshrined in the federal constitution as a result of learning from experiments undertaken in various Länder since the 1990s.24However, reforms on the Länder level should not be overestimated. The federation still plays the dominant role in the Austrian political system, and the Federal Constitution’s restrictions on state constitutional space do not allow for deep-rooted reforms such as the change from proportional to majority voting in elections to Länder parliaments. To sum up, in recent decades reform has proceeded step-by-step at the Länder level, while at the federal level efforts at constitutional reform have failed. One reason is that the federal reform projects are very general and aim to realize deep structural changes in the federal system. Another reason is that Austria is what Jan Erk has called “a Federation without federalism.”25 Austrian citizens would like to have both strong regional entities and a uniform legal system.
While the first goal is an essential element of federalism, the second is incompatible with it. As long as Austrian politics and society are unable to overcome this paradox, all deep-reaching reform projects are likely to fail. Only reform projects dealing with specific matters, such as the administration of education or administrative courts in the Länder seem to have a chance to be realized.
1 Although such “revisions” are infrequent – there has been only one since 1945 – they do occur. Austria’s accession to the EU and the constitutional changes this required qualified as a total revision of the Federal Constitution, so these modifications required approval by referendum in accordance with Art. 44, par. 3, B-VG. In June 1994, about two-thirds of the voters approved of Austria’s accession to the EU and consented to the total revision of the Federal Constitution.
2 Friedrich Koja, Das Verfassungsrecht der osterreichischen Länder (Vienna/ New York: Springer 1988), 23–4; Joseph Marko and Klaus Poier, Die Verfassungssysteme der Bundesländer: Institutionen und Verfahren repräsentativer und direkter Demokratie, in Dachs et al., eds., Politik in Osterreich (Wien: Manz 2006), 943–58; Peter Pernthaler, Die Verfassungsautonomie der osterreichischen Bundesländer, Juristische Blätter (1986), 477; Richard Novak, “Die relative Verfassungsautonomie der Länder,” in Rack, ed., Landesverfassungsreform (Graz: Bohlau 1982), 35–49.
3 See VfSlg 5676/1968; 9547/1982.
4 See also Anna Gamper, “The Principle of Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian Federalism: The Constitutional Court’s Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg,” in Peter Bußjäger and Anna Gamper, eds., The Homogeneity of Democracy: Rights and the Rule of Law in Federal or Confederal Systems (Vienna: Braumüller 2003), 126.
5 Richard Novak, “Kommentar zu Art. 99, B-VG,” in Korinek and Holoubek, eds., Bundesverfassungsrecht (Vienna and New York: Springer 2005), 12–13.
6 Gamper, Principle, 134.
7 See VfSlg 16.241/2001.
8 Constitutional Court (VfGH) 28.6.2001, G 103/00, JBL 2002, 31; VfGH 1.7.1993, G 75/93.
9 See also Joseph Marko, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutionalism, and the Protection of Minorities, at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/subpapers/marko.pdf.
10 Compare Institut für Foderalismus, 31: Bericht über den Foderalismus in Osterreich (Vienna: Braumüller 2006), 145.
11 Koja, Verfassungsrecht, 89–90.
12 Ibid., 71–2.
13 Peter Pernthaler, Osterreichisches Bundesstaatsrecht (Vienna: Verlag Osterreich 2004), 473–4.
14 Burgenland (Art. 68, par. 4); Lower Austria (Art. 25, par. 3); Upper Austria (Art. 58, par. 3); Styria (Art. 36, par. 1 in c.w. par. 4); Tyrol (Art. 36); Vorarlberg (Art. 34).
15 Compare Friedrich Koja, “Instruments of Direct Democracy in the Austrian Federal State and in its Länder,” Austrian Journal of Public and International Law 45 (1993), 35.
16 Ibid., 38. Taking the Constitutional Courts ruling on the “Volksgesetzgebung” in Vorarlberg into account (VfSlg16.241/2001), such doubts should not be neglected.
17 VfSlg 16.241/2001.
18 On 2 December 2010 the Federal Council gave its consent to the relevant amendment of the Federal Constitution. Before that, on 9 November the National Council had passed the law.
19 Norbert Wimmer, “Die verfassungsrechtliche Unzulässigkeit der Gemeindegebarungskontrolle durch einen Landesrechnungshof,” Osterreichische Gemeinde-Zeitung (1991), no. 9, 2.
20 Gerhard Baumgartner, “Kommentar zu Art. 127c, B-VG Rz 13,” in Rill and Schäffer, eds., Bundesverfassungsrecht (Vienna: Verlag Osterreich 2004).
21 Tanja Koller, “Die Neuerungen für den Rechnungshof – insbesondere die Überprüfung der Gebarung von gemeinden und Gemeindeverbänden durch Landeskontrolleinrichtungen,” Journal für Rechtspolitik 2007, 322.
22 Rudolf Thienel, “Kommentar zu Art. 148i, B-VG” in Rill and Schäffer, eds., Bundesverfassungsrecht (Vienna: Verlag Osterreic 2002).
23 VfSlg 12.229/1989.
24 See also Ferdinand Karlhofer, “Wählen mit 16: Erwartungen und Perspektiven,” in Der WählerInnenwille: Forum Politische Bildung, Informationen zur Politischen Bildung Nr. 27 (2007), 37. Further Marko and Poier, Verfassungssysteme, 945.
25 Jan Erk, “Austria: A Federation without Federalism,” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 34, no. 1 (2004): 1–20.