INTRODUCTION

The basis for federalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH)¹ is rather peculiar owing to the unique complexity of the situation: a multiethnic population consisting of three major groups (Bosniaks/Muslims, Croats, and Serbs) and a number of smaller minority groups,² the experience of “ethnic federalism” in former Yugoslavia, the experience of democratization and transition to a free-market and liberal-democratic system, and the post-conflict situation involving massive intervention by the International Community.

After more than three years of war, military intervention by NATO finally ended the Bosnian War in 1995. It had been characterized by brutal atrocities against the civilian population for the purpose of “ethnic cleansing,”³ and the International Community’s⁴ most important short-term objective was creating security through stability, which was to be accomplished by physical reconstruction as well as by preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as one country. For this purpose, a peculiar federal system was established that forced the former warring parties together, made them recognize each other, and provided for some common institutions.⁵ However, the International Community’s medium-term objective went far beyond merely overcoming the direct consequences of war: it was to create a viable state in which all ethnic groups could live peacefully together and the rights of all citizens would be effectively guaranteed. This objective was seen as the essential precondition for reaching the long-term goal of Bosnia’s integration into the European Union (EU) as an equal member.⁶ These objectives required a functioning state, and in the daunting task of state-building, federalism was seen as an essential tool.

Bosnia’s path towards accession to the EU was complicated by its triple transition.

Consequently, the basic focus of this volume – namely, constitutional change from below, with change and development brought about by constituent units or federated entities – has to be reframed for the Bosnian case, where, at least so far and in line with historical experience, change has been brought about or even imposed by external forces. This peculiar situation can be explained only by a number of paradoxes underlying and conditioning the process of state-building in Bosnia, as well as the evolution of its federal system. The basic paradox is plainly visible in the tensions and dysfunctional features created by the two fundamental but contrasting objectives of the International Community: stability through territorialisation and the institutional entrenchment of ethnicity, on the one hand, and the reconstruction of a multinational state, on the other.⁸

This chapter illustrates the main paradoxes of state-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the evolution from a postwar situation towards the objective of European integration, and it analyzes the constitutional change this brought about. The decisive questions are whether it will be possible to build a viable and sustainable multinational federal state on these paradoxes, what the incentives are for doing so, and where change might come from. As of 2010, the agents of change have mostly been external. The challenge for Bosnia-Herzegovina if it is to become a sustainable multinational state is therefore for it to reach consensus and rally support for this state from within its borders.