INTERNATIONAL IMPOSITION RATHER THAN DOMESTIC LEGITIMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION
Some months after NATO’s air strikes, in November 1995 a peace agreement was negotiated at a US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, which guaranteed the unity of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina in a federal arrangement.9 The “state” of Bosnia-Herzegovina is identical in its territorial extension with the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and consists of two “Entities”: the Republika Srpska (Serb Republic, RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH).
Both Entities had been founded during the war as “states” with proper constitutions and full-fledged, state-like institutional systems; thus, the Entities are actually older than the current state of which they are compound units. The RS had been proclaimed on 7 April 1992 as a separate State of Serbs in a clear act of secession.10 The constitution of the FBH had been adopted in June 1994 on the basis of the Washington Agreement of March 1994, which brought an end to the hostilities between Croats and Bosniaks and provided the foundation for a federal system.11The construction of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina reflects the logic of a ceasefire: in order “to end a war,”12 it is necessary to avoid creating winners or losers; no side should gain anything. This approach led to a package deal with the warring parties, as well as to the partition of the territory according to the situation on the battlefield after the international air strikes: 51 percent for the FBH and 49 percent for the RS. The ceasefire line became the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), which mirrored the position of the troops on the ground at the end of war but did not take into account other factors that were important for the reconstruction and development of the country, such as demographic, geographical, and economic considerations. International (i.e., American) pressure was decisive for the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), which was signed by the three presidents: of Bosnia-Herzegovina (A.
Izetbegović), of Croatia (F. Tudjman), and of Yugoslavia (S. Milošević). Thus, the three warring groups (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) were all represented, but there was no direct recognition of the RS or the FBH, which would have been in contrast with the International Community’s main objective of the continuity and unity of Bosnia as a state.The objective of keeping Bosnia together also explains why the presidents of the neighbouring states, Croatia and Serbia, were involved in the agreement even though they were not directly and formally representing combatants in the conflict.13 Their inclusion was meant to dissuade them from further intervention in Bosnian affairs, as well as to secure de facto approval within the Entities (of Croats and Serbs in Bosnia represented by the heads of their respective kin-states).
While the involvement of neighbours and the pressure of the International Community (IC) were crucial for the International Peace Treaty, which consisted of a long list of eleven annexes on various military and civilian issues, among them the Constitution of the State (annex 4 of the DPA), there was no involvement of Bosnian citizens at all. Although it is the basis for reconstruction and normalization, the Dayton Constitution has never been directly approved by the population of BiH; even now, an official version of the English document in local language (s) does not exist.14 It is no wonder that under such conditions there is not much acceptance of this constitution, either by the population or by local politicians.