NIGERIA: PLURALISM AND THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIZATION

While there are many similarities between the cases of Sudan and Nigeria on issues of the contingent role of Islam in relation to constitutionalism, the Nigerian case has so far been on a more limited and less drastic scale than that of Sudan.

Like most African countries, present-day Nigeria was first unified under British colonial rule, and achieved full political independence in October 1960. With very little advance preparation, the British parliamentary model was abruptly and uncritically adopted by the Nigerian elite who took over power from the British colonial administration (Suberu 1995: 198). The constitution of 1954 divided Nigeria into ethnic regions, representing the ethnic majorities of the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. The division meant “an inequitable incorporation of more than two hundred ethnic minority groups into the tripartite regional structure” (199). The government responded to the urgent need for an adjustment of this unworkable structure during the first phase (1966–79) of military rule which implemented “the reorganization of the federal structure, the centralization of the political economy, and the reconstitution of critical political institutions. First, the lopsided regional system was transformed into a more institutionally balanced scheme of federalism through the establishment of twelve and subsequently nineteen states in 1967 and 1976” (199). It is therefore important to understand the role of the military in the constitutional development of Nigeria, like many other African countries, as discussed in chapter 3 earlier.

The first period of military rule ended with the establishment of what is known as the Second Republic in October 1979, based on an “American-style presidential system, a uniform local government structure and police force, ingenious electoral provisions that required the president and all political parties to obtain broad inter-ethnic support, and a constitutional directive that enjoined the recognition of the country’s ‘federal character’ of cultural diversity in the composition and conduct of key public institutions” (Suberu 1995: 200). Hence the Second Republic had a progressive, positive vision, for instance, in its emphasis on consensus across ethnic groups and its imperative for constitutional recognition of cultural plurality and diversity. However, in practice the Republic could not take root, and reflected similar patterns and failures of mismanagement of governance and corruption as the First Republic until it was removed by the military after four years.

The second period of military rule, from 1984 to 1999, was in turn marked by popular pressures for democratic renewal and politics and constant demands for return to democratic governance (Suberu 1995: 200). Despite the failure of the Second Republic and the ruthless efforts of the military to undermine democratic institutions, the popular democratic impulse has persisted. Indeed, ironically, successive military dictators offered this as the justification for military rule. This was the promise of the regime of General Ibrahim Babangida, and his failure to deliver became the justification for his overthrow. Thus, upon taking over the new military dictator, Sani Abacha proclaimed in his first broadcast to the nation on November 18, 1993, his strong determination to enthrone a true and lasting democracy, and announced the forthcoming national constitutional conference to determine Nigeria’s political future (200).

It seems that ethnic pluralism provides an important basis for the commitment of Nigerians to democracy, since all groups strive for a system which can ensure equitable political representation. In this regard, “Nigeria’s abiding commitment to the mediation of its ethnic fragmentation via federation has truly set the country’s democratic ethos in the constitutional mold” (Suberu 1995: 209). Other sources of constitutionalism include the introduction and diffusion of British liberal institutions and values since the late colonial era and the impact of socioeconomic modernization and demography. This combination of factors has given rise to a healthy civil society dedicated to the establishment of democratic and constitutional principles, on the “premise that an inviolable body of fundamental human rights, coupled with the diffusion of power among different governmental arenas in the federal system would suffice to secure the most important group interests while preserving the overriding integrity of basic individual freedoms” (212). Another positive development is that constitutionalist culture has indeed inhibited the political role of the military, instead of being undermined by it. Nigeria’s commitment to constitutionalism is seen as “a critical national project rather than an Anglo-Saxon ideal” (216). The restoration of civil democratic rule since 1999, especially the relatively successful critical second general elections of 2003, clearly supports this positive assessment in my view. As I am arguing in this book, however, should there be another setback or regression into undemocratic military rule or other dictatorial regime happen in the near future, that should be seen as only a phase in an ongoing process of constructing constitutionalism.