THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIZATION
For the purposes of this chapter, however, the most recent challenge that has to be taken into consideration in analysis of the incremental success of constitutionalism in Nigeria is what might be called the politics of Islamization, as played out in northern Nigerian states since 2000.
Efforts by some twelve northern states within the Federation of Nigeria to enforce Shariʿa as positive state law have attracted a lot of international attention, often in terms of negative media reports and highly critical reaction from human rights organizations about stoning to death as punishment for adultery (zina). But the more serious crisis over this issue is internal to Nigeria itself. While it is not possible to examine the origins and dynamics of the multiple dimensions of this crisis here, I will attempt to highlight the most important contributing factors, analyze the competing claims for the proper interpretation of the Nigerian constitution and the possibility of religious and ethic reconciliation.There seems to be a correlation between ethnic and religious diversity in Nigeria. The north is dominated by Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups, which are predominantly Muslim. In the middle belt states and in the urban centers of the north there are a significant number of Christians. In the southwest the Yoruba ethnic group constitutes the majority, but there is no dominant religion. In the east, the Igbo ethnic group dominates while the Catholics and Methodists are the majority, but many Igbos observe traditional rites and ceremonies. Rough estimates suggest that approximately 50 percent of the population are Muslim, 40 percent is Christian and 10 percent practice exclusively traditional indigenous religions or no religion.
Some observers suggest that the conflicts in Nigeria are artificially constructed or maintained by corrupt elites for selfish ends, and assert that the violence in Nigeria is politically orchestrated by politicians playing on religious fears of the population.
Proponents of the political disorder theory claim that political actors in Africa seek to maximize their returns on the state of confusion, uncertainty and chaos (Chabal and Daloz 1999). Such theories do not, of course, explain why framing the issues in religious terms is a useful strategy for fermenting violence, confusion and chaos, or indicate strategies for mediating the conflict.Another aspect of the causes or dynamics of the crisis over Shariʿa in northern Nigeria relates to competing claims of die various ethnic/religious groups in view of great disagreement over the interpretation of Article 10 of the Nigerian Constitution prohibiting the adoption of an official religion, and Article 38 guaranteeing freedom of religion (Ilesanmi 2001). One view is that the constitution creates a secular state that confines religion to the private realm by erecting a high and impermeable wall between religion and the state. Another view challenges secularism itself as a sort of religion that violates the neutrality of the state in matters of religion and limits the ability of Muslims to fully exercise their beliefs under Shariʿa. There are also those who, while supporting the separation of state and religion, still argue that the government should allow religiously based arguments into politics on the same terms as they admit secularly based arguments (Gutman 1999: 907).
The Constitution of Nigeria provides that states may decide to implement Shariʿa law and courts, though the issue of establishing a Federal Shariʿa Court of Appeal was debated in the constitutional conferences of 1977, 1989, and 1995, without arriving at a clear resolution. Christian Nigerians opposed the Court as a first step toward the Islamization of the country and the repudiation of secularism. As one of the opponents argued, “to entrench the Shariʿa court in the constitution is to legalize the inferiority of non-Muslims and the superiority of the Muslim” (Osaghae 2001: 191).
The proponents of the Shariʿa Court, on the other hand, asserted that “freedom of religion enshrined in the constitution would mean a truncated freedom for the Muslim who is denied Shariʿa” (Osaghae 2001: 192).While the debate continued, Ahmed Sani Yenma, the elected governor of the Zamfara state, declared in October 1999 that Shariʿa law must govern personal and criminal issues in that state. The draft bill for the application of Shariʿa was taken before the House of Assembly, passed into law, and returned to the governor within forty-eight hours. Yenma declared that Shariʿa was adopted “to ensure justice, protection of peoples lives and property and sanctity which cannot be guaranteed without making the Shariʿa our guide” (Osaghae 2001: 192). The law described its purpose as to curb high crime, moral decadence and anti-social behavior. Within two years, 12 states in northern Nigeria adopted Shariʿa law: Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, Kano, Katsina, Kaduna, Jigawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Borno and Gombe.
As to be expected, that development intensified the debate and raised the stakes for both sides. Proponents of the implementation of Shariʿa viewed the law as an exercise of freedom of religion, federalism, and democracy, an assertion and realization of their full identity, while its opponents viewed it as a threat to religious freedom and an instigator of religious intolerance that undermines Nigeria’s secularism. Ayo Adebanjo argued, for instance, “It is clear from what is happening that the North has an agenda to destabilize the nation. And they are doing so because President Olusegun Obasanjo is a southerner and a Christian (Osaghae 2001:191). Obasanjo himself expressed the view that the extended Shariʿa provisions were unconstitutional, but the federal government did not intervene legally to annul the provisions. Conceding that the states have the ability to implement Shariʿa criminal law under Nigerian federalism, the federal government appointed a committee to draft uniform Shariʿa criminal and procedural law that could be adopted by all of the states.
In March 2002, Justice Minister Kanu Agabi made public a letter written to northern governors, which provides that sentences under Shariʿa law should not be harsher than those issued under the general secular law. But it is not clear how that sort of request can be taken seriously when Shariʿa penalties are believed by Muslims to be divinely ordained, and not subject to judicial discretion in sentencing in individual cases.Moreover, the conflict over the imposition of Shariʿa laws has also led to grave violence in which thousands of Muslims and Christians have died in different parts of northern and central states. For example, it is reported that 2,300 people were killed in ethnoreligious violence in the city of Jos within one week in September 2001. Approximately 80 percent of the victims were Hausa Muslims, who constitute the minority in that city. That may indicate an underlying ethnic dimension of the violence emerging in the context of competition over economic resources and broader social tensions. While the advocates of Shariʿa repeatedly promised that it would not be applied to non-Muslims, many of them have been subjected to its provisions and suffered discrimination from that. It is indeed difficult to imagine how such laws can in practice be enforced on Muslims alone when different religious communities are completely integrated, socially and economically, sharing the same services and public facilities, engaging in daily social interaction, and so forth.
For instance, the expansion of Shariʿa in the northern states beyond the traditional field of family law and inheritance has also led to debate on whether punishments such as amputation for theft, stoning for adultery, and flogging for fornication and public drunkenness, constituted torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment, which is prohibited by the Constitution of Nigeria. During 2002, seven men were convicted of stealing and burglary and sentenced to having their hands amputated while numerous criminals were sentenced to public caning for various minor offenses.
There were also several sentences of stoning for women convicted of adultery that year. Moreover, private vigilante groups have sometimes received official state sanction to enforce Shariʿa through extralegal means. It is reported, for instance, that Governor Ahmed Sani vested the local vigilante group with full powers of arrest and prosecution in Zamfara state because he believed that police were not enforcing the Shariʿa laws, just like as Numeiri did in Sudan in 1983, as noted earlier. Governor Saminu Turaki of Jigawa state also mobilized a Shariʿa enforcement committee to arrest, detain, and prosecute Muslim offenders. While these groups are still working to enforce Shariʿa their activities have declined since 2002 (Report 2003).Some commentators present the fundamental issue here in terms of competing rights: what is seen by Muslim supporters as an exercise of their right to self-determination and freedom of religion is perceived by opponents, including some Muslims, as a violation of these same rights (Osaghae 2001: 191). Others have emphasized the dangers of the manner in which Shariʿa was enacted and implemented, especially the fact that these new laws and policies are being carried out by state-sponsored vigilante groups rather than officers of the state. In Kano city, for instance, vigilante groups were responsible for destroying drinking and night spots, and such groups were responsible for arresting individuals for playing music in Katsina state. This aspect of the process not only undermines the legitimacy of the application of Shariʿa and makes objective monitoring and evaluation difficult, but also challenges the fundamental role of the state to ensure the rule of law and protect all citizens against arbitrary violence.
It is therefore remarkable that the federal government of Nigeria has not taken decisive action to settle the underlying constitutional issues raised by the implementation of Shariʿa in the north, especially the prohibition of sponsorship of religion by the state under Article 10 and freedom of religion under Article 38 of the Federal Constitution.
It is important to note that these constitutional provisions are critical for Muslims and non-Muslims alike, throughout the country and not only in the northern states, as members of both groups, and the groups in a collective sense, can suffer serious violation of their rights as equal citizens of their own country. Indeed, since Muslims are hot united in their understanding of Shariʿa, or on the question of whether it should be enforced by the state, Nigerian Muslims can also suffer serious violations of their constitutional rights under an Islamic state. This danger is probably greater in the predominantly Muslim northern states not only for the arbitrary nature of the enforcement of Shariʿa by vigilante groups, but also because of the strong social pressure for conformity with the official position on the matter.Moreover, and in view of the strong connection between religion and ethnicity in Nigeria noted earlier, it is critical for the governments of the northern states and the federal government as the ultimate constitutional authority throughout the country, to safeguard the fundamental rights of all citizens against private as well as official coercion and arbitrary violence. The ethnic dimension of violence over the enforcement of Shariʿa raises the serious risk of civil war, which would undermine, if not totally destroy, the national unity and territorial integrity of the whole country. The economic and social underpinnings of ethnic conflict must be addressed in efforts to mediate the religious expression of those tensions (Falola 1988: 303). As Phillip Aka has argued, a well-tailored program of reconciliation for past inequalities should redress the grievances and concerns of all ethnic groups (Aka 2000). The point I am emphasizing in conclusion of this review of the case of Nigeria is the critical importance of securing the necessary space for debate over such fundamental issues like the local and national consequences of the politics of Islamization in the states of northern Nigeria.