Substantive Result and Post-Constitution­Making Implementation

Ultimately, the text of the final Article 51 remains substantially unchanged. The key phrases of ‘socialist-oriented market economy, ‘multi-forms of ownership and multi-sectors of economic structure’, and ‘the state economic sector plays the lead­ing role’ were all retained.^[1033] A new, final subsection of Article 51 stated,

The State encourages [and] provides favorable conditions for entrepreneurs, enterprises and individuals and other organizations to invest, produce, and do business, contrib­uting to the stable development of the economic branches and national construction.

This was hailed as the first time that ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘enterprises’, as part of the private sectors, were acknowledged in the Constitution for their contributions

State-Owned Enterprises in Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution 289 to Vietnam's economic development.^[1035] It also reiterated an explicit commitment by the Party-State that legal commercial assets are not subject to nationalisa­tion - ostensibly an expression of the Party-State's support for the private sectors and investors' economic rights.^[1036] Overall, while SOE inefficiencies, poor perfor­mance, and preferential treatments that lead to corruption risks were recognised as grave concerns, constitutional drafters appeared to believe that solutions to those problems would be more appropriately dealt with in subsequent implement­ing regulations and guidance, rather than in the amended Constitution. As such, subsequent law and guidance on SOEs play crucial roles in understanding the impact of the new constitutional provisions on SOEs.

Soon after the new 2013 Constitution took effect on 1 January 2014, the Standing Committee of the National Assembly issued Resolution 718/NQ-UBTVQH13 to implement the new Constitution.^[1037] The Resolution mandated the timely revision of laws and regulations at national and local levels to ensure consistency with the new Constitution, named the government bodies in charge, and sketched out a timeline for task completion.^[1038] The Resolution further mandated that laws and regulations relating to the economy, including laws on enterprises, bankruptcy, investment, state budget, investment of state capital, just to name a few, were all subjected to review by the Office of the Government.^[1039] While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the changes in each of these laws and their imple­mentation, it is fair to say the 2013 constitutional-making process has triggered a domino wave of reforms in all aspect of Vietnamese state-market relations.

One clear pragmatic change was manifested through the institutional play­ers most consequential to the management of SOEs.

examine actual institutions such as the SCIC, the Prime Minister soon issued a decree in 2013 that directed the SCIC on divestment of state ownership, thus dras­tically reducing its scope and authority.^[1042] Instead, a new institutional actor, the Commission for Management of State Capital (CMSC) was established in 2018 with equivalent rank to a ministry.^[1043] Charged with representing state ownership in all Vietnamese SOEs, including in SEGs, the CMSC replaces all other govern­ment entities, whether ministries, agencies, and provincial and local People's Committees, as the sole representative of the Vietnamese state with respect to state capital and ownership rights.^[1044] One of its key priorities has been to seek foreign investment into SOEs, including curating a list of industries and firms that foreign investors are allowed to access, and promulgating laws and regulations implement­ing such a process.^[1045]

Dubbed a ‘super committee, the CMSC has been compared to the model of China's State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) - a special commission under the Chinese State Council.^[1046] Acting as the state-affiliated controlling shareholder, SASAC also holds strategic linkages with a number of key Chinese institutional actors, including other business groups, governmental organs, state institutions, and universities, implemented through a personnel appointment and rotation managed jointly by both the Chinese Communist Party and SASAC.^[1047] Unlike its Chinese counterpart, however, at least for now, the CMSC does not appear to have the same level of entrenchment, argu­ably allowing for a public economic sector relatively more untethered from the political apparatus.

VI.