The Expansion of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Various Roles

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, countries in continental Europe and those that followed the Roman-Germanic tradition, in general, witnessed a major paradigm shift with respect to constitutional design and theory: the transition from a legislative rule of law to a constitutional rule of law.^[67] In the old model, the Constitution was understood primarily as a political document, containing rules that could not be directly applied and that therefore depended upon further expansion by the Legislature or the Executive Branch.

The expression constitutional jurisdiction refers to the interpretation and appli­cation of the Constitution by judicial bodies. In the United States and countries that adopt its model of judicial review - such as Brazil - that power is exercised by all judges and courts, with the Supreme Court at the top of the system. The constitu­tional jurisdiction comprises two distinct components. In the first one, the Constitution is directly applied to the situations contemplated within it. For exam­ple, the recognition that a particular power belongs to the federal government instead of the states, or the right to freedom of expression without prior censorship.

From a political and institutional standpoint, the exercise of constitutional juris­diction by supreme courts or constitutional courts around the world involves two types of components: one counter-majoritarian, and the other representative. On one hand, the counter-majoritarian component is one of the most studied themes in constitutional theory, and for many decades has deliberated the democratic legiti­macy of judicial invalidation of acts from the Legislative and Executive Branches. On the other hand, legal scholarship and opinion leaders in general have ignored the representative function. Nonetheless, in some parts of the world, notably in Brazil, this second role has become not only more visible, but, circumstantially, more important. This essay attempts to shed light on this phenomenon, which has, oddly, gone unnoticed, despite being possibly the most important institutional transforma­tion of the last decade.

4.3.1 The Counter-Majoritarian Role of the Supreme Courts

Supreme courts and constitutional courts in general - comprising the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil - conduct judicial review of normative measures, includ­ing those arising from the Legislative Branch and the head of the Executive Branch.

Despite occasional theoretical contention,^[69] this counter-majoritarian role of judi­cial review is almost universally accepted. The democratic legitimacy of the consti­tutional jurisdiction settled on the basis of two main grounds: (a) the protection of fundamental rights, that corresponds to the ethical and justicial minimums of a political community^[70] and are not susceptible to being trampled on by majoritarian political deliberation; and (b) the protection of the rules of democracy and of channels of political participation for all.^[71] Most countries in the world give the Judiciary, and in particular its supreme or constitutional court, a sentinel status against the risk of a tyranny of the majority.^[72] This prevents the oppression of minor­ities and the distortion of the democratic process. Today, there is reasonable con­sensus that the concept of democracy goes beyond the notion of a majority rule, requiring the assimilation of other fundamental values.

One of these core values is the right of every individual to equal concern and respect,^{[73] [74] that is, to be treated with the same dignity of others - which includes hav­ing their interests and opinions taken into account.}

It should be mentioned that, in Brazil, the counter-majoritarian role of the Supreme Court has been exercised, as it is proper, with self-restraint. In fact, in situ­ations in which neither fundamental rights nor preconditions of democracy are at stake, the Court has been deferential to the reasonable discretion of the Legislative and Executive branches. For this very reason, the number of federal law provisions effectively declared unconstitutional under the 1988 Constitution is relatively low.^[75] Admittedly, in what amounts to a Brazilian singularity, there are some precedents in which constitutional amendment provisions were declared invalid by the Supreme Court.^[76] But, again, there is nothing of special significance, in quantity or quality. In some emblematic cases of adjudication of political decisions - such as the legiti­macy or not of embryonic stem cell research, the validity or not of federal law pro­viding affirmative action measures destined to improve the access of Afro-Brazilians to universities, and the constitutionality of the Presidential Decree which demar­cated a large area of the state of Roraima as indigenous reservation - the Court’s opinions, in each, favored self-restraint and worked to preserve decisions already made by Congress or by the President.

So far, this work has focused on justifying the democratic legitimacy of the counter-majoritarian role carried out by the constitutional jurisdiction, and demon­strating that there is no equivalence between the concept of democracy and the majoritarian principle. Before examining the issue of the representative function of the supreme courts and presenting its conclusion, this essay shall confront a world- widely complex and sensitive issue, embodied in the following question: to what extent can it be said, without clinging to a fiction or a disconnected idealization of facts, that legislative acts correspond effectively to the will of the majority?

4.3.2 The Crisis of Political Representation

For many decades, throughout the democratic world, the discourse about the crises of parliaments and the difficulties of political representation has been recurrent. From Scandinavia to Latin America, a mixture of skepticism, indifference, and dis­satisfaction marks the relationship between civil society and politicians. In coun­tries where voting is not compulsory, abstention rates reveal a general disinterest in participation in the political process. In countries with compulsory voting, such as Brazil, a very low percentage of voters are able to remember whom they voted for in the last parliamentary elections. Dysfunctionality, corruption, and over-influence of private interests are issues globally associated with political activity. And, despite this, in any democratic state, politics are an essential. Nevertheless, the current shortcomings of representative democracy are too obvious to ignore.

The inevitable consequence of a representative system is the risk of an inade­quate expression of the majoritarian will of the people. As stated, the phenomenon is universal to some extent. In the United States, whose domestic politics have global visibility, excesses in political campaign financing, infiltration of religion into the public arena, and the radicalization of some partisan discourses have degen­erated the public debate and pushed ordinary citizens away.

This crisis of legitimacy, representativeness, and functionality of Parliaments generated as a first consequence, in different parts of the world, an invigoration of the Executive branch. In recent years, however, and especially in Brazil, there has been an expansion of the Judiciary and, notably, the Federal Supreme Court. In a curious paradox, the fact is that in many situations judges and courts have become more representative of aspirations and social demands than traditional political institutions. It is strange, but we live in an era in which society relates more with its judges than with its parliamentarians. Take the following illustration: when the Brazilian National Congress sanctioned research with embryonic stem cells, the issue went unnoticed. When the law was challenged in the Brazilian Supreme Court, it led to a national debate. It is imperative to seek a better understanding of this phenomenon, explore any positive potential it may have, and remedy the distortion it represents. Constitutional theory has not yet analytically elaborated the subject, despite the inevitable conclusion that democracy no longer flows exclusively through its traditionally legitimized vectors.

4.3.3 The Representative Role of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court

Le grand art en politique, ce n’est pas d'entendre ceux qui parlent, Cest d'entendre ceux qui se taisent.^[78] Etienne Lamy

To this point, this essay seeks to emphasize the substantiation of the concept of democracy, which, in addition to not fully corresponding with the majority princi­ple, has searched for new mechanisms of expression. One of these has been the transfer of political power - including some degree of judicial lawmaking - to bod­ies such as the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. This section explores this phenom­enon, both in its internal dynamics and in its causes and consequences. In the contemporary institutional arrangement, which presents a confluence between rep­resentative democracy and deliberative democracy,^[79] the exercise of power and authority is legitimized by votes and arguments. There is no doubt that the tradi­tional model of separation of powers, designed in the nineteenth century and which survived the twentieth century, no longer has breadth to justify, to the fullest extent, the structure and functioning of contemporary constitutionalism. To use a cliche, parodying Antonio Gramsci, we live in a time in which the old is dead and the new is yet to be born.^[80]

A brief clarification is called for at this point. Many advocates of the idea of deliberative democracy defend a modest role for constitutional jurisdiction,^[81] urging constitutional courts to adopt an attitude of self-restraint in cases involving substan­tive matters. Some of them emphasize that the role of constitutional jurisdiction is justified only when it is directed to ensuring equal conditions for a democratic delib­eration.^[82] However, one cannot detach the contours of deliberative democracy and of the role of supreme courts from the specific social and political contexts where they will be playing their parts. In Brazil, for example, a persistent crisis involving the legitimacy, representativeness and effectiveness of legislatures and majoritarian politics has elevated the Supreme Court to the center stage of public debate con­cerning certain sensitive matters. Of course, there are problems and difficulties associated with this phenomenon, but they will not be addressed in this essay. The point that I will be making here is that the Brazilian Supreme Court, combining moments of self-restraint with others of more expansive constitutional intervention, coupled with an intense and continuous interaction with civil society, has acted in favor, and not to the detriment of, the idea and practice of deliberative democracy.

The doctrine of the counter-majoritarian difficulty, previously studied, is based on the premise that the decisions of elected bodies such as the Brazilian National Congress would always express the will of the majority. As well, conversely, a judgment given by a Supreme Court, whose members are not elected, would never do so. Any empirical study discredits these two propositions. For numerous rea­sons, the Legislature does not always express the sentiment of the majority.^[83] Besides the already mentioned democratic deficit resulting from the failures in the electoral and political party systems, it is possible to point out some others. Firstly, parliamentary minorities can act as veto players,^[84] blocking the adoption of the will of the parliamentary majority. In other cases, the self-interest of the legislative body pulls it towards decisions that frustrate the popular sentiment. In addition, legisla­tures around the world are subject to possible capture by special interests - a euphe­mistic term that identifies the accommodation of the interests of certain influential political or economic agents, even when in conflict with the collective interest.^[85]

For many reasons, it is not unusual or surprising that the Judiciary, in certain contexts, is the best interpreter of the majority sentiment. I will start with one that is less explored by legal scholarship in general, but particularly significant in Brazil. In Brazil, judges are recruited in the first instance by official public entrance exams. This means that people from all social backgrounds, provided they have attended a law school and have devoted themselves to systematic and diligent study, can join the Judiciary. This state of affairs has led, over the years, to a drastic democratiza­tion of the Judiciary. However, access to a seat in Congress still involves high finan­cial costs, which often requires a candidate to seek funding and partnerships with different economic and business players. This fact produces an inevitable alliance with specific interests. For this reason, in some circumstances, judges are able to represent better - or at least more independently - the will of society. One could counter that this argument is not valid for the members of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. However, virtually all the members of the Court have come from legal professions in which entrance occurs by competitive official public exams.^[86]

There are several other reasons in addition to this one. First, judges have the guarantee of lifelong tenure. As a consequence, they are not subject to the short­term tribulations of electoral politics, nor, at least in principle, to populist tempta­tions. A second reason is that the courts can only act on the initiative of the parties: lawsuits cannot be brought ex officio, that is, from the bench. Moreover, judges and courts cannot judge beyond what has been asked, and have a duty to hear all con­cerned parties. In the case of the Federal Supreme Court, in Brazil, in addition to the mandatory participation of the Head of the Prosecutor’s Office and the Solicitor General in several lawsuits, it is possible to convene public hearings and accept amici curiae briefs. Last but not least, judicial decisions must be motivated. This means that, to be valid, these decisions can never be an act of pure discretionary will: the legal system imposes on judges of all levels the duty to present reasons, that is, the grounds and arguments of his reasoning and persuasion.

This last point warrants a closer look. In a traditional and purely majoritarian view, democracy would correspond to an electoral legitimation of power. According to this criterion, fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany could be seen as demo­cratic, at least at the time they were installed into power and the period in which they had support of the majority of the people. In fact, according to this last crite­rion, even the Medici administration, at the height of the military regime in Brazil, would pass the test. This is a problematic thesis. In addition to being sworn into office, power is legitimized, too, by actions and intended purposes.^[87] Returning to the idea of deliberative democracy, which is, precisely, based on a discursive legiti­macy : political decisions should be preceded by free, ample and open public debate, after which the reasons for the choices then made should be provided. That is why it has been said earlier that contemporary democracy is made of votes and argu­ments. An important insight in this area is provided by the German legal philoso­pher Robert Alexy, who referred to constitutional courts as an argumentative representative of society. According to his view, the only way to reconcile the con­stitutional jurisdiction to democracy is to conceive it, too, as popular representation. Rational people are able to accept solid and correct arguments. Democratic consti­tutionalism has a discursive legitimacy, which is the process of the institutionaliza­tion of reason and righteousness (2005b, 278 ff).

A few additional comments are in order. The first one is of a terminological character. If the thesis that representative bodies may not reflect the majority will is to be accepted, a judicial order that invalidates an act of Congress may not be counter-majoritarian. What it will invariably be is counter-representative,^[88] seeing that the parliament is the body par excellence of popular representation. However, the assertion made above that judges are less susceptible to populist temptations does deserve a counterpoint. It must not be taken for granted that judges are immune to this dysfunction. Especially in an era of televised trials,^[89] with intensive press coverage and repercussions in public opinion, an impulse to please the audience is a risk that cannot be discarded. But I think that any impartial observer can bear wit­ness that this is not the rule. Another risk is that judges in Brazil pass arduous and competitive official entrance exams that require long preparation, only after this process becoming qualified public servants. This may bring about the pretense temptation to superimpose a certain judicial rationality to the circumstances of the other Powers, governed by logics often more complex and less Cartesian. Even so, judicial arrogance is as bad as any other, and it is to be avoided.

The fact that judges are not subject to certain vicissitudes that affect the two political branches is not, of course, a guarantee that the supreme courts will lean in favor of a society’s majority view. The truth, however, is that a careful observation of reality reveals that this is exactly what happens. In the United States, decades of empirical studies demonstrate this point.^[90] The same is true in Brazil. In two rele­vant decisions, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court upheld a ban on nepotism in the three branches of government,^[91] in clear alignment with the demands of society regarding administrative morality. The thesis then defeated was that only the Legislature could impose such restrictions.^[92] The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court also answered to the social desire for judicial reform, despite resistance from other sectors of the Judiciary,^[93] when examining the legitimacy of the creation of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) as a body devoted to judicial oversight, and when affirming the concurrent jurisdiction of the Council to initiate disciplinary proceed­ings against judges.

With regard to political partisan loyalty, the position of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court was even bolder, establishing the loss of mandate by any member of Congress that changes parties.^[94] Although it suffered criticism for excessive activ­ism, it is beyond doubt that the decision fulfilled a social demand that had remained unanswered by Congress. Another example: in an ongoing lawsuit, in which the legitimacy or not of political campaign contributions from corporations is being examined, the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, clearly reflecting the majority sen­timent, has signaled for a reduction in the influence of money in the electoral pro­cess.^[95] The Court is performing, in slices, incompletely, and without the possibility of systematization, the political reform that society calls for.

In addition to the purely representative role, supreme courts occasionally play the role of an enlightened vanguard, in charge of pushing History forward when it stalls. This is a dangerous power, to be exercised with great parsimony, because of the democratic risk it represents, and so that the constitutional courts do not become hegemonic. But, once in a while, the court can indeed play that indispensable role. In the United States, it was through a pivotal move by the Supreme Court that the illegitimacy of racial segregation in public schools was declared, in Brown v. Board of Education.^[96] In South Africa, it fell to the Constitutional Court to abolish the death penalty.^[97] In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court had the final word on the validity of the criminalization of Holocaust denial.^[98] The Israeli Supreme Court reaffirmed the absolute prohibition of torture, even in the interrogation of suspected terrorists, in a war-torn social environment that had become lenient with this practice.^[99]

In Brazil, the Federal Supreme Court granted equal status between same-sex unions and conventional common-law unions, paving the way for marriage between same-sex couples.^[100] It was perhaps not a majority position in society, but the protec­tion of a fundamental right to equality granted legitimacy to the decision. The same happened to the decision permitting the termination of pregnancies involving anen- cephalic fetuses.^[101] These are emblematic examples of the enlightened role of the constitutional jurisdiction. In these two specific cases, a phenomenon drew special attention. Due to the controversial nature of the two subjects, a significant number of scholars stood against the decisions - “not because they were against its sub­stance, absolutely not.” - but because they believed the matter fell within the power of the Legislature, not the Supreme Court. However, as there were funda­mental rights at stake, this was a problematic position. It contrasts the formal prin­ciple of democracy - the political majorities are entitled to decide - to the material principles of equality and human dignity, favoring the former in both cases.^[102] It put procedure above outcomes, which does not seem the best prioritization.^[103]

Sometimes, there occurs a reaction to the type or mode of progress proposed by the Supreme Court - a backlash. A paradigmatic legislative backlash occurred in response to the Furman v. Georgia^[104] case in 1972, in which the United States Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional as then applied in 39 States. The underlying principle of the decision was that juries in criminal trials lacked uniformity in the application of the death penalty, and that it was dispropor­tionately applied against minorities. By 1976, however, most states had adopted new death penalty laws, bypassing the decision of the Court. In Gregg v. Georgia,^[105] the United States Supreme Court upheld the validity of the new version of that State’s criminal law. Also, in Roe v. Wade,^[106] the famous decision that decriminal­ized abortion, the reaction was enormous, radically dividing public opinion.^[107] In Brazil, there are few cases of normative reaction to decisions of the Federal Supreme Court. Some examples are the decisions regarding the privileged forum for cases involving certain authorities,^[108] municipal taxes for street lighting,^[109] progressive rates for property taxes in urban areas,^[110] collection of contributions from beneficia­ries of social security,^[111] and the definition of the number of municipal councilors.^[112]

There are several decisions from the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court that con­tribute to social progress in Brazil, and that can be presented in support of the thesis advocated for throughout this work, especially in regards to the importance of the democratic role of the constitutional jurisdiction. They all fall within the realm of constitutional law, but also have an impact on other branches of law, as outlined below:

Civil law : ban on imprisonment due to the breach of duty of a depository, recogniz­ing the effectiveness and prevalence of the Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica over national law.

Criminal Law: declaration of unconstitutionality on the ban on the downgrading to the most favorable incarceration conditions in prison sentences involving cases of drug trafficking and other offenses considered heinous.

Administrative law: proscription of nepotism in the three Powers.

Right to health: imposition on the public healthcare system a duty to offer free medication for the treatment of HIV-positive patients in financial need.

Right to education: recognition of the governmental duty to effectively realize the right to early childhood education, therein including access to day care and pre­school opportunities.

Political rights: ban on unimpeded change of political party after election, under penalty of disqualification from office for violation of the democratic principle.

Rights of public servants: regulation, through the decision on a writ of injunction, of the right to strike of public servants and employees.

Rights of people with disabilities: recognition of a right to free use of the interstate public transportation system by people with disabilities, proven in need.

Protection of social and religious minorities:

(i) Religious minorities: recognition that freedom of expression does not pro­tect manifestations of racism, which also comprises anti-Semitism.

(ii) Racial minorities: assertion of the constitutionality of affirmative action measures in favor of blacks, mixed-race and indigenous people.

(iii) Same-sex couples: equalization of the rights of same-sex partners in stable unions to those of conventional common law unions and right to civil marriage.

(iv) Indigenous communities: demarcation of the Raposa Serra do Sol indige­nous reservation as a contiguous area.

Freedom of scientific research: declaration of the constitutionality of embryonic stem cells.

Women"s rights: recognition of the right to the therapeutic anticipation of delivery in case of anencephalic fetuses; declaration of the constitutionality of the Maria da Penha Law, which provides for severe punishment of domestic violence against women.

Three comments before concluding. First, the constitutional jurisdiction, as this essay has tried to demonstrate, has served the country well. As well, the concern about abuse by judges and courts is not without merit, and one must be prepared to prevent its occurrence.^[113] However, in the real world, only a very limited number of decisions by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court can be said to have arguably gone beyond what is acceptable. And in the few cases in which this occurred, the Court itself undertook to rectify the situation.^[114] Therefore, the democratic and civilizing potential of a constitutional court should not be overlooked on the basis of imagi­nary fear. Criticism of Brazilian Federal Supreme Court decisions, both desirable and legitimate in a pluralistic and open society, usually comes from either those dissatisfied with specific results or from a certain niche minority within academia, which operates on different theoretical assumptions from those stated herein. Moreover, it is befitting to propose a crucial question^[115]: Why is the argument that constitutional jurisdiction acts in undemocratic patterns not accompanied by a pop­ular dissatisfaction with the role played by the Supreme Court? How to reconcile that the very opposite is indeed the case: in Brazil and abroad, the approval ratings of the constitutional courts are often well above those enjoyed by the legislatures.^[116] Most certainly, this should not lead to hasty or overly broad conclusions. However, a criticism that is anchored on a formal vision of democracy, but without a people, should not impress.

The second comment is intuitive. As stated several times already, as a rule, polit­ical decisions should be taken by those who indeed receive votes. Therefore, the Legislature and the head of the Executive branch have a prima facie general prefer­ence in dealing with all matters of interest for the Government and society. And, when they have acted, the courts must be deferential toward the legislative or administrative choices made by public officials legitimated by popular vote. The constitutional jurisdiction should only be imposed in such cases if the opposition to the Constitution is clear, or if an offense to fundamental rights or to the rule of law has taken place. However, as the reader will have intuited so far, the constitutional jurisdiction plays a greater role when the Legislature has remained silent. It is in the normative gaps or unconstitutional omissions that the Supreme Court assumes an incidental leading role. As a result, in the end, it is the Congress itself that holds the final decision, including on the appropriate level of judicialization of life.

In a third note before concluding this essay, it is worth incidentally pointing out a phenomenon known by legal scholarship as constitutional dialogue, or institu­tional dialogue.^[117] Even though the constitutional court or supreme court is the final interpreter of the Constitution in each case, three noteworthy concepts can subvert or mitigate this condition, namely: (a) the interpretation of the Court can be over­come by an act of the Parliament or Congress, usually by constitutional amendment; (b) the Court may return the matter to the Legislature, setting a deadline for resolu­tion; or (c) the Court may urge the Legislature to act, resorting to the so-called “appeal to the legislator.” In the Brazilian experience there are many precedents that fall under the first hypothesis, as is the case of the wage cap for public servants,^[118] and the calculation basis for social security contributions,^[119] in addition to the others already mentioned earlier in this section.

In regards to the second concept for such dialogue, a court-set deadline for Congress to legislate, there are already precedents in Brazil in regards to the cre­ation of Municipalities^[120] and the reformulation of the criteria adopted in the system of distribution of funds to the States (the State Participation Fund or Fundo de Participates dos Estados).^[121] However, compliance within the period determined by the court is not always achieved. Finally, with respect to the third concept in constitutional dialogue, already this was the understanding for many years in the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court case law on the writ of injunction.^[122] A very sig­nificant case of informal institutional dialogue took place with respect to art. 7, I, of the Constitution, which provides for the enactment of a supplementary law regulat­ing the discipline of compensatory damages against dismissal without cause or arbi­trary dismissal of a worker. In deciding the injunction, the plenary of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court ruled that the court itself would set the indemnity criteria, in view of the more than two decades of failure by the Brazilian Congress to do so.^[123] Given this new provocation, the Congress passed in record time Law 12.506 (2011), regulating the matter.

More recently, two instances of institutional dialogue took place. When deciding a criminal case against a Senator of the Republic, the Federal Supreme Court, by a tight majority vote, interpreted a specific provision of the Constitution (art. 55, VI, §2) so as to confer to the Legislature - not to the Court - the power to strip the man­date of a member of the Congress declared guilty of a crime.^[124] The Justices that withheld the majority opinion stressed their severe criticism of the scheme imposed by the Constitution, urging Congress to revisit the topic.^[125] Shortly after the decision, the Federal Senate approved a Constitutional Amendment Bill overcoming the unsatisfactory treatment of the matter. In late 2015, the bill was still pending before the House. In another case, a federal deputy was sentenced to more than 13 years in prison, to be served initially in closed facilities (which means the prisoner is not allowed to work outside the prison system).^[126] Once the issue of his loss of mandate was submitted to the House of Representatives, the majority decided not to revoke it. In writ of mandamus filed against this decision, an injunction was granted by the Justice presiding over the case, on the grounds that in cases of incarceration in closed conditions, the loss of mandate should occur by declaration of the House’s leadership, and not by a political decision of the Plenary.^[127] Before the judgment on the merit of the writ of mandamus, the House of Representatives abolished the pro­vision of a secret ballot on the matter, and decided in favor of the loss of mandate.

What can be drawn from that final note is that the current model cannot be char­acterized as judicial supremacy. The Brazilian Federal Supreme Court has the pre­rogative to be the ultimate interpreter of the law, in cases that are submitted to its examination, but it does not own the Constitution. Much to the contrary, the mean­ing and scope of constitutional norms are set in interaction with society, with the other Powers and with institutions in general. A loss of dialogue with society, the potential inability to justify its decisions or to be understood, would undercut com­pliance with and legitimacy by the Court. Moreover, any claim of hegemony over the other branches would subject the Court to a change in its institutional design, or to the overruling of precedent by constitutional amendment, powers which belong to the Brazilian National Congress. Therefore, the power of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court has clear limits. In institutional life, as in life in general, no one is too good and, above all, no one is good alone.

4.4