Conclusion

The decades that followed the end of World War II witnessed a vertiginous institu­tional rise of the Judiciary and constitutional jurisdiction. It would not be an exag­geration to state that the American model of constitutionalism prevailed in many parts of the world, with its features of centrality of the Constitution, judicial review, and judicialization of disputes involving fundamental rights.

As can be clearly seen, I am an advocate of constitutional jurisdiction. To my credit, I held this position long before I became a constitutional judge. I think it plays a very important role even in mature democracies such as the United States, Germany, or Canada. But I consider it even more important in countries that have experienced recent re-democratization, or of late democratization. In these coun­tries, as is common, the majoritarian political process cannot fully meet the social demands, due to historical distortions in the distribution of power and wealth. Certainly, one should not live under the illusion that the Judiciary is immune to these distortions. However, circumstances associated with the way by which judges enter into their judgeships, their institutional guarantees, and the type of relation­ship they have with society (which is not linked to votes or short-term goals) enhances their suitability for the use of reason and the protection of fundamental rights. For sure, the essential condition is that they can escape ordinary politics - as has been, fortunately, the case in Brazil.