The Indian Constitution and Universal Franchise

Remarkably, however, the Indian Constitution contained within it one provi­sion that ran counter to the dominant discourse of justice as equity on which it was grounded: universal adult franchise based on the idea of the freedom of the individual as a citizen.

The Indian Constitution, therefore, carried a conflict at its very heart: the discourse of imperial justice as equity as a discourse of governance that was anchored in the figure of the monarch and directed to the groups or communities on the one hand, and the democratic electoral polity with universal adult fran­chise based on individual freedom of the citizen. Even as the discourse of justice as equity grounded on the representation of communities came to anchor the polity at large, the principle of universal suffrage based on the representation of the individual as a citizen rejected the colonial notions of separate electorates and communal representation. It was as if Indians could become citizen individuals and, as such, equal irrespective of the communities they belonged to only during elections. Moreover, while the discourse of governance based on the idea ofjustice as equity assumed the presence of a monarch as the sovereign figure who would render impartial justice between communities, the necessity of five year national elections assumed the sovereignty of the people.

The crucial question that arises is, what was at the origin of this contradic­tion at the heart of the Indian Constitution? It is important to note at the very outset that the debates in the Indian Constituent Assembly between 1946 and 1949 reflect a marked absence of enthusiasm in the majority of the members towards the idea of universal adult franchise. Strikingly, universal franchise was not part of the aims and objectives discussion in the Constituent Assembly. Indeed, even the term democracy was left out of the discussion and only included later in the draft Preamble. The attempt by Ambedkar to include universal adult franchise in the chapter on fundamental rights was rejected by the draft committee and left for inclusion ‘in some other part of the constitution’. Ultimately, it was grafted on to the Constitution towards the end of the document as Article 326 of Part XV - this too on the initiative of Ambedkar.^[1322]

The decision by the Constituent Assembly not to ratify the draft constitution on the basis of adult suffrage is another reflection of the opposition of a major­ity of the members to the idea of the direct participation of the people of India in constitutional decision-making. In contrast to France and America, where, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, ‘Articles of Confederacy [were] debated, clause by clause, in the town-hall meetings and, later, the state congresses',^[1323] in India, the Constitution was not ratified. Also significantly, all devices of direct democ­racy such as the Referendum, Recall, or Initiative were meticulously avoided in the Indian Constitution.^[1324] As Khushal Talaksi Shah, one of the members of the Constituent Assembly expressed it:

The excuse that has been given is that we are not yet ready for such methods of working democracy in all its fullness.... Had we accepted the suggestion of the British that the people of India were not educated enough and aware enough of their rights and obliga­tions to be able to work a democratic Government of their own, we should never even now have obtained our independence..^[1325]

The ambivalence on the part of a majority of the Constitution-framers for the idea and practice of universal franchise can be explained by the fact that the conflict at the heart of the Indian Constitution was the result of two competing historical legacies that framed it.

The recognition of universal suffrage by the Constitution-framers was not a proof of their magnanimity, as is often assumed, but rather of their limit. The power of democracy was too strong for the Constitution-makers to deny the people the right to universal adult franchise.^[1326] Significantly, it was Ambedkar, the leader of one of the most important democratic movements for rights, who was the strongest advocate of universal franchise in the Constitution.^[1327]

VI.