Criticizing Rawls III: The status of the two principles
A second kind of objection to Rawls' theory focuses, as I have said, on the question of why the fact that the two principles could be derived in this sort of way would show that they were justified.
We posed a similar problem to Hobbes' theory when we asked why the fact that we would have accepted certain arrangements in the state of nature should bind us now. As we saw, there were two main reasons why Hobbes was unable to reply with “Because you ought to keep your word.” One was that we didn’t give our word. The other was that there was no reason to think a purely self-interested person would be impressed by the claim that promises are binding—and Hobbes rules out appeal to moral principles in the state of nature, anyway.But, unlike Hobbes, Rawls is free to make appeal to moral ideas in defense of his principles; in fact, he offers two sorts of reason for thinking that the fact that the two principles would be chosen in the bargaining game is an argument in favor of them. One is a moral reason, which depends on a conception of a fair bargain:
Since everyone’s well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated.
The less well situated will quite reasonably refuse to cooperate if they think the way in which resources are allocated in the society is unfair. So only a system where the costs are fairly distributed is morally appealing. But, as Robert Nozick has pointed out, if we examine the way the deal looks from the point of view of the better situated, we may wonder whether the two principles really do reflect a fair deal.
Nozick imagines the less well situated (or, as he says, “endowed”) making their pitch:“Look, better endowed: you gain by cooperating with us. If you want our cooperation you’ll have to accept reasonable terms. We suggest these terms: We’ll cooperate with you only if we get as much as possible. That is, the terms of our cooperation should give us that maximal share such that, if it was tried to give us more, we’d end up with less.”
Nozick points out that if it is fair for the least well-off to argue like this, it would seem to be fair for the better-endowed to do likewise. But that would lead to a radically different arrangement from the one suggested by Rawls. On this scheme, we should allow an increase in wages for the poorest only if it benefited the richest: and that sounds not like justice but like exploitation!
Indeed, the very words that the worse-endowed have to utter sound not so much like the offer of a fair-minded person as the threats of a blackmailer: “We can spoil the whole system,” the worse-endowed are saying, “so if we don’t get everything we can, we'll bring down the whole house of cards.” Rawls' argument here is unconvincing.
A second way to try to justify the principles—a way we considered in the case of Hobbes—is to argue that they are principles you would choose if you were having to decide what principles to accept in getting out of the state of nature. I said about Hobbes that this argument seemed simply unsound: I, at least, would not choose Hobbes' potentially tyrannical sovereign over the life of the Mbuti pygmies. But the reason why this sort of argument will not work for Rawls is rather different.
In the original position we are behind a veil of ignorance, which deprives us of knowledge of our own goals and our relative positions.
In a certain sense, the veil of ignorance eliminates everything that makes me distinctive. Rawls cannot say that I would have chosen the two principles in the original position, because the veil of ignorance wipes me out. The fact that someone like me in the original position would choose a certain set of principles for regulating society gives me no special reason to like those principles, for that person doesn't know enough about me to take my interests properly into account. class=a2 style='text-indent:18.0pt'>It is a good thing, therefore, that Rawls does not offer the argument that we would choose the two principles if we were getting out of the state of nature. The reason why he doesn't is that his official explanation of the role of the original position is very different from Hobbes' discussions of the meetings in the assembly that gathers in the state of nature to institute the commonwealth.6.10