The Side-Effect Effect
Sometimes people's intuitions about whether a particular action has been performed intentionally or unintentionally are influenced by normative considerations. That is, sometimes when people are evaluating whether or not a given action has been performed intentionally, their judgments are influenced by their beliefs about whether the action (or the outcome of that action) was morally good or morally bad.
This seems to be particularly clear when we consider cases involving foreseen side effects. (An outcome is a foreseen side effect just in case an agent performs an action that she foresees will bring about the outcome but doesn't perform the action for the purpose of trying to bring it about.) Consider, for example, the following pair of vignettes:Environmental Harm:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don't care at all about harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was harmed.
Environmental Help:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help the environment.” The chairman of the board answered, “I don't care at all about helping the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's start the new program.” They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped.
In one of the most famous findings in experimental philosophy, Joshua Knobe (2003a) found that most people asked to consider the Environmental Harm case judge that the chairman intentionally harmed the environment, while most people asked to consider the Environmental Help case judge that the chairman did not intentionally help the environment.2 It seems that people are considerably more inclined to judge that an agent brought about a side effect intentionally when they regard that side effect as morally bad than when they regard it as morally good.
This provides evidence for the view that people's beliefs about the moral status of an action (or the outcome of that action) influence their intuitions about whether or not the action was performed intentionally.The apparent influence of moral considerations on people's intentionality judgments is not limited to cases involving side effects. The same influence appears to be found, for example, in cases involving agents who are trying to bring about a certain outcome but lack the skill necessary in order to reliably bring it about. Again, let's consider a pair of vignettes:
No Skill/Positive Outcome:
Jake desperately wants to win the rifle contest. He knows that he will only win the contest if he hits the bull's-eye. He raises the rifle, gets the bull's-eye in the sights, and presses the trigger. But, Jake isn't very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild.... Nonetheless, the bullet lands directly on the bull's-eye. Jake wins the contest.
No Skill/Immoral Outcome:
Jake desperately wants to have more money. He knows that he will inherit a lot of money when his aunt dies. One day, he sees his aunt walking by the window. He raises his rifle, gets her in the sights, and presses the trigger. But, Jake isn't very good at using his rifle. His hand slips on the barrel of the gun, and the shot goes wild... Nonetheless, the bullet hits her directly in the heart. She dies instantly.
Knobe (2003b) found that most people asked to consider the No Skill/Immoral Outcome case judge that Jake intentionally hit his aunt, while most people asked to consider the No Skill/Positive Outcome case judge that Jake did not intentionally hit the bull's-eye.3 It seems that people are considerably more inclined to judge that an agent brought about an outcome intentionally when they regard that outcome as morally bad than when they regard it as morally neutral.
Again, this provides evidence for the view that people's beliefs about the moral status of an action (or the outcome of that action) influence their intuitions about whether or not the action was performed intentionally.The studies just examined indicate that people's moral judgments can influence their intuitions about whether or not an action has been performed intentionally. But, what does this mean? Two explanations have dominated the landscape. According to the first explanation, these results tell us something about the relationship between moral judgments and people's use of the word ‘intentional' and are best explained in terms of specific features of the underlying mechanisms responsible for our linguistic practices (see, e.g., Adams & Steadman 2004a, 2004b). According to the second explanation, these results tell us something very specific about the relationship between moral judgments and people's concept of intentional action and are best explained in terms of specific features of the underlying mechanism responsible for people's judgments about intentional action (see, e.g., Knobe 2003a, 2006, Nadelhoffer 2004a, 2004b, 2006b, Nichols & Ulatowski 2007, and Machery 2008).4 Let's take each of these explanations in turn.
3.