Alexander J.. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press,2021. � 186 p.. 2021

We ask philosophical intuitions - what we would say or how things seem to us to be - to do a lot of work for us. We advance philosophical theories on the basis of their ability to explain our philosophical intuitions, defend their truth on the basis of their overall agreement with our philosophical intuitions, and justify our philosophical beliefs on the basis of their accordance with our philosophical intuitions. This may not be all that we do and maybe not all of us do it. But enough of us do it, and often enough, that this way of thinking about philosophy has come, at least in certain circles, to be the way to think about philosophy.

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Contents

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Experimental Philosophy: Setting the Scene

A Note on Scope and Coverage

An Issue Set Aside

Philosophical Intuitions

George Bealer does it. Roderick Chisholm does it a lot. Most philosophers do it openly and Unapologetically, and the rest arguably do it too, although some of them would deny it. What they all do is appeal to intuitions in constructing, shaping, and refining their philosophical views. Hilary Kornblith (1998)

Introduction

Intuitions and Philosophical Practice

Philosophical Intuitions

Conclusion

Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Analysis

Introduction

Experimental Philosophy, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Experimental Philosophy and Epistemology

Conclusion

Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophy of Mind

Introduction

The Side-Effect Effect