Inde
absolute growth convergence, 188
ACC. See average cost of capital (ACC) Acemoglu, Daron, 188«
Acharya, Viral, 143
Admati, Anat, 3, 4-5, 22-23, 53-54, 116, 118-19
bank equity capital recommendation, 115
Afonso, Gara, 10, 140-41
aggregate output floor, 211 aggregate production function approach, 129, 150«
AIG, 137, 159, 213
support for, 158
Ally Financial, 65«
almost ideal (AI) demand system approach, for estimating utility-maximizing profit, 145
AmTrust, 154«
Angelini, Paolo, 48
Anginer, Deniz, 143
Araten, M., 144
arbitrage, 72
vs.
optimization, 59Arcand, Jean-Louis, 178, 182, 183«, 194 reply to, 201-04
Ashcraft, Adam A., 10, 135 assets, opacity in valuation, 165
AT1 bonds, of Deutsche Bank, 173
Australia
output loss estimates from banking crises, 93t
private credit and GDP, 186
Austria, output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
available stable funding, categories, 18« average bank lending rates, and TLAC liabilities, 150
average capital cost, with no M&M effect, 68
average cost of capital (ACC), 59-60, 71-72, 103-06
demonstrating constant, in M&M, 75-76 implications of bank capital requirements increase, 66-69 average return on equity, 29 Avgouleas, Emilios, 161
Bagehot, Walter, 138
bail-in
enforcing, 161
shift to forced, 207
bail-in securities, 149
bank bailouts, limiting taxpayer costs for future, 133
bank betas, 81 bank capital
benefits, 124
problems with estimates of, 126-27 benefits and costs of additional, 111/ requirements
costs of increasing, 77
implication of increase for average cost of capital, 66-69
output cost to economy from, 106 bank debt, reducing, and interest rate decline, 50-51
bank equity capital, optimal amount, 205 Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 126, 178, 210
report on costs and benefits estimates of TLAC, 149-51
bank holding companies
funding costs for larger, 143 surveillance of affiliated banks, 135 bank lending rates
average, and TLAC liabilities, 150 in US and euro area, 78/
bank leverage ratio, beta as function of, 58 bank net incomes, distribution relative to assets, 64/
Bank of America, 155, 158, 159
fines, 166
and Merrill Lynch, 137
stress test, 19 n
Bank of England, 16, 35-36, 142 optimal capital ratio evaluation, 33 review estimating TBTF subsidy, 138
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive of April 2014, 161
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, Single Resolution Mechanism, 17 bank regulatory requirements, for assessment for TLAC, 22
bank stress, 207 banking crises
annual probability, 97-98
banking capital requirements and reduction, 87
costs
long-term, 8, 207-08
modeling of, 22
damage from, 4
optimal capital ratios and, 110 losses, 92t
annual, as percent of GDP, 98 calculating, 88-103, 90/
long-term, 89-91 long-term in UK, 37-38 present value of loss, 31, 33, 108, 115 probability
of avoiding, as function of capital/ risk-weighted assets, 125/ as function of bank capital/risk- weighted assets, 126-27, 127/ and level of capital, 117 reduced, 121
banking crisis in 2008-09, 205.
See also financial crisis of 2007-09Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive, 207
banking sector, 1 banks
bankruptcy of large, 118 borrowing cost for, 69-70 debt/equity characteristics of, 55 economies of scale in, 10 large vs. small, 212 living wills for, 1 minimum capital requirements, 53 and nonfinancial sector, 55-57 real interest rate paid by, 104 resolution
of bankrupt G-SIBs, 130
and crisis management, 157-61 retained earnings, 45-46 risk taking, 140
subordinated debt and, 139
share of largest in US and other countries, 154-56
size, and risk, 140, 141-42
stocks
average stock return, 141, 142 market valuations and cost to raise capital, 171 volatility of, 138
BankUnited, 154n
Barclays, 213 Barrell, R., 30 Barro, Robert J., 187
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS), 2, 28
comparison with estimates, 96-98 Long-Term Economic Impact (LEI) analysis, 5, 8, 28-29, 107
and M&M offset, 54n
Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG), 41
reforms, 194 survey in 2010, 99, 114
Basel I accord, 2
Basel II accord, 2
Basel III reforms, 2, 19, 37, 205
capital requirements, 205 schedule, 27
change from Basel II, 53n
and FSB capital requirements for G-SIBs, 116-18, 117t
implications for targets, 209 leverage ratio, 172
liquidity standards, 18-19 minimum for G-SIBs, 210 minimum leverage target, 15 need for further improvement, 205 and optimal capital ratio, 4 requirements, 40
for TLAC, 133
revisions to, 211
risk-weighted assets requirement, 116-18 on TBTF, and subordinated debt, 139 Basel IV rules (proposed), 2n
revisions for risk weighting, 15
Bear Stearns, 154, 159
in financial crisis 2008, 137 Begenau, Juliane, 50-51 behavioral capital cushion, 209-10 Belgium
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
private credit and GDP, 186 benefits curve, 101, 102/ Berkes, Enrico, 178, 182, 183n, 194
reply to, 201-04 Berlin, Mitchell, 55 Big Bank in UK, 141 borrowing cost, for banks, 69-70
calibrated optimization, 28-38 California National, 154n
Calomiris, Charles W., 10, 23, 56-57, 136, 137n
Canada, losses, 93t, 95 capital.
See also weighted average cost of capital (WACC)appropriateness of reform level, 205
BCBS synthesis of impact on probability of systemic banking crisis, 100t cost-minimizing structure, 36 cost of additional, 32 increase, and GDP long-run level, 4 interaction with liquidity, 32 low stock valuations, and cost of raising, 171
optimal level, 88
social costs of raising, 47
tangible common equity concept of, 117 capital assets pricing model (CAPM), 7
vs. direct estimation, 57-58 framework, 79
Yang and Tsatsaronis use with leverage as shift variable, 80
capital cost, average, 68 capital ratios
increase, and drop-off in crisis probability, 8
optimal for banks, 209 capital requirements
adverse spillover effects, 41 benefits of, 51
benefits of higher, 88-103, 208 costs of higher, 103-07, 208 economic studies of costs and benefits, 21
marginal costs of, 51
optimal, 108-10
MP study overstatement, 131 capital requirements benefits curve, 98-99 calibrating, 99-103 capital to assets ratios
basis point increase, 24-25 calculating optimal, 7-9 impact of raising, 671 optimal, 96
capital to risk-weighted assets ratio negative effect on GDP, 42 optimal, 114
capitalization, 215
CAPM. See capital assets pricing model (CAPM)
Cecchetti, Stephen G., 5, 47, 178, 179, 182, 194
charge-offs
as fraction of total assets, 152 large vs. medium banks, 154 charter value hypothesis, 140
Citigroup, 159
derivatives, 171
Federal Reserve's guarantees, 158 merger with Travelers Group, 155 overoptimism in valuation, 172 real assets, 155 scaling back, 155n
stress test failure in 2014, 19n
Clerc, Laurent, 48-49 CoCo. See contingent convertible (CoCo) coefficient of equity cost on leverage, 7 coefficient of per capita growth on per capita income, 188
Cohen, Benjamin H., 5, 45-46, 68 Colonial, 154n common equity capital, 2009 to 2012, 68 common equity requirement, 136 common equity tier 1 capital, 163 compensation of employees, as percent of national income, 109n
Comptroller of the Currency, 13 conditional growth convergence, 188 confidence intervals, for US bank ratio averages, 62
Consumer Protection Act, 170 Continental Illinois, 91, 143 contingent claims approach, 138 contingent convertible (CoCo) capital, 1 for supplementing equity capital requirement, 57
contingent convertible (CoCo) debt, 9, 10, 19, 118, 133-34
disciplinary role of, 135-36 as part of capital requirement, 210 with perpetual maturity, 137n preferred investors for, 148-49 as proposed requirement, 136-37 UK suspension of sales, 149 control group, of advanced economies without crisis, 93t, 94-95 convergence factor, 188 core tier I capital, 2n corporate borrowing, sources of, 113 Correa, Ricardo, 10, 140 Corus, 154n cost curve, 127-29, 205 cost-minimizing capital structure, 36 cost of additional capital, 32 cost of equity capital, 67
estimating influence of leverage, 79 trends in unconstrained earnings indicators, 83
costly state verification, 49
costs
elasticity, output size and, 145 of higher capital requirements, 103-07, 205
country fixed effects, 188, 204
and misleading results, 191
Countrywide, 154
Cournede, Boris, 28, 42, 184
lack of solid base for conclusions, 193 negative coefficients in study, 203 radical policy implications of accepting results, 194
specifications of regressions for per capita GDP growth, 185t
study results, 185-87
credit
causality, and per capita income, 184 plausibility of negative impact size, 186 punitive taxes to shrink, 202 credit default swap (CDS) rate, 74 credit finance, and growth, 183 Credit Suisse, 174, 213
crisis avoidance, gross benefits, 34
crisis damage, 124
crisis probability curve, 109, 131 cross-country growth data, 199 cross-country growth patterns, 186-87 cross-country tests, and exclusion of country fixed effects, 189
Dagher, Dell'Ariccia, Laeven, Ratnovski,
Tong (DDLRT), data compilation, 123
Dagher, Jihad, 5, 27, 115
damage estimates, crisis severity and, 96 Davies, Richard, 10, 146-47, 162
De Nicolo, Gianni, 52
de-Ramon, Sebastian, 37-38
DeAngelo, Harry, 56
debt financing, 55
and M&M model, 71
Debt Guarantee Program, 159
debt to equity ratio, relationship of unit cost of equity capital to, 85f
Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, 123
Denk, Oliver, 184
lack of solid base for conclusions, 193 negative coefficients in study, 203 radical policy implications of accepting results, 194
specifications of regressions for per capita GDP growth, 185t
study results, 185-87
Denmark, output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
dependent variable, negative relationship between exogenous variable and, 198 deposit insurance, 56
depositors, interest rate for, 169 deposits, as financial liabilities, 55 derivatives
bilateral netting of, 18n
Deutsche Bank and, 171-72, 174
Deutsche Bank, 13, 134, 213
capital adequacy and market valuation, 171
derivatives, 171-72, 174 implication of difficulties, 165 optimal capital requirements, 175 possible need for new equity, 173 potential missed coupon on convertible bonds, 149
share price 2015/16, 165
solvency, 174-75
stock price decline, 166-67 discount rate, 61 distance from insolvency ratio, 139 diversification, and risk, 148 “doctors” variable, 179
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 12, 207
Collins Amendment, 15, 170, 211 constraints on Federal Reserve, 158-59, 212-13
Orderly Liquidation Authority, 130 and too big to fail, 214
Volcker rule, 1, 53n
Downey, 154n
Dudley, William, 159
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, 6, 22, 44 estimates, 48-52
earnings, expected future, 61
earnings indicators, trends for cost of equity capital, 83 earnings yield (EY), 62, 63f
and asset risk, 61
vs.
income-book equity ratio, 63 of stock, and capitalization rate, 73-74 economies of scalebank breakup and, 157
in banking, 10, 214-15
at largest banks, 162
TBTF literature on, 144-48
TBTF status and, 143
TBTF subsidy and, 146-47
test for, 146
economy, benefit from any given level of capital, 124
education, cross-country studies of returns, 190n
Eisenberg, Larry, 36 elasticity of costs, output size and, 145 endogeneity bias, 66, 85-86 equity
alternative measures of cost, 7
bank total assets as, 3
and unit borrowing costs for banks, 69 unit cost of, 7
equity beta, 79
equity capital
cost, 67
alternative measures, 62 economists' arguments for high levels, 205
importance, 2
ratio to total assets, 104
unit cost of, 65-66
equity capital target, for large banks, 19 equity cost to firms, 109
equity market beta coefficient, 31
equity ratios
historical trends, 23
quasi-market value of, 136 equity yield, ratio of debt to equity and, 58 estimates
based on related linear equations, negative quadratic influence, 197-98 direct, vs. capital assets pricing model betas, 57-58
euro area
bank lending rates, 78f
European Central Bank as lender of last resort, 161
European banks, 13
optimal capital range, 113
risk-weighted assets/total assets ratio, 15 systemic implications of problems at major, 165-75
vs. US banks, 16-18
European Commission, estimates, 45
European Union, shift from lender-of-last resort to bail-in, 161
Evanoff, Douglas D., 10, 135
expected annual stream of income earned, 71
expected future earnings, 61 expected output, calculating, 88
Fama, Eugene F., 6, 55, 58
Fannie Mae, 159
in financial crisis 2008, 137
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 12, 17, 91, 214 interventions, 26
receivership of financial companies, 157 Federal Reserve
constraints as lender of last resort, 12, 161n
constraints on lending to nonbank affiliates of banks, 159
Dodd-Frank constraints on, 158-59, 212-13
interest on excess reserves, 16 macroeconomic model, and higher bank capital cost on GDP, 128
Federal Reserve Act, 158
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 38, 115
Plan to End Too Big to Fail, 123-31 finance
quadratic term and linear term, 202 relating growth to, 203
finance variable
and country fixed effects, 189
sign of, 193
financial crises
average incidence, 124
control group of advanced economies without, 93t, 94-95
financial crisis of 2007-09, 53
credit write-downs, 25
financial depth, growth for low vs.
high, 192 financial depth variable, coefficient on, 191 Financial Development Index, 178, 182 financial sector crisis, 1Financial Stability Board (FSB), 23, 46, 117, 149
TLAC recommendations, 27 Finland
and banking crisis, 95
financial crisis, 91
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t, 93f
R&D technicians, and growth, 180
First Federal of California, 154n
Fitch support rating floors (SRF), 140-41 Flannery, Mark J., 140
France
combined assets of large banks as percent of GDP, 156
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92f
Franklin, 154n
Freddie Mac, 159
in financial crisis 2008, 137
French, Kenneth R., 6, 55, 58 funding advantage approach, 138 funding costs
for larger bank holding companies, 143
LEI study on, 29
Gamba, Andrea, 52
Gambacorta, Leonardo, 33-34, 69 Geithner, Timothy F., 159
General Accounting Office (GAO), 143 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), 18, 171
German Banking Industry Committee, 211n
Germany, output loss estimates from banking crises, 92f
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 155 global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs), 1
Basel III and FSB capital requirements for, 116-18, 117t
Basel III reforms requirement for TLAC, 133
capital requirements, 116, 123 minimum requirement for, 9 price-to-book ratios, 167, 168/ ratio of share price to book value, 170t resolution of bankrupt, 130 study of capital needs, 23-24 US vs. Europe performance, 169
Goldman Sachs, 155, 159 derivatives, 171 fines, 166 overoptimism in valuation, 172
Goldstein, Morris, 13, 14, 24-25
Goodhart, Charles, 161 government support, influence of
(potential), 140 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 141, 155 Great Recession of 2007-09, 1, 53, 91, 177 bank losses in, 26 bank size and losses, 4, 214 indicators of relative impact, large vs.
medium banks, 153t lender of last resort in, 159 output losses, 208 US banks in, 134, 151-54
Greece, 127n
output gap, 94 output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
peak NPLs, 127f private credit and GDP, 186 gross domestic product (GDP) annual loss from crisis, 98 capital increase and long-run level of, 4 combined assets of largest US banks as percent, 155-56, 156f
identifying benchmark baseline, 88-89 ratio of liquid liabilities to, 178
Group of Ten, 2
growth driver in cross-country tests, 188 influence of financial intermediation, 11 for low vs.
high financial depth, 192 negative influence of additional doctors per capita, 179and per capita income, 181, 181f 203 relating to finance, 203 variables influencing long-term potential, 188
growth per capita in emerging-market and developing countries, 188
and purchasing-power-parity (ppp) per capita income, 179
G-SIBs. See global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
Guaranty, 154n
Hall, Maximilian J.B., 34
Hanson, Samuel G., 23, 81
Hellwig, Martin, 3, 4-5, 22-23, 53-54, 115, 116
Herring, Richard, 10, 55-56, 56-57, 136, 137n
heuristic seawall studies, 21, 22-28
Hindlian, Amanda, 143
historical estimate of asset volatility, 138-39
Hoenig, Thomas M., 13, 15, 23
HSBC, 155
Hughes, J., 10, 145-46
Iceland, 127n
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
peak NPLs, 127
income-book equity ratio, vs. earnings yield,
63
IndyMac, 154n
Institute of International Finance (IIF), 2,
43, 77
interest rate
decline, bank debt reduction and, 50-51 for depositors, 169
interest rate swaps, 174 intermediated credit, to private sector, 185 International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS), 18
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 25,
178
on advantage of being SIB, 144 adverse spillover effects in capital requirements, 41
and Deutsche Bank, 166
output gap calculations, 95-96
output gap estimate, 94
and seawall framework, 26-27
interstate banking, 155
Intesa Sanpaolo, 13
investment, as explanatory variable in crosscountry tests, 189
investment banks, and Great Recession, financial crisis, 137
investors, and risk taking penalties, 139
Ireland
output gap, 94
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
Israel, private credit and GDP, 186
Italy
doctors' density, 179
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
Jagtiani, Julapa A., 10, 135
Japan, 127n
and banking crisis, 95
financial crisis, 91
financial development annual growth, 182
growth rate and credit reduction, 204 losses in economy, 95
output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t, 93t
peak NPLs, 127f
private credit, 186
R&D technicians, and growth, 180
JPMorgan Chase, 155
asset guarantee, 158
asset size, 60
derivatives, 171
in financial crisis 2008, 137 overoptimism in valuation, 172 risk-weighted assets, 13
Kashyap, Anil, 23, 57, 81
Kato, R., 32
Keely, Michael C., 140
Kharroubi, Enisse, 178, 179, 182, 194
King, Michael R., 27-28, 177-78
King, Robert G., 187
Kirkegaard, Jacob, 166n
Kobayashi, S., 32
Korea, 127n
peak NPLs, 127f
Kragh-Sorensen, Kasper, 36
Laeven, Luc, 28, 123, 141-42
large banks, share in US and other countries, 154-56
Lehman Brothers, 13, 25-26, 154, 210
in financial crisis 2008, 137
LEI study (Basel Committee), 5, 8, 28-29, 107 lender of last resort, 24, 26, 158, 212-13 constraints on Federal Reserve, 12 European Central Bank as, 161 in Great Recession, 159
shift to forced bail-ins, 207
lending rates, higher capital requirements impact, 27, 81
lending spreads, 47 leverage
average cost of capital and, 72
estimating influence on cost of equity capital, 79
leverage ratio, 104
capitalization, 53
minimum for bank holding company, 13 Levine, Ross, 177-78, 187
Liikanen Report, 14
linear equations, estimates based on related, negative quadratic influence, 197-98 linear term of finance, 202
liquid liabilities, ratio to GDP, 178 liquidity
central bank and, 26 interaction with capital, 32 requirements, 18-19 long-term impact on output, 48 liquidity spread, 56 living wills for banks, 1 loan spread, 56
Long-Term Economic Impact (LEI) analysis, 5, 8
long-term growth potential, variables influencing, 188
loss equivalency probability, 173 loss given default (LGD), 124 losses
capital equal to, 123 cumulative in initial years, 88-89 present value of, 89
and proxy for expected stream of future earnings, 61
Lucchetta, Marcella, 52
Macroeconomic Assessment Group (MAG), 5, 41, 150, 209
Maiden Lane, 158 Mankiw, N. Gregory, 187 Marcheggiano, Gilberto, 5-6, 8, 30, 54n, 69,
79, 106, 114-15, 128, 150 market discipline hypothesis, 140
Marques, Luis Brandao, 10, 140
McAllister, Patrick H., 147-48
McFadden Act of1927, 154
McManus, Douglas, 147-48
Mendicino, Caterina, 49-50
Merler, Silvia, 16, 113
Merrill Lynch, and Bank of America, 137 Merton, Robert C., 140
Merton-style structural credit risk portfolio model, 33
Mester, L., 10, 145-46
Miles, David, 5-6, 8, 30, 54n, 69, 79, 106, 114-15, 150
aggregate production function use, 128 minimum equity capital, 22-23 Minneapolis Plan, 115
comparison with current study results, 129
to end too big to fail, evaluation, 123-31 Modigliani-Miller (M&M) theorem, 3, 22-23, 43, 53-86, 205
data for testing, 60-65
demonstrating constant average cost of capital in, 75-76
offset, 127
alternative analyses of, 77-82
size, 207
and optimal relationship of equity finance to debt finance, 54
and risk, 59
specification for empirical test, 59-60
test results, 65-66
testing, 6-7
monetary policy offset, and costs of additional capital, 120
money multiplier, 16
Monte Carlo experiments, country fixed effects in, 189
Moody's bank financial strength ratings, 140
Morgan Stanley, 159
risk-weighted assets, 13
national income, employee compensation as percent, 109n
National Institute Global Econometric
Model (NiGEM), 30, 37
negative net earnings, in bank-year observations, 61 negative quadratic effects, bias toward,
181-82
negative quadratic term on finance, 182,
204
net earnings, change as fraction of assets,
11
net income
for large banks, distribution, 63
relative to assets between 2006-07 and
2008-10 for large US banks, 152, 152f relative to equity and earnings yield, 83f relative to equity, earnings yield and debt
to equity ratio, 63f
net income to assets ratio, reductions in,
152
net income to book equity ratio, 46
net income to equity ratio, 62
net interest income, 68
net stable funding ratio (NSFR), 46n, 101 Netherlands, output loss estimates from
banking crises, 92f
New Zealand
output loss estimates from banking crises, 93f
private credit and GDP, 186
Nguyen, Tu, 139
Nakata, Taisuke, 10, 135
Noe, Thomas H., 36
nonbank firms average cost of capital (ACC), 105-06 and banking, 55-57 constraints on Federal Reserve lending,
159
lender of last resort access, 213 minimum equity, 22 nonlinear finance hypothesis, 178n nonperforming assets
as fraction of total assets, 152 large vs. medium banks, 154
Norges Bank, Financial Stability Board
(FSB), 36-37
Northern Rock, in financial crisis 2008, 137 Norway
banking crises, 95
output loss estimates from, 92f, 93f doctors’ density, 179 financial crisis, 91
Noss, Joseph, 144
OECD countries
cross-country growth regressions, 185 study of financial depth and growth reduction, 183-84
optimal capital ratios, 209 calculating, 7-9 early study of requirements, 30 equation for changes, 113
MP study on, 129
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (TCE/RWA), 114
and risk-weighted assets, 205 summary, 38-40, 39t optimal capital, requirements, 30 optimal capital requirements, 108-10
MP study overstatement of, 131 results, 110, 113-14
optimal capital to assets ratio, 96 frequency of estimates for, 112f optimization
vs. arbitrage, 59
calibrated, 28-38
option-price estimate of asset volatility, 138-39
orderly liquidation authority (OLA), 12, 157, 214
and TLAC, 160
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 27 banking crises incidence, 30 Cournede-Denk estimates for, 189 estimates of medium-term decline in growth, 42
New Global Model, 42
output
cost to economy from bank capital requirements, 106
cumulative five-year loss, 94 size, and elasticity of costs, 145 output losses, from banking crises, 92
PacWest Bancorp, net stable funding ratio
(NSFR), 60
Panizza, Ugo, 178, 182, 183«, 194
reply to, 201-04
Penn World Table, 190, 199
per capita GDP growth, Cline estimates for regression specifications, 190t per capita income. See also purchasingpower-parity (ppp) per capita income in finance studies, 182-84 and growth, 181, 181f purchasing-power-parity (ppp), 179 telephone density and, 180
per capita real growth rate, 199 Persaud, Avinash D., 148 physicians per 1,000 population, 179 plausibility, of negative impact size of credit, 186
population, working-age, 88-89 Portugal, output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
ppp. See purchasing-power-parity (ppp) per capita income
price-to-book ratios, 46
for G-SIBs, 167, 168f prime rate, spread between 5-year US Treasury rate and, 77 private credit
and GDP, 186
linear coefficient of growth on, as percent of GDP, 193
reestimating impact, 187-94 private returns, vs. social, 118-19 private sector, intermediated credit to, 185 production function approach, 6
to long-term output impact of higher lending costs, 30
production, target for capital and, 25 prompt corrective action, 14 proprietary trading, 1
Prudential, 213 purchasing power parity (ppp), 184 purchasing-power-parity (ppp) per capita income, 187
and growth per capita, 179 logarithm of lagged, 194 logarithms of, 190
quadratic term of finance, 202 quasi-market value of equity ratio, 136 QUEST model, 45
R-G Premier, 154«
R&D technicians, influence of additional on growth, 180
Rajan, Raghuram G., 57 ratings-based estimates, and TBTF subsidy,
138
ratio of capital to assets
basis point increase, 24-25 calculating optimal, 7-9 impact of raising, 67t optimal, 96
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets
(TCE/RWA)
negative effect on GDP, 42
optimal, 114
ratio of debt to equity, 62, 63f
and average cost of capital, 75
equity yield and, 58
ratio of equity capital to total assets, 104 ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, 178 ratio of net income to book equity, 46 ratio of notional value of derivatives to
GAAP assets, 171-72
ratio of private credit to GDP, 191
ratio of risk-weighted to total assets, 211 ratio of share price to book value, for
G-SIBs, 170t
ratio of subordinated debt to regulatory capital, 135
ratio of total assets to equity capital, 6-7
Ratnovski, Lev, 123, 141-42
real interest rate paid by banks, 104 regressions for per capita GDP growth,
Cline estimates for, 190t
Reinhart, Carmen M., 28 resolution of bankrupt G-SIBs, 130 resolution of banks, and crisis
management, 157-61
retained earnings, additional equity from, 2, 166, 171
return on equity, average, 29
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act of 1994,
155
risk
of banks, 140 subordinated debt and, 139
and diversification, 148 relationship between spreads and indicators, 135
z-scores as measure, 140 risk-weighted assets (RWA), 5, 19, 104, 205
Basel III reform requirements, 116-18 dealing with problem, 210-12
vs. total assets, 12-16, 23 understatement, 165 risk-weighted capital ratios, retained earnings and increase, 45-46 Roger, S., 44-45 Rogoff, Kenneth S., 28 Romer, David, 187 Royal Bank of Scotland, 142
potential fines, 166
Sachs, Jeffrey D., 187 Sahay, Ratna, 182, 183n
Saita, Y., 32 Santos, Joao, 10, 140-41 Sapriza, Horacio, 10, 140
Sarin, Natasha, 174 savings and loans banks, crises, 91 Scatigna, Michela, 68
Schanz, Jochen, 33 Scott, Hal S., 158 seawall approach, to capital levels determination, 5
Securities and Exchange Commission, 13
10-K reports, 60, 151 shadow banking, bank regulatory reform and, 16
Shin, Hyun Song, 69 Siegert, Caspar, 143, 144
SIFIs (systemically important financial institutions), 53
single point of entry (SPOE) approach, 12, 159-60, 215
and TLAC, 160 size-based estimates, and TBTF subsidy, 138
Slovik, Patrick, 28, 42 social costs, 5
of raising capital, 47 social returns, vs. private, 118-19 Sorescu, Sorin M., 140 Sowerbutts, Rhiannon, 144 Spain, output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
spreads, relationship between risk indicators and, 135
SRISK, for measuring systemic risk, 142 St. Petersburg Summit of the Group of
Twenty (G-20), 117
Stein, Jeremy C., 23, 57, 81 stocks, price of, 61 stress tests, 1, 18-19 studies, quantitative findings of, 4
Stulz, Rene, 56 subordinated debt, 1, 118, 133-34
Basel accord on, 2 disciplinary role of, 135-36 mandatory requirements, 136 as part of capital requirement, 210 and risk of panic dynamics, 19, 163 risk taking of banks and, 139
TLAC and, 9-10
Summers, Lawrence H., 174
Sweden
financial crisis, 91 output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
Switzerland
combined assets of large banks as percent of GDP, 156
doctors' density, 179 output loss estimates from banking crises, 92t
telephones, 180
Synovus Financial, 65n systemic risks, Deutsche Bank contribution
to, 166 systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), 53
tangible common equity, 19
optimal level, 4 relative to total assets, 14
taxes, punitive to shrink credit, 202 taxpayers
avoiding losses to rescue banks, 213 and future bailouts, 133, 162
Taylor rule, 128 telephones, density, per capita income and, 180
10-year Treasury bond rate, 89n tier 1 capital, 62, 163 tier 2 capital, 2n
subordinated debt to raise, 139 time period, for cross-country tests, 189 TLAC. See total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC)
Tong, Hui, 123, 141-42 too big to fail (TBTF), 10, 118, 213-15
incentive distortions, 3
and risk taking, 162 internalizing risk subsidy, 137-44 Minneapolis Plan to end, evaluation, 123-31
questionable link to surcharge, 130 response of regulatory reform, 214 studies estimating subsidies, 143 and subordinated debt, Basel III on, 139 “too much finance” studies, 191
literature survey, 177 plausibility, 182-84 as statistical illusion, 207 total assets
nonperforming assets and charge-offs as fraction of, 152
risk-weighted assets vs., 12-16, 23 total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC), 1,
9-11, 118, 133, 205, 210 benefits, 150-51 impact estimates, 149-51 literature survey, 134-51 panic dynamics and, 148-49 shortfalls from target, 46n target, 19
total tier 1 capital, 53n
Tracey, Belinda, 10, 146-47, 162
Traina, James, 10, 140-41 transient analyses, 21 transient estimates, 41-47 translog cost function, 147 translog production function, 145, 145n Travelers Group, Citigroup merger with,
155
Treasury inflation-protected (TIP) five-year bonds, 62
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), 138, 159, 213
Tsatsaronis, Kostas, 69, 80
Turner, C., 144
Turner, Paul, 34
UBS, 213
UniCredit Group, 169
UnionBanCal, 65n
unit cost of equity capital, 7, 65-66, 108 base value, 25n cost to economy, 131 relationship to debt to equity ratio, 85f
United Commercial, 154n
United Kingdom
costs and benefits of higher capital requirements for banks, 37
Financial Services Authority, 126 long-term loss from banking crisis, 37-38
model of optimal capital requirements for economy, 35
output loss estimates from banking crises, 93t
R&D technicians, and growth, 180 United States
average real per capita GDP, 188n output loss estimates from banking crises, 93t
private credit, 186
University of Groningen, 199
US banks
capital ratios and Basel III requirements, 119-20
capitalization improvement, 169 decline in size, 215
vs. European banks, 16-18 large vs. small, 212 lending rates, 78f optimal capital range, 113 risk-weighted assets/total assets ratio, 15 share in US and other countries, 154-56 total assets of commercial, 212n trends in averages of ratios, 62
US Department of Justice, fine for misleading investors in mortgage- backed securities, 166
US Treasury
10-year bond rate, 89n
money market funds guarantee, 159
Valencia, Fabian, 28
Van den Heuvel, S.J., 32, 51
vector autoregression and vector error correction approach, 34, 35
Veron, Nicolas, 113
Vlcek, J., 44-45
volatility, of banking stocks, 138
Volcker rule, 1, 53
Wachovia, 154
and Wells Fargo, 137-38
Warburton, A. Joseph, 143
Warner, Andrew, 187
Washington Mutual, 154 weighted average cost of capital (WACC),
79, 104
Weil, David N., 187
Wells Fargo, 155 risk-weighted assets, 13 and Wachovia, 137-38
WesternBank, 154n
Wheelock, D.C., 10, 144-45, 146, 162 on output and inputs, 148
Willison, Matthew, 143, 144, 162
Wilson, P.W., 10, 144-45, 146 working-age population, 88-89
average annual growth, 94
World Bank, World Development Indicators, 199
Yan, Meilan, 34
Yang, Jing, 5-6, 8, 30, 54n, 69, 79, 80, 106, 114-15, 128, 150
z-scores, 10
as measure of risk, 140
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