THE PARTICIPATION PRINCIPLE
Loss of control of public resources
Markets for conservation reduce public participation in the same way that tradeable pollution rights schemes do. By granting private ownership to fish species and waterways and conservation areas, much of the decision making is shifted to the private sector.
The introduction of tradeable fishing rights is often viewed by the community as the privatisation of a public resource, with the transfer of power, control and benefits away from the community. Similarly, there is a tendency for the public to view water as a community resource; in the USA private rights to water and privately-owned water banks are widely seen as a loss of a community resource and of democratic control over it (Clifford et al. 2004).In Iceland the introduction of ITQs means that the trading of fishing quotas can now occur without consultation with the unions, the local community or the ministry, as had previously been required. The 'prac- tice of working out the fisheries management policy by broad debates and consensus in the Fisheries Assembly and by preparing new legislation by task forces with broad representation from different stakeholder groups' has been discarded as quota owners and the vessel owners association have become more powerful (Eythorsson 2000: 486-90).
In California, even though the state Constitution holds water to be a public good, private interests seem to be profiting from water marketing at the expense of the public (Gibler 2003: 1).
In a new era of buying and selling water, there may be no bigger stockpile than the Kern Water Bank. It was conceived in the mid- 1980s by the state Department of Water Resources as a way to store water in the aquifer in wet years so that it can be pumped out in dry years.
Today, though, the massive underground pool is controlled by one corporate farmer, wealthy Los Angeles businessman Stewart Resnick, who owns Paramount Farming Co., the Franklin Mint, and Teleflora, a flowers-by-wire service.
The Kern Bank, which was intended to help balance out the state's water supply to cities, farms and fish, has instead allowed Paramount Farming to double its acres of nuts and fruits since 1994. (Arax 2003)
Increase in power of vested interests
The creation of markets in environmental resources often encourages a concentration of ownership and vested interests that wields considerable political power. The system of tradeable fishing rights which has granted quota owners great wealth and power in the industry has also created a strong vested interest that lobbies government to prevent changes that threaten those interests. In the Tasmanian fishing industry, '[a] new management environment is emerging with greater involvement of lobbyists, lawyers, accountants, and brokers of fishing entitlements... There is an ongoing push by the industry to further quot;liberalisequot; the market for quota units in order to increase their value' (Phillips et al. 2002: 465).
The more concentrated the industry the more influence it will wield over the politicians setting the total allowable catch (TAC). In Iceland, for example, quota owners 'include wealthy, well-connected, and influential individuals in Icelandic society who have every reason to fight tooth and nail to protect their newly-found treasure' (Hannibalsson 1995). In New Zealand the TAC is supposed to be based on scientific research showing what is sustainable, but in reality the TACs for most species 'have shown no variation whatsoever during recent years', indicating a political unwillingness to reduce them in the face of pressure from the fishing industry (SFN 2003).
Restriction of information and participation
Finally, the conversion of environmental decision-making into a series of commercial transactions tends to exclude the public and restrict the amount of information about these transactions that is available to the public. For example, the 'public has very little access to information' on mitigation banking. There are no standardised descriptions of wetland types and the rules for different banks vary so it is difficult to compare banks or evaluate them (ELI 2002a). Data on their ecological performance is even more difficult to come by. Additionally, there is often no process for public comment on proposed mitigation banks (BEST et al. 2001; Wilkinson et al. 2002: 17). NGOs 'feel they have little or no ability to influence the process on decisions regarding location, design, or service area designation' (Fleischer 2005).
Similarly the transformation of community fishing into a global industry has removed decisions about fishing from the community to the boardrooms of large corporations. The introduction of transferable quotas has enabled quota owners to take their quotas out of the community, or sell them to city-based fishing companies, without any consultation with those affected.