GOVERNMENT CHALLENGES TO THE IETF PROCESS
The IETF standards process may be facing an even more significant challenge than it has in the past as a result of the desire of some governments to play a larger role in Internet governance in general, and the standardization process in particular.
Waz and Weiser (n.d.) note, for example, that ‘The future of this unusual and largely successful form of Internet governance is far from assured’. An important manifestation of this development is a proposal to make it compulsory for member states of the ITU, an international treaty organization, to impose ITU-T standards on Internet service providers in their respective countries.42 If this proposal were adopted, it would effectively shift much of the influence over Internet standards from the IETF to the ITU.43According to former Federal Communications Commissioner (FCC) Robert M. McDowell, this would ‘subsume under intergovernmental control many functions of the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Internet Society and other multistakeholder groups that establish the engineering and technical standards that allow the Internet to work’ (McDowell, 2012). The proposal, along with ones that would deal with the Internet Domain Name System, electronic mail abuse, cybersecurity, and peering, among others, was initially scheduled to be considered at the World Conference on International Telecommunications [WCIT] to be held in Dubai in December 2012. Gross and Lucarelli have noted:
For some governments, the WCIT presents an opportunity to significantly expand the jurisdiction and role of the ITU into previously unregulated, lightly regulated or domestically regulated aspects of the emerging digital economy... Several countries have proposed to move oversight or ‘control’ of aspects of the Internet and Internet development from the non-governmental multi-stakeholder mechanisms such as ICANN and replace them with the ITU.44
Although it is not alone, the United States government has opposed the proposal.
For example, according to Lawrence E. Strickling, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information:The United States strongly supports the use of a multistakeholder process as the preferred means of addressing Internet policy issues... We expect that some states will attempt to rewrite the regulation in a manner that would exclude the contributions of multi-stakeholder organizations and instead provide for heavy-handed governmental control of the Internet, including provisions for cybersecurity and granular operational and technical requirement for private industry. We do not support any of these elements. (Strickling, 2011)
More recently, the Majority Staff of the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the US House of Representatives issued a memorandum expressing concern about proposals that ‘seek to authorize regulation of the Internet by an international governmental body within the ITU, replacing the multi-stakeholder model that has served the Internet and the world so well’.45 At about the same time, several members of the House of Representatives proposed that the US government should ‘continue working to implement the position of the United States to promote an Internet free from government control and preserve and advance the successful multi-stakeholder model that governs the Internet today’.46
The Internet Society has also expressed strong concerns about the effect of these developments on the Internet standardization process. It notes that the proposals to modify Articles 1.4 and 3.5 of International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs):
[...] would have the effect of making it compulsory for states to impose ITU-T standards... on telecom/Internet service providers in their countries. This approach would be counterproductive for global communications and is counter to the international collaborative standards development process that is place today. The Internet Society believes that ITU-T Recommendations should continue to be voluntary.
(Internet Society, 2012a)The Society argues that:
[t]he ITRs should enshrine a commitment to the use of open and voluntary international standards. Interoperability, mutual agreement, and collaboration are invariable requirements for the Internet’s survival. Many standards development organizations contribute to the smooth functioning of the Internet, and new standards development organizations have emerged over time, so it is potentially damaging to impose a preference for some standards development organizations (SDOs) over others. (Ibid.)
At the same time that some countries are proposing changes that would alter substantially the current mode of Internet governance, including of the Internet standards process, there appears to be considerable support for retaining the arrangements, albeit with a somewhat larger role for governments. For example, a European Advisory Group has proposed, as one of its Internet Governance Principles that:
[t]he decentralized nature of the responsibility for the day-to-day management of the Internet should be preserved. The private sector should retain its leading role in technical and operational matters while ensuring transparency and accountability to the global community for those actions which impact on public policy. (Council of Europe, 2011)
Similarly, the OECD has observed that:
[t] Internet’s openness... stems from globally accepted, consensus driven technical standards that support global product markets and communications. The roles, openness, and competencies of the global multi-stakeholder institutions that govern standards for different layers of Internet components should be recognised and their contribution should be sought on the different technical elements of public policy objectives. (OECD, 2011, p. 6)
It seems clear that the Internet standards process would change substantially if the current structure, which is dominated by private voluntary standards organizations, were replaced by one under the auspices of the ITU, where governments are able to block the adoption of standards.
Such a change would likely mean that Internet standardization would no longer be a primarily technical activity and instead would accord a much larger role to commercial and political considerations, especially the interests of traditional telecommunications carriers, as well as to the interests of governments themselves. Although it seems unlikely that major changes to the Internet standards process will occur any time soon, the proposals before the World Conference on Telecommunications nonetheless represented a potential challenge to that process. Although they did not get a significant hearing at WCIT, such proposals are certain to be raised in future ITU-led international meetings. Thus, we expect the challenge to the current Internet standards process to continue, and we anticipate that it will be a long time before its outcome will be known.NOTES
* The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of Lyman Chapin, Stephen D. Crocker, Timothy Simcoe and Philip L. Verveer on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this chapter are the authors’ own and do not necessarily represent the views of any organizations with which they are affiliated.
1. This chapter focuses on standards for the basic communication protocols of the Internet. It does not address the multiplicity of standards at higher layers, such as those developed by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) and others.
2. For a fuller treatment see Besen and Farrell (1994).
3. See Farrell and Saloner (1988), Lerner and Tirole (2004) and Simcoe (2012) for important contributions to this literature.
4. For a discussion of these issues see Besen and Levinson (2012).
5. For descriptions of the development of the Internet in its earliest days see Leiner et al. (2003) and Cerf (1993).
6. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) changed its name to the Defense Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1971, back to ARPA in 1993, and back to DARPA in 1996.
7. For brief descriptions of the entities involved in the IETF standards process and of the process itself see Jakobs (2000).
8. As we discuss below, however, recent developments suggest that this statement may now be less true than it was in the past.
9. Some of the same people who were involved in the development of TCP/IP were also part of the International Packet Network Working Group (INWG), which was developing an alternative protocol. McKenzie (2011) argues that ‘DARPA had a bigger research budget than any of the other research organizations, and for this reason, its protocol choice [TCP/IP] became dominant over time’.
10. For a model in which both types of outcomes are possible see Katz and Shapiro (1985). Balkanization could have involved either two ‘Internets’ between which users could not communicate or the development of (probably costly and imperfect) ‘translators’ that would permit users of one network to communicate with users of the other.
11. The classic article on how a small early lead can result in a permanent advantage when network effects are present is Arthur (1989).
12. It is important to note, however, that one of the advantages that the authors identify for TCP/IP is ‘Availability of wide-spread technical expertise on TCP/IP (due to extensive deployment, i.e., large “installed base”), which resulted from TCP/IP’s early lead’ (Maathuis and Smit, 2003, p. 173).
13. Note, however, that Cashin significantly underestimated the amount of support available for OSI. In 1994 most or all of the OSI protocols were implemented in the standard software releases of every major computer and router manufacturer. They were just not being used very much.
14. Borthick (1991) attributes many of these problems to the fact that ‘the standards committees are often populated by public network types and entrenched big suppliers, many of whom ignored the existence of private local and wide area networks for as long as possible. Technical developments have continually outpaced many of the very standards they were meant to embody, and multiple standards, subject to numerous interpretations and additions, have been approved’.
15. Many United States government agencies had purchased TCP/IP products despite a mandate that network procurements comply with OSI under the Government OSI Profile (GOSIP). Eventually, the US government withdrew the mandate and recommended acceptance of TCP/IP.
16. The influence of the Federal government was used successfully in this way in 1961, when it required use of the COBOL language for all procurements, assuring a quick death for IBM’s competitive COMTRAN language.
17. Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) argue that there is no inconsistency between the dominance of a standard such as TCP/IP and significant entry by, and competition among, firms that produce products that are based on that standard. Indeed, the success of a standard may well depend on the extent to which it receives support from different firms. Interestingly, TCP/IP has been incorporated both in proprietary operating systems, such as Windows, and public domain operating systems, such as BSD.
18. For example, in order to resolve a concern that IBM had manipulated interface standards in order to injure competitors, the company agreed to disclose information about these interfaces prior to the date at which it shipped new products (United States v. IBM, 69 Civ. 200 [S.D.N.Y. 1969]. Under the Modified Final Judgment that settled the US government’s antitrust case against AT&T, the Bell operating companies were ‘prohibited from discriminating between AT&T and other companies in... the establishment of technical standards’ (United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 552 F. Supp. 131 [1982]).
19. Personal communication from Dan Lynch, CEO of Interop, 26 July 2003.
20. The tepid acceptance of DECnet Phase V, which was a solid implementation of the ISO/OSI model, was doomed both by the rapid adoption of TCP/IP, which created a bandwagon effect, and by the growing rejection of proprietary standards.
21. For a discussion of the trade-off between a vested interest in a particular standard and an interest in promoting the universal adoption of any standard see Besen and Saloner (1989, pp. 178-84). Besen and Farrell (1994) refer to the case in which compatibility is the preferred outcome for everyone as the ‘Battle of the Sexes’.
22. Russell (2006, p. 54) also claimed that: ‘The informal character of the IAB’s oversight of the IETF had created problems in the past, especially when IETF engineers perceived that IAB decisions favored the commercial interests of vendors over the technical consensus of the IETF’.
23. Standards-setting organizations are sometimes referred to as standards-developing organizations (SDOs).
24. The empirical results refer to a comparison of the time that the IETF took to approve standards and the time that it took to approve what Simcoe referred to as ‘non-standards’. Although the time-to-consensus has increased for both tracks, Simcoe finds that the increase is greater for standards and that the difference is statistically significant. One of the variables that Simcoe considers is the ‘suit-to-beard ratio’, which is based on the sources of contributions to an IETF Working Group listserv. Simcoe characterizes this as a measure of the extent to which an IETF working group ‘is creating commercially relevant technology’ (Simcoe, 2012, p. 319). Maher (1998) earlier noted a slowdown in the IETF process, although he attributed it to the increase in the number of participants, not to the fact that commercial considerations had become more important.
25. Lyman Chapin (private communication) notes that almost all of the protocols in the TCP/IP suite were well established even before the IETF was even created.
26. Of course, especially when there are many dimensions of performance, firms may have different views about what is the technically ‘best’ solution. Thus, a firm may favor a particular standard even if doing so does not provide it with a competitive advantage.
27. For more details on these strategies see Besen and Farrell (1994).
28. See the discussion below of the attempt by some vendors to have the ITU adopt their MPLS standard during the period when the IETF had not yet adopted its MPLS standard.
29. See, for example, American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation, 456 U.S. 556 (1982).
30. See, for example, Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988). Waz and Weiser (n.d.) observe that that ‘With greater openness to members [multistakeholder] bodies must minimize the risk of forum-packing, which can become a challenge when an organization’s ground rules permit disproportionate representation that may introduce dimensions of politics into the processes. When broad industry participation takes place, [multistakeholder] bodies must manage potential antitrust and competition concerns, not overstepping appropriate bounds of cooperation intentionally or inadvertently’.
31. See, for example, Rambus v. Fed. Trade Commn, 522 F.3d 456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2008) and Commission Decision of 9.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement: Case COMP/38.636 - Rambus.
32. For example, Besen and Johnson (1986, p. 47) report that the National Association of Broadcasters declined to adopt a standard for AM stereo in part because it feared that its actions might be challenged in the courts.
33. See Andersson and Bryant (2008) and International Telecommunication Union (2007), ‘ITU-T Newslog - T-MPLS agreement: ITU_T and IETF’, 16 October, accessed 19 July 2014 at http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ newslog/default,date,2007-10-16.aspx.
34. Greg Jones, quoted in Van Beijnum (2011b).
35. An earlier trade press report makes this point even more strongly: ‘Carriers do not believe that IP/ MPLS can deliver the levels of network resilience and equipment reliability that define ‘carrier-class’ performance. And carriers have serious reservations about the lack of operations, administration, and maintenance (OAM) systems in IP/MPLS switches and routers... Without carrier-grade resilience and reliability in place, service providers will not be able to offer the ‘five-nines’ class of network reliability for which corporate customers are willing to pay a steep premium’ (Bennett, 2004). On the other hand, one vendor had suggested that the needs of carriers could be met by adding ‘a few enhancements’ to the MPLS Transport Profile (Juniper Networks, 2011).
36. In this regard, it is interesting that Lerner and Tirole (2004, p. 7) note that ‘it has been argued that the ITU is a much more sympathetic venue [than is the IETF] for proposals by large telephone companies’.
37. Matsumoto (2011) reported that ‘ITU-T Study Group 15 apparently passed a recommendation for using the ITU Y.1731 standard for operations, administration and management (OAM) in transport networks... The side that got their way includes AlcaLu, China Mobile Ltd..., Huawei and Telecom Italia’.
38. Curiously, one of the complaints that were apparently raised by the ITU was that a standard was urgently needed and that the IETF had failed to complete its work on schedule. On this point see Lawson and Ricknas (2011).
39. Code points in this context are identifiers assigned by the IETF for formally recognized protocols and administered by IANA (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority). They allow network objects on both ends of a data transmission to agree on and ensure a common protocol for transmission.
40. The IETF had conditioned the award of a code point on the existence of a stable normative reference, which the WTSA decision provided.
41. One possible interpretation of the behavior of those vendors who prevailed on the ITU to adopt their standard is that they sought to obtain an early, and possibly insurmountable, lead in a forthcoming standards ‘war’.
42. See International Telecommunication Union (2012, p. 9, Option 1 MOD1 [Source: TD Rev. 1 and Russian Federation]) and Internet Society (2012a, Annex 2, Comment on Proposal to MOD Art. 1.4 and 3.5), accessed 8 January 2016 at https://info.publicintelligence.net/ITU-TD43.pdf and http://www.internet society.org/sites/default/files/Internet%20Society%20comment%20to%20the%20WCIT%20Preparations- %20February%202012.pdf respectively.
43. For an analysis of an earlier attempt by the ITU to maintain its historic pre-eminence in setting international telecommunications standards in the face of challenges from regional standards organizations see Besen and Farrell (1991).
44. Gross and Lucarelli (2012) also note that ‘Some governments would also like the ITU to play a greater role in regulating peering, termination charges for data traffic, and other Internet-related rate issues to, among other things, potentially lower certain Internet backbone costs and to capture for domestic coffers some of the value of international VoIP services entering their countries’.
45. ‘Memorandum, To: Members and Staff, Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce, From: Majority Committee Staff, Re: Hearing on International Proposals to Regulate the Internet, 29 May 2012’. See also Testimony of Ambassador Philip Verveer, Hearing on International Proposals to Regulate the Internet, 31 May 2012.
46. ‘Proposed Concurrent Resolution, Expressing the sense of Congress regarding actions to preserve and advance the multistakeholder governance model under which the Internet has thrived, 30 May 2012’.
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11.