Mahayana Buddhism and Buddhist Philosophy

When Buddhism disappeared from India around 1200 ce, inevitably its Indian literary sources also vanished. What was not directly destroyed during the Muslim pillaging of the monasteries disinte­grated in the course of time, since nobody was left who could, or wanted to, copy out the manuscripts.

First, not everything had been lost or destroyed; manuscripts (though often in a fragmentary state) of Buddhist Sanskrit texts were discovered in areas (such as Nepal, Kashmir and Central Asia) where the climate (both literally and socially) was more favourable to the preserva­tion of this fragile material.

Considerable effort has been spent on trying to iden­tify a particular region of India, or a particular Buddhist community, as the original birthplace of the Mahayana. The two main contenders have been north-western India and the Andhra country in the south. However, such a quest has not proved particularly useful. Early Mahayana in itself is not easily defined, and the model of a one-point origin appears not to be appropriate. By looking at the earliest identifiable material in extant Mahayana literature, a variety of themes emerges, and it seems best to regard these as documenting a dynamic discussion within Indian Buddhist communities, which eventu­ally crystallised as a ‘revivalist’ movement all over the country. Institutions surrounding the (non-monastic) stupa cult, and the role of the dharma-bhanaka (lay preacher?) have been suggested as possible points of departure for Mahayana teaching.

Let us first look at this literature. Sanskrit appears to have been used by Indian Buddhists at a relatively late period.

The rise of the Mahayana could perhaps be described by reference to a tension well known also in other religious movements: that between institution and charisma. Earliest Buddhism maintained a spontaneous link between spiritual perfection and social interaction by being an itinerant movement. But consequent upon the development of settled monasticism, the emphasis had to shift. The distance between monks and laymen had to increase, the elaborate rules must have absorbed a considerable amount of spiritual energy, and the ultimate goal itself moved further and further away into some distant future existence for the individual. In the formulation of the goal itself, that is nirvana, the (philosophically realistic) Abhidharma appears to have developed, in cer­tain instances, a relatively negative and sometimes perhaps even nihlistic conception. Certainly its ‘monolinear’ approach to spiritual progress (which allowed for no more than individual and separate streams of continuity) reduced the possibility of spiritual achievement through personal interaction.

This appears to characterise the perception of institutionalised Buddhism by at least certain segments of the Buddhist community. A reaction set in which in a variety of ways criticised individual aspects, or in fact the whole, of the Buddhist establishment. Attempts were made to restore the Buddhist teaching to its charismatic origins, and in that sense it may be possible to speak here of a ‘revivalist’ movement.

The following may convey some impressions of the ideas put forward by the ‘revivalists’. The Buddha brought back into the world the medicine that cures the suffering of humanity: his Dharma. Trans­mitted from generation to generation, it must be spread to as many people as possible, to put an end to their duhkha. Thus for someone to receive it and not to pass it on and administer it is a fundamental breach of the Buddha’s intentions. Moreover, the spreading of the Dharma cannot simply be a mechanical act. Every human skill must be involved, searching for and applying the most appropriate means to communicate it in different contexts to different kinds of people. The concept of ‘skilfulness in means’ (updya- kaus'alya) evolved which denotes the mode in which the Dharma is dynamic­ally transmitted through history and infused into society. Even the different types of Buddhism that existed in India were interpreted as expressions of the Buddhas’ skilfulness in means. ‘Rationalist’ interpreters of Buddhism have found it difficult to accept the belief in many past Buddhas and in Buddhas found in many other world-systems. But we are dealing here in principle with a universal Buddhist idea and not a specifically Mahayana conception. Thus time and again in cosmic history Buddhas arose to reinstitute the Dharma.

But this could also be developed into another direc­tion. Given the belief in the existence of many past Buddhas, in the accumula­tion of vast amounts ofpunya over endless periods, and in the existence of many cosmic realms other than our own world, a cult like that of the Buddha Amitabha (or Amitayus) could ‘logically’ develop. The names of this Buddha mean ‘possessing unlimited light’ and alternatively, ‘unlimited life’. Whether or not this Buddha-figure is derived from some Iranian god, does not affect his role and function in one branch of the Mahayana. On the other hand, it is important not to read back into the Indian understanding of Amitabha developments that took place in China andjapan, where the ‘ Amida’ form of Buddhism became extremely popular. The Indian conception could be summed up as follows. Here is a past Buddha who through his enormous amount of merit could actually create a world-system ideally suited for the achievement of enlightenment. Ordinary human beings could become reborn in that world due to the merit acquired from worshipping Amitabha. The Sanskrit name of that ideal world is Sukhdvati, ‘the blissful one’; other names are: ‘The Pure Land’ and ‘The Western Paradise’.

Yet another very different line is pursued by a further segment of the early Mahayana. It concentrates its attack of institutionalism on certain implicit assumptions made in the monastic life. Ingeniously it uses ancient concepts, but redefines them. The key term here is that of‘emptiness’ (sunyatd). The pursuit of spiritual perfection in the monasteries implies cer­tain ‘realist’ (in a philosophical sense) assumptions. There it is taken for granted that there is virtue, the Buddha, nirvana and the process of personal continuity. Now the question is asked in what sense such items can be said to ‘exist’. As to the nature of the person (including that of the Buddha), earliest Buddhism had already been teaching that it is anatman (or s'unya), lacking an eternal core or individual essence. In the Abhidharma, this had been general­ised: all dharmas are anatman. But, these critics point out, to strive through many lives towards nirvana actually means to ignore such fundamental facts. Thus instead of conceiving of a ‘monolinear’ progress through time, from samsdra to nirvana, what ought to be envisaged is a ‘qualitative leap’ of insight—corresponding to the Buddha’s own enlightenment. This qualita­tive leap beyond nirvana, or outside both samsdra and nirvana, is styled the ‘supreme enlightenment’ (samyak-sambodhi), or the ‘perfection of wisdom’ (prajhd-pdramitd). What has created particular difficulties for early interpreters of such ideas is the fact that ‘nirvana’ here has actually undergone a conceptual transformation. In early Buddhism, it may well have denoted a state of realisation which transcended the realm oiduhkha. Now it is used to denote merely the end of duhkha. Another term created similar difficulties: ‘empti­ness’. Originally it denoted little else than the lack of an dtman. However, the Abhidharma, and the subsequent Theravada philosophies which derived from it, used anatman as one of the three characteristics of aH dharmas. Implicitly or explicitly, these anatman dharmas were regarded as momentarily real (and, in that sense also, any sequence of dharmas, their continuity in time, had to be seen as ‘real’). At this point we have come back to the critique levelled by the proponents of the emptiness teaching against the ‘realist’ trends of the monas­tic life. Developing ideas originally formulated in the schema of the ‘con­ditioned origination’, they state that nothing which is ‘conditioned’ can be regarded as ‘real’ (in the sense of possessing autonomous existence or essence). To take an example of ordinary life: we can perceive of‘cows’ only by virtue of there being non-cows (such as horses, pigs, etc.). ‘Cows’ are thus ‘conditioned’. When this approach is pursued to the highest level of abstrac­tion, even nirvana (as perceived in institutionalised spirituality) is ‘con­ditioned’ by samsdra, and vice versa. Neither can therefore be regarded as possessing autonomous reality. Both are ‘empty’. This does not now imply that what is ‘empty’ is ‘nothing’. Myriads of phenomena are there, for us to perceive, including our own ‘persons’. But none of these dharmas possesses an ontological status which could be denoted by terms like ‘real’, ‘unreal’, etc.

All we can say is that they are empty, because they are conditioned. At this point, what earlier on has been called a ‘qualitative leap’ can be defined in more precise terms. If all dharmas, including samsdra and nirvana, are empty (sunya), it becomes possible to speak of sunyatd, ‘emptiness’ as the common ground of all dharmas (and the term dharmadhatu, ‘root of dharmas’, is indeed found). Sunyatd is ultimate truth, all dharmas make up the realm of relative truth. This realisation of sunyatd is the qualitative leap beyond samsdra and nirvana. It is however important to keep in mind that such ideas are not primarily intended as ‘philosophy’. They are an attempt to back up logically the spiritual programme put forward, and the critique levelled against the striving for personal perfection and nirvana. The true spiritual path aims at the realisation of emptiness in all phenomena, including the Buddha, his teach­ing, nirvana and virtue. This is the supreme enlightenment and the perfection of wisdom. But clearly sunyatd is not something outside, or separate from, the dharmas. Thus, whilst the traditional, institutional approach aimed at leaving samsdra behind in the realisation of nirvana, a dialectical attitude is suggested here. The ‘perfection of wisdom’ can only occur within the realm of the dharmas. This dialectic is now given a particular application. The realm of relative truth is, as earliest Buddhism has taught, the realm of suffering, duhkha. Any insight into its fundamental nature cannot now ignore the (relative) reality of duhkha and of suffering beings. The very insight into this is experienced as stimulating an active drive towards making the medicine of the Buddha’s teachings available. This is conceptualised as the ‘perfection of compassion’, karuna-paramitd.

Mahayana literature refers to the type of Buddhist it criticises by means of the term srdvaka. This is the person who receives the Dharma externally and makes use of it purely for personal spiritual advance­ment towards nirvana. Contrasted with him is the bodhisattva who aims at the ‘qualitative leap’ of ‘supreme enlightenment’ and combines the pursuit of wisdom and compassion. Again, the terms ‘bodhisattva’ and ‘perfection (pdrami[td])’ are ancient Buddhist. Popular jdtaka literature is filled with stories depicting the Bodhisattva (that is, the Buddha-to-be in past exis­tences) cultivating the perfection in various virtues. It is not difficult to see how the Mahayana could derive its generalised bodhisattva concept from this. Besides srdvaka and bodhisattva, we find contrasting terms denoting the different spiritual programmes. What has been characterised here as the ‘revivalist’ movement presented itself as the ‘Mahayana’ and labelled the srdvaka tradition the ‘Hinayana’. Our understanding of these terms is not as clear as one would wish for. Possibly the most original meaning of ydna is that of a ‘[spiritual] road’. A contrast could be construed between a ‘broad’ or ‘high’ (for maha) road and a ‘narrow’ or ‘low’ (hina) one. Butmahd could also denote ‘large’, in the sense of incorporating more. This ‘more’ in turn may refer to an enhanced role of laymen, or to the claim frequently made of being the all-embracing, culminating form of Buddhism (thereby actually includ­ing the Hinayana as a lower stage). Alternatively, ydna has been interpreted as denoting a ‘vehicle’. Whilst it is clear that ‘srdvaka’ and ‘Hinayana’ are used as derogatory terms, it is not clear whether ‘Hinayana’ referred to any specific institution or Buddhist community. More likely the term was originally intended as a critique of generally prevalent attitudes.

What has been sketched so far can relatively safely be regarded as fairly early Mahayana teaching. There are however further aspects which have as yet evaded a more precise chronological location within Mahayana history. Thus a considerable amount of material is con­cerned with the glorification of particular meditational exercises (called samadhis) and the specific insights and ‘miraculous’ powers gained through them (e.g. the Samddhirdja- and Surahgamasamddhi-sutras). Then we find reflections on the actual ‘locus’ of supreme enlightenment. Given that man lacked an inner, autonomous core, it seemed preferable to locate the ultimate spiritual experience in some real beyond the individual. In this connection the concept of the tathdgatagarbha, ‘the seed of all Buddhas’, is developed. En­lightenment is perceived as a potential (the ‘seed’) latent in all men and, moreover, as ultimate reality which in some sense gave rise to the world of phenomena. Or again, a closer relationship between the realm of dharmas and the perceiving mind was established. An ultimate insight into the nature of reality could only be regarded as ‘achieving’ anything (i.e. liberation) by virtue of reality itself being ‘mental’. We can move away from the realm of suffering not by changing our perception of samsdra and so on, but by realising that—quite literally—they are no more than figments of our imagi­nation. Another very different aspect of the Mahayana is the development of ritualism in connection with specific Bodhisattva and Buddha-figures. Once again legend and myth are busy elevating particular figures to objects of worship and veneration. Conceptually, the ‘trikdya’ evolved as an attempt to provide a systematic exposition of this. Reality is envisaged here as ‘three levels’ (or ‘realms’, lit. ‘chunks, bodies’). There is the realm of the phenomena (nirmdna-kdya), with its Buddhas in ‘flesh and blood’. Then there is the realm of the highest truth (dharma-kdya), ultimate Buddhahood, empti­ness, and at the same time the seat of the eternal Dharma. In between these two is a third (sambhoga-kdya), a heavenly realm filled with Buddhas such as Amitabha and Bodhisattvas like Avalokitesvara.

From all these different trends it becomes clear that both in its beginnings and during its later history the Mahayana was a multifarious movement, mirroring the dynamism of the ‘sects’ of both the Indian Theravada and Mahasanghika. But the Mahayana expressed itself not merely through its enormous sutra literature. On the basis of the latter, far more systematic philosophical and scholastic traditions arose. Some of this speculation found expression in further sutras (see, for instance, the minute scholasticism about the spiritual career of a bodhisattva, divided into ten stages or bhumis, found in the Dasabhumika-siitra, or the lengthy catalogue of samddhis in the Gandavyuha-sutra, or the tathdgatagarbha theory formulated in the Aryd-Srlmdld-sutra). But on the whole it was in identifiable philosophical schools and by individual thinkers that these more systematic trends occurred.

One of the earliest figures to emerge is Nagarjuna (second century ce?) He became the founder of the school of the Madhyamika. His main concern was to place on a philosophical foundation the teaching of‘emptiness’ as lying ‘in between’ (madhyama) the ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’. Perhaps to the following century belonged Saramati who created a system very different from that of Nagarjuna. One truly ‘real’ is assumed here, a cosmic self-luminous Mind which due to extraneous impurities projects, as it were, the world of phenomena. Such ideas influenced Maitre- yanatha (c. 300 ce?), who developed the idea of a cosmic mind further, while he tried, at the same time, to eradicate the blatantly substantialist views of Saramati. It has been suggested that Maitreyanatha was the actual founder of the second grand school of Mahayana philosophy, the Vijnana/Vijnapti- matra (‘Consciousness-Only’), also called Yogacara. Better known represen­tatives of this school are Asanga and the (senior) Vasubandhu (both fourth century ce).

In a sense, Mahayana philosophy reached its culmi­nation during the fourth and fifth centuries ce. Indeed it continued for centuries after this period (e.g. in the famous Nalanda in eastern India and in Kathiavar in the west). But fundamentally new ideas were not produced any more. The religious focus shifted to other areas (which will be discussed in the section on the esoteric traditions.) The various philosophical schools that continued elaborated on the details of existing thought and attempted various syntheses of different trends. Thus out of the combination of ideas found in the Yogacara and Sautrantika (a Hinayana school) evolved the epistemologi­cal school associated with the south Indian Dinnaga (fifth/sixth century ce). Whilst certain followers of the Madhyamika school (like Buddhapalita, fifth century, or Candrakirti, seventh century) restricted themselves to elaborat­ing on Nagarjuna’s arguments and substituting a more satisfactory logic for them, others went further and attempted a synthesis with Yogacara thought. Among these may be mentioned Bhavaviveka of the sixth century. These different attitudes to the thought of Nagarjuna gave rise to considerable controversy within the Madhyamika, and two branches are distinguished: thePrdsarigikas (restricting their efforts to demonstrating the impossibility of all positive propositions) and the Svdtantrikas (who were prepared to accept the more positive fine of the Yogacara teaching). With all these thinkers, Mahayana thought had entered into a philosophical discourse of enormous complexity and technical acumen. It would be impossible to discuss the details of this material here.

But whilst the philosophers were busy refining their systems, and whilst in other areas the esoteric traditions were influencing Buddhist religious life, a much more popular strand continued. This was an increasing trend towards a devotionalism centred around specific grand Bodhisattva-figures. Avalokitesvara appears to have been particularly popu­lar, as some latesutras (like the Kdrandavyuha) and late additions to older ones (particularly to the Lotus-Sutra) demonstrate. We also find figures like the ‘goddess’ Tara being worshipped.

All the various forms of Mahayana Buddhism, with its different literary works, were taken up by the Chinese, and through their mediation transmitted to other Asian countries, like Korea and Japan.

How did the ‘Hinayana’ deal with all these develop­ments? In one sense it attempted to keep abreast in the philosophical discus­sion that was going on under the banner of the Mahayana. Thus it created its own systematic expositions. But in another sense, it simply closed itself off against the attack of the Mahayanists. We must not forget that from an early date onwards the ‘Hinayana’ became fragmented into many different ‘sects’, ‘schools’ and communities, scattered over a very large area. Thus it is impossible to expect a concerted and generally co-ordinated response to Mahayana philosophical critique. Instead we find in various individual schools separate attempts at developing traditional beliefs and practices into coherent philosophical systems that could rival, as far as the sophistication of its analysis was concerned, with its Mahayana competitors. Best known among these is the school of the Sarvastivada, which appears to have spread from Mathura all over northern India and to have found in Kashmir one ofits most important strongholds. In the (junior) Vasubandhu (fifth century) this school’s thought reaches its culmination. Historically, however (as the title of Vasubandhu’s main work itself bears out: Abhidharma-kosa, ‘Treasure of the Abhidharma’), the thinking is primarily an elaboration on the older Abhidharma and thus cannot positively relate to Mahayana metaphysics with its open or implied critique. More nebulous is our information on another school, that of the Sautrantika (associated with the names of Harivarman, third century ce, and the same Vasubandhu of the fifth century, through his own commentary on his Abhidharmakosa). The contrast between the Sarvas­tivada and the Sautrantika has been described as that of philosophical realism versus nominalism. ‘Sarvasti-vada’ itself means the ‘teaching that claims “everything exists”’, and refers to the belief in the reality of all dharmas (including the past and future ones). The Sautrantikas, on the other hand, rejected such ideas and proposed a merely nominal reality for many dharmas. Since ‘nirvana’ was included among the latter category, the school may well be described as nihilist. Nirvana here is, ontologically speaking, ‘nothing’. Both because treatises of the Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika became known relatively early in the West, and also because its teaching draws on seemingly archaic ideas, such Hinayana ideas tended to influence Western interpretation of Buddhism as such.

When we turn to Sri Lankan Theravada, we also find here for the same period (the fifth century or so) attempts at systematising the religious thinking on the basis of the Abhidharma. Buddhaghosa, particularly through his treatise Visuddhimagga (Pali, ‘Path of Purification’) produced the culminating works here. But in many ways the radical extremes of the Sarvastivadins and Sautrantikas are avoided by him.

Buddhist philosophy, particularly Mahayana thought, may be regarded as leading intellectually in India for a number of centuries. There is nothing really comparable, in terms of sophistication, on the ‘Hindu’ side till the seventh century or so. When such systems emerge (and that means not merely dealing with religious issues in a general sense, but presenting themselves as consciously ‘Vedic’), they reveal many traces of Mahayana ideas and of the Buddhist philosophical method generally.