Hindu Philosophies and Theologies

For a variety of motives, the Indians have shown, from an early period onwards, a considerable interest in a more systematic analysis and understanding of the world, man and religion.

Traditionally, the whole arena of Hindu speculation has been conceptualised as the ‘six (orthodox or Hindu) darsanas’. The word ‘darsana’ itself denotes a ‘vision’ or a ‘conception’ of the world and man’s destiny in it; it therefore fuses observation with religious practice. But for a number of reasons, the schema is extremely unsatisfactory. It was formulated at a late stage of the Indian history of thought when most of the thinking listed in it had already lost its relevance to live discussion. It obscures basic distinctions between very different types of systematic thought and their different motivations. It restricts the range of what India produced in the form of critical thought, and ignores all aspects of a historical development and interaction.

When we turn to the individual members in the group of the six darsanas, some further general comments are necessary. Already the later portions of the Rg- Veda demonstrate a great interest in a systematic analysis of the world. More than intellectual curiosity is involved here, for this knowledge is perceived as power, ultimately the power to control one’s own destiny and, in the Upanisads, to reach out for liberation. Two trends may be distinguished even at this early stage: a proto-scientific (sometimes even mechanistic) approach, and attempts to create a metaphysic for ‘mystical’ experiences. In addition, ancillary disciplines were developed that served as tools for both approaches. But as always in India, such neat logical distinctions get considerably blurred in real life. In this context it is important to note that these forms of intellectual activity developed their own institutional structures. Professional school traditions evolved, where specific teaching was handed down and elaborated over the centuries. The primary core of such traditions would vary enormously. But given that at least to the professional within any of these traditions it made up ‘his whole life’, we need not be surprised to find that these cores were expanded and surrounded by a metaphysical framework. Sooner or later, every philosophi­cal school tradition attempted to offer a ‘deeper meaning’ of its subject matter. Presumably this was primarily intended as a religious conceptualisa­tion internal to the tradition, for the professional representatives. But it may well have been directed also towards society at large, justifying itself in this manner. However, what society made of it is yet another affair. It might adopt the whole package, core discipline and metaphysical framework (as was certainly the case of the Vedanta), or ignore the metaphysics and restrict itself to what the tradition had to offer in practical terms (as seems to have been the case frequently with the Yoga- andNydya-darsanas).

Let us begin by exploring the developments in the ‘proto-scientific’ strand of Indian speculation. Probably the most impressive results were reached, at an early period, in the area of language. They were motivated by the need to preserve the older form of the Sanskrit language that itself was rapidly changing and in fact developing various vernacular ‘mother tongues’. At first sight, language consists of an unlimited number of words, put together as sentences. At closer analysis, the number of words reveals itself as finite (say, a hundred thousand). Modifications to a word (the morphemes) show themselves to be far more limited, and also suggest the existence of different types of words (verbs, nouns, adjectives, etc.). In turn, a ‘root’ can be abstracted from this, to which the various morphemes are added. Thus what results from such an analysis is a system consisting of 1. a catalogue of all roots, 2. sets of morphemes and 3. an account of how to combine the two. Such a system was indeed produced; its final form is associated with the name of Panini and belongs to the fifth century âñå. It is presentedin the form of about 4,000 formulas (calledsutras), systematically ar­ranged and incomprehensible without the explanation ofthe commentaries.

In its own right, grammar could hardly claim a place in an account of the Indian religions. But Indian thought perceived a close affinity between language and the world, and in addition applied the methods and the principles of analysing it to other areas. As to the affinity with the world, whole metaphysics evolved. Language in the abstract (this may be called the Vedas or sabda-brahman, the brahman of words) possesses eternal, autonomous being.

As far as the method is concerned, both in approach and in the presentation of its results parallels to other areas of enquiry were perceived. Here was an ideal example of ordering an amorphous and seem­ingly infinite set of phenomena, by reducing this ‘chaos’ to a limited set of primary factors and the rules governing their combination and interaction. Obviously this could be applied to the whole world of human experience. From an early period, Indian thought envisaged four or five primary ele­ments that made up all material forms (earth, water, fire, air and possibly ether). Correlations of these five to the five human sense-organs (eye for sight, etc.) were attempted (earth being an object for all five, ether—as carrier of sound—only for the ear). At an early date, forms of atomism emerged which postulated that matter (i. e. the elements) consisted of four or five types ofinnumerable atoms. To account for ‘life’, that means for example organic growth, movement, the healing faculty of the human body, perception and consciousness, the existence of a ‘soul’ or ‘life-principle’ (often called jiva) was postulated. Elements, jivas, and space and time which made up the continuum within which matter and life occurred, tended to be regarded as eternal. On the basis of this raw material, whole cosmological systems could be built which described not just the outside world but also the nature of man. It is quite possible that sometimes such systems carried a conscious mechanis­tic intention, directed against more ‘mystical’ or transcendentalist forms of thought.

Out of a concern for debating techniques arose an interest in the structures of human thought and reasoning, and in their relationship with language. Eventually this crystallised as the Nydya-dars'ana, which at a still later stage added a kind of theistic frame to its teaching. Often the Nyaya and Vaisesika were regarded as complementary and thus fused into one.

The scholastic study of the ancient Vedic ritual treat­ises revealed all kinds of contradictions and variations between different branches of the tradition.

Originally at least, these systems of thought tended to bypass the issues that were raised in the Upanisads: samsdra and moksa, the dtman and brahman, and ‘altered states of consciousness’. Jainism drew directly on ‘proto-scientific’ thought to present its own views within the renouncer tradition, and the Buddhists initially refused to put up any kind of systematic, metaphysical account, and even in the Abhidharma presented a very idiosyncratic view of the same proto-science. The earliest attempts within the ‘Hindu’ tradition to deal with such matters centrally still bear the mark of‘proto-scientific’ thought, and it may be argued that differences from the actual teaching found in the Upanisads are due to this impact. Anyway, the darsana Samkhya addressed itself directly to the questions of samsdra and liberation. A very idiosyncratic cosmology was suggested, in which all phenomena other than the eternal and individual souls (called purusas) are derived from one ultimate substance, prakrti. The latter consists of three aspects (gunas, qualities or components) sattva, rajas and tamas. Since the latter unequivocally means ‘darkness’, the other two are most easily explained as ‘dust’ or ‘haze’ (rajas) and ‘brilliance, light’ (sattva). Because of these three different ingredients, prakrti time and again evolves increasingly ‘gross’, material forms. The result is a view of the person consisting of a body (made up of five subtle elements—which carry the karma after a person’s death—and the corresponding gross elements); five senses and five primary faculties of movement; a ‘mind’ (manas). All these are regarded as evolved out of ahah- kdra, the sense of ‘I’, and the latter in turn grows out of buddhi (intellect) which itself is the first stage in the differentiation ofprakrti. A. purusa is fettered by this whole structure, but internally unaffected by it. By locating most aspects of the empirical person in the realm ofprakrti, it becomes almost impossible to say anything at all about the nature of the purusa, for even thought and consciousness are still part of prakrti. The intention seems here to be to prevent any kind of action (even a mental one) being associated with the purusa—an extreme form of the belief in karma. In ordinary circumstances (namely in samsdra), the manas feeds into the ‘self-awareness’ (aharikara) all kinds of false ideas, which are derived from the contact of the senses with their corresponding objects in the material world. By systematically remov­ing the gunas rajas and tamas from the whole structure, the aharikara can be purified. Moreover, it is possible then to influence the buddhi, which at the moment of deepest insight realises that its own nature is evolved from prakrti and that there exists a fundamental difference of the purusa from anything connected with prakrti. At this moment the link betweenpurusa andprakrti is severed, and unimpeded by samsdra thepurusa achieves liberation.

The Samkhyais a difficult system to interpret. The oneness of all being of the Upanisads is maintained here only to the extent that all phenomenal being is unified in prakrti. But the purusas are very many and remain so even in the state of liberation; there is no brahman into which they merge. To what extent the purification of the buddhi is regarded as a purely ‘intellectual’ affair has also been a problem, and to what extent we are actually dealing here with meditational exercises in the form of yoga. Certainly historically, the Samkhya aligned itself very closely with the Yoga- darsana. This link itself is problematic, for it has been suggested that the earliest text of the Yoga-darsana indicates a metaphysics very much at variance with that found in the later commentaries which all appear to project Sam­khya ideas on the sutras. What is important here is the fact that Indian traditions have looked on the Yoga-sutras as the classical account of yoga meditational exercises.

The rationale of these are clear. After preparations of a general ethical and moral kind (yama, that is avoiding negative actions like lying and stealing, and niyama, that is cultivating positive virtues like conten­tedness and endurance), the technical side of yoga can begin. This involves the choice of a place conducive to inner quiet and a bodily posture that allows for comfort, relaxation and concentration (asana). A new rhythm is imposed on one’s breathing intended to slow down and calm our mental processes (pranayama). Our faculty to filter out sense data that are accidental in a given situation is consciously developed further (in pratydhdra, withdrawal of the senses from their objects). Now follow the inner yogic exercises. Dharana (concentration) seeks to increase the length of time a thought can focus on a particular mental object, and thereby to increase its penetrating powers. ‘Meditation’ (dhydna) develops this further towards a merger between the meditating mind and its object, and this culminates in samadhi, where full mental clarity and an ultimate insight into the nature of reality are achieved. Naturally this achievement is seen as constituting liberation (moksa).

The sutra (or a similar device) constitutes the formal expression of all these types of teaching. But unlike the Buddhist sutra, the word refers here to extremely concise formulas which are incomprehensible without a commentary. Such explanations tended to be given orally and are therefore not available to us. Even in those cases where literary commentaries were produced, frequently they have not come down to us. This then made it possible for later commentators to read all kinds of interpretations back into the enigmatic sutras. In the case of the sixth of the dars'anas, the Vedanta, this is particularly apparent.

When discussing theistic and ‘mystical’ matters, the Epics and earlier Puranas used concepts derived from, or related to, the Samkhya system. Even a group of relatively early Upanisads resorted to the Samkhya for their speculative material. Although what can be recognised as ‘Samkhya material’ does not quite correspond to the classical formulation of the system (as found in Isvarakrsna’s Sdmkhyakdrikds and its commentary Yuktidipa, both fifth or sixth century ce), it can by no means be said that we are dealing here with an integral systematisation of the thought of the earliest Upanisads. In fact, a systematic metaphysic which could conceptualise sam- sdra and moksa in terms of brahman and dtman was developed only at a relatively late date. A concept of the ‘transcendental experience’ of brahman was not easily formulated against the background of other philosophical schools. The Brahma- or Veddnta-sutras ascribed to Badarayana (possibly fourth/fifth century ce) are the earliest known attempt to systematise the teaching of the early Upanisads. In turn they served as the scriptural authority for the whole of the Vedanta-dars'ana. ‘Vedanta’ itself means ‘end of the Vedas’ and denotes the Upanisads, as the Veda’s final portion. Thus by its very title this system claims the highest Vedic authority. But from the critical out­sider’s point of view, the systematisation offered by Badarayana is no more than one way of analysing the wide spectrum of Upanisadic thought. Moreover, it contains a major unresolved tension. While the cosmos is envisaged as a real transformation (parindma) of brahman, the liberation of the dtman is seen as a monistic merger into brahman. Later commentators had to decide which of these two positions to adopt for a fully coherent framework.

Thus Gaudapada (in his comments on the Mandilkya-Upanisad, c. seventh century ce) interpreted the world of phenomena as a purely illusory imposi­tion (vivaria) upon the universal Mind (equivalent to brahman). But it was the south Indian Sankara (between 650 and 750) who through his commentary on the Brahma-sutras established the classical exposition of this approach. He proposed two levels of reality (or ‘truth’), an empirical and an ultimate one. The world of the phenomena is explained as the effect of universal ignorance (avidyd) upon pure consciousness (brahman); individuality as the effect of (individual) ignorance on the atman which in essence is identical with brah­man. From the ultimate point of view, brahman is the sole real. Avidyd cannot possess separate, autonomous existence. This dependent relationship be­tween brahman and avidyd is styled a-dvaita, ‘non-dual’. Since brahman alone possesses true being (sat), Sankara cannot accept the existence of a Bhagavan. Thus the God-figures of Hindu religion are conceived of as ultimately illusory aspects of avidyd. Overtly in Gaudapada, and still implicit in the structure of Sankara’s thought, are many Buddhist influences, particularly from the Mahayana. But by identifying, for instance, Mind-Only with brahman, not only does the Vedanta turn substantiafist; it also becomes consciously Vedic, that is Hindu, and anti-Buddhist. Of somewhat doubtful historical value are the accounts that have Sankara imitate the Buddhists by also founding a variety of monastic orders. But monasticism certainly did develop in the tradition of theadvaita- Vedanta. The increasingly subtle discus­sion of the precise relationship of brahman with avidyd (or mdyd, ‘illusion’) gave rise to a number of further schools.

The non-classical Samkhya of the Epics, Puranas and some Upanisads knows of Bhagavan over and above prakrti and the purusas. In Sankara’s system, there was no place for such a figure. But by drawing on the popular devotion to Visnu current in South India at the time (i.e. the tradition of the Alvars), and on theological ideas found in the Pancaratra, Ramanuja (twelfth century ce) created a blatantly monotheistic system. He also applied the cosmological realism of Badarayana to the relationship between brahman (who is Visnu here) and the atman. The universe, with its beings and its material objects, is as it were Visnu’s body. For their existence they depend totally on him (thus again this is advaita), and they are his real external expression—he is ‘differentiated’ into, or ‘qualified’ by, them (visista). Thus the system known as the vis'istddvaita. Later theologians (like Vedantadesika, thirteenth/fourteenth century ce, and his contemporary Pillai Lokacarya) focused on the problematic relationship between the opera­tion of Visnu’s grace and human merit. Eventually, Srivaisnavism, that is the religious movement of the vis'istddvaita, split into two branches. One side maintained that in no way could human merit (acquired through virtue and religious works) be a condition for Visnu’s saving grace. As the cat simply grabs its kitten at the moment of danger and carries it off to safety, Visnu simply comes and saves. The other branch insisted that by this logic either everybody should be in the state of salvation, or Visnu would be a cruel lord. At least in some small measure man must make himself ready to receive the divine grace, as the baby monkey must at least hold on to its mother’s neck in order to be carried into safety.

The period between the thirteenth and the sixteenth centuries witnessed the formulation of many further theistic varieties of the Vedanta. Madhva (thirteenth century) formulated a strictly dualistic system, with Visnu as brahman. Even in the state of liberation, the soul does not lose its individual identity. Nimbarka (before the sixteenth century), Vallabha and Caitanya’s disciples, particularly Rupa and Jiva Gosvami (all sixteenth century) focused on Krsna as brahman. It is impossible here to provide further details on all these theological developments within the Vaisnava or Krsnaite Vedanta.

A commentary on the Brahma-sutras was one of the most prestigious ways of formulating a theology and thereby establishing the orthodoxy of a religious system. But theologies were created in India in many other ways; the example of the Devisataka by Anandavardhana has already been mentioned in a previous chapter. Thus alongside the Pancaratra, the Saiva Agamas had also been transmitted from north India to the south. Against the background of the earlier Saiva mystics (the Nayanars), a theol­ogy was developed on the basis of the Agamas which is called the Saiva- siddhanta. Meykantan, Arulnanti and Umapati (1200-1300 ce) are some of the more important theologians involved in this; they all wrote in the vernacular Tamil. The devotionalism derived from the Nayanars added features in the south which made the system look rather different from its earlier namesake in Kashmir. In a similar manner, Pancaratra ritualism acquired a devotional dimension through the Alvars and Srivaisnavism.

Theism and mysticism (in the sense of meditation- ally gained ‘knowledge’) are, however, not the only areas to which this type of critical and systematic thought was applied. The materials typical of the esoteric traditions (about which more will be said in following sections) also became the object of philosophical investigation. Kashmir was particularly fertile in the production of such systems.

From these various observations it should have become clear that, in spite of the enormous spectrum of different views contained in the labels of the Vedanta, and of the ‘six systems’ generally, Hindu religious speculation does not restrict itself to these traditions. As far as the religious content of this speculation is concerned, a similar variety and flexibility presents itself. Man may be envisaged as capable of achieving his own liberation (through meditation, or through rituals which in turn may be exoteric or esoteric); or he may be regarded as totally dependent on divine grace, or a subtly balanced combination of both views may be proposed. Attempts may be made to gather together the totality of all that exists in one ultimate unity, or irreconcilable and unfusable differences of categories of reality may be perceived to persist even on a fundamental level, or again, combinations of both positions may be proposed. The possible varieties are unlimited, and over more than a millennium Hinduism has formulated a large number of them. That such intellectual dynamism was possible is due to a number of factors: a particular interest of Indian society at large in such matters and its readiness to support its institutionalised forms, but perhaps most of all, the absence of any central and all-embracing doctrinal authority. Naturally, the emergence of ever new religious teachers and movements made the formulation of ever new systems necessary.