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1973 War

From 1967 to 1973, the military situation remained unchanged on the Egyptian-Israeli front during a “war of attrition” that involved intermittent artillery exchanges between Egyptian and Israeli forces across the Suez Canal.

These artillery battles destroyed portions of three Egyptian cities along the canal, namely, Ismailia, Port Said, and Suez. The situation’s untenability increased, portending new war.

The 1973 war began on October 6, 1973, the Jewish high holiday of Yom Kippur, Iwith Egypt and Syria launching a surprise attack against Israel. The holiday was strategically chosen to catch Israeli forces off guard with most soldiers engaged in religious observance and/or on leave from military positions. In messages to the United States, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat explained that this war was not aimed at destroying Israel itself, but at driving Israel back to its pre-1967 position.

The bulk of combat occurred in the Suez Canal in the south and in the Golan Heights in the north between Israeli and Egyptian-Syrian forces, with at least ten other Arab states symbolically aiding in the war effort with personnel, military equipment, and/or financial support. Some Palestinian Arabs fought with the Egyptian-Syrian forces and shelled Israeli towns from Lebanon.

Initially, Israeli aircraft and tanks were destroyed at a high rate. By October 9, Israel grew increasingly concerned that the Arab armies would cross the 1967 borders in an attempt to destroy the state. Fearing that Israel might resort to using nuclear weapons to end the war, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided to accommodate Israeli requests for defense assistance. On October 14, the first American Galaxy transport aircraft arrived with supplies for Israel; other U.S. planes delivered military material and ammunition in the Sinai.

This turned the tide of the war, as Israel broke through Egyptian positions in the south.

On October 16, Israeli forces under the command of General Ariel Sharon crossed the Canal and advanced south toward the City of Suez. That operation, in an area of the Suez Canal called the “Deversoir” (spillway), cut the supply line to Egypt’s Third Army, which was east of the canal, while Sharon’s division was behind it, west of the canal. This untenable situation precipitated Egypt’s acceptance of a cease-fire agreement mediated by Kissinger whereby both Egypt and Israel could claim victory.

On the economic front, the Organization ofArab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced on October 17 that it would reduce its oil production until Israel withdrew from the Arab territories it occupied during the 1967 war. This was followed by a total oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands. The prevailing Cold War atmosphere also complicated the war because the Soviets backed the Arab states and the United States backed Israel; it became increasingly possible that the two superpowers could clash over the Middle East.

Both Israel and Egypt accepted the United Nations cease-fire agreement laid out in Security Council Resolution 338 on October 22, but it was soon broken. On October 23, the Security Council adopted Resolution 339, which confirmed Resolution 338 and called for the dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise a cease-fire. Within two days, the Security Council established a UNEF, and, on October 27, fighting officially ended. Egypt’s success in crossing the Suez Canal and briefly defeating Israeli forces became the primary lesson of the war for Israel.

It is important to note that the United Nations issued virtually no formal resolutions or reports on the situation during the course of hostilities. The first United Nations decision addressing the war, Security Council Resolution 338, was passed only when it was apparent that Egypt’s offensive was stopped and Israel had moved its military from the defensive to the offensive.

In adopting this strategy, the United Nations tacitly confirmed Egypt and Syria’s right to reclaim their territories from Israel. Israel’s military gains allowed for the public representation that neither side lost face, thus opening the door for step-by-step negotiations under U.S. auspices and two disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975. These two disengagement agreements paved the way for Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem, which led to subsequent developments, namely, the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 peace treaty, which both sides have upheld to date.

It should be noted that from 1948 to 1977, Arab states offered no political option to Israel other than war. Palestinian and Arab rhetoric heralded the extinction of Israel, and Arab slogans included “throwing them back into the sea.” Israel’s past experiences and potential military vulnerability were such that it could not ignore these threats. Given this embattled position, Israel resolved towards constructing a society firmly oriented towards national defense at all costs. Israel invested its resources and political influence to encourage the large-scale immigration of Jews into the territory, the creation of a diverse, sustainable economy, and the significant power its defense.

With the occupation of Arab territory after the war came the trans­formation of Israeli society. Security was always a sacred cow in Israel, even before 1967. But, the tragic dichotomy that developed after 1967, one that persists to this very day, is that of a supposedly democratic Israeli society that applies norms of military and police repression against an occupied people next door. Policies enforced by Israel in the territories it occupied following the 1967 war included collective punishment, the deportation and relocation of civilians, the destruction of villages and homes, the denial of the right of return to refugees, and torture. The issues arising out of occupational policies and practices relate to the legal status of Palestinians in accordance with, inter alia, international humanitarian law and more particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and the Hague Convention of 1907.

Israel, however, has claimed the inapplicability of these conventions to the Occupied Territories after the 1967 war because it considers the conflict between it and the Palestinian people is of a non-international character. Moreover, Israel justifies its repressive practices on the basis of its inherent right to self-defense and by reason of military necessity. Israel has further discounted allegations of excessive use of force by labeling their occurrences as anomalous and unsanctioned. To date, Israel has not complied with many of the decisions of the various United Nations bodies aimed at improving living conditions for Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.

Moreover, Israel has placed settlers in the post-1967 Occupied Ter­ritories, a practice which is illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Recently, it was revealed that some of these settlements are also illegal under Israeli law. According to the first official Israeli report on the illegal settlements in the Occupied Territories, which was prepared for submission in March 2005 by former chief state prosecutor and attorney Talia Sasson of the State Attorney’s Office at the request of the state, Israeli governments have for years allowed illegal settlements to be established by turning a blind eye and by using a variety of unofficial and even illegal methods to support them. Sasson’s report, which examines such activities during the past ten years, when more than 120 illegal settlements were established, uncovers the long-standing method by which services and maintenance were supplied by the state to outposts that were never approved by the state, despite orders from the attorneys general to stop the transfers. According to the report, officials in the local authorities of various settlements disregarded the requirements of the law when they budgeted projects for putting up mobile homes, connecting to the waste and electricity infrastructure, establishing kindergartens, etc., for illegal neighborhoods and settlements.

The report inculcates: the Defence Ministry, the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), the Civil Administration, the Police, and the Ministries of Infrastructure, Education, Industry and Trade, Finance, Housing, and Religious Affairs. While Israel has agreed to withdraw its settlements from Gaza under Ariel Sharon’s Disengagement Plan, it anticipates maintaining some territories in the West Bank under a final settlement peace agreement with the Palestinian Authority. Under such an arrangement, Palestinians might cede to Israel large, heavily populated settlements located near the 1967 border and receive corresponding land elsewhere.

Israel’s victory over Arab forces in the 1967 war dramatically changed the landscape of Palestinian politics, as control of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem shifted from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the State of Israel. Subsequently, groups like the PLO that emphasized Palestinian identity over Pan-Arabism gained strength. This period also saw the formation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which was among the first of the Palestinian organizations to use terrorism as a means to win attention to its cause, carrying out numerous terrorist attacks in the international arena, particularly hijackings of civilian airliners.

In 1974, the question of Palestine and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination was reintroduced in the General Assembly following PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat’s speech to the General Assembly on November 13, 1974. Soon, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236, which reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, and Resolution 3237, which granted the PLO observer status, were passed.

F.

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Source: Bassiouni M. Cherif (ed.). A Guide to Documents on the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli Conflict: 1897-2008. Brill,2009. — 322 p.. 2009
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