Arab-Israeli Peace Process: 1967-2008

On March 26, 1979, Egypt became the first Arab state to sign a formal peace treaty with the State of Israel. This was a major step toward the normalization of relations between Israel and its neighbors after the League of Arab States formed a unified Arab stance against Israel with the Khartoum Resolution of 1967.

The United States played a significant role in bringing about the existing Arab-Israeli peace deals, providing parties with both a sense of direction and a mechanism for dialogue. From 1973 to 1977, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger practiced what has been called “step-by-step” peace negotiations—meeting personally with Middle East leaders to secure gradual land and security concessions from each side. The U.S. policy was revised during the Carter administration to a more comprehensive approach that culminated in the first historic peace settlement. Under the presidency of Bill Clinton, the United States resumed its close involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Other documents on related subjects may be found in: Section 3, Arab-Israeli Wars; Section 5, Arms Control and Regional Security; Section 6,Jerusalem and the Holy Sites; and Section 7, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.

Document 289: United Nations Security CouncilResolution 242, DemandingtheWithdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from Territories Occupied in the Recent Conflict (November 22, 1967) [S.C.

Document 290: Statement by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers (Rogers Plan) (December 9, 1969) [The Quest for Peace: Principal United States Public Statements and Related Documents on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process 1967-1983 23-29 (U.S. Dep’t of State, 1984)]. United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers delivered this address before the 1969 Galaxy Conference on Adult Education in Washington. It reveals the U.S. government’s thinking during discussions with the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in an effort to achieve an agreed interpretation of Resolution 242 for negotiations. On December 22, 1969, both Israel and Egypt rejected the Rogers plan, the former because of its resistance to the call for a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, and the latter because it was bound by the Khartoum principles. President Nasser would not accept a separate peace with Israel, nor the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula. He simply would not consider peace on the basis of a military defeat. In a vote in the U.S. Congress in 1970, seventy senators and 280 representatives rejected Secretary of State Rogers’s peace plan as being too one-sided against Israel.

Document 291: Plan Issued by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers (Rogers Plan B) (June 19, 1970) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary HιsτoRγ(Bernard Reich ed., 1995)].

The plan asked that Israel and the United Arab Republic adhere to a cease­fire and that the United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Israel agree to follow through with all parts of Resolution 242. It further states that discussions to carry this out must occur between the groups in order to create a fair and long-lasting peace agreement in which the groups recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of one another. The plan also stated that Israel withdraw from the territories occupied after the 1967 conflict. Secretary of State Rogers writes that the parties must strictly follow the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council from July 1, 1970, to, at least, October 1, 1970. The United Arab Republic, Jordan, and Egypt accepted the plan, and the talks began on August 25, 1970. However, Egypt violated the cease-fire agreement and the United States was reluctant in supporting Israeli claims, so the Israeli ambassador to the United Nations refused to partake in continuing the talks.

Document 292: Plan Issued by U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers (Rogers Plan C) (October 4, 1971) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. In an effort to reach his ultimate goal of lasting peace, William P. Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State, posed the Rogers C Plan. Rogers’ Six-Point Program, addressed to the United Nations General Assembly, remained within the framework of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

The six points were meant to take into account the positions and concerns of both the Israeli and Egyptian side and call for further discussions between the parties.

Rogers claimed there was no alternative to arriving at an interim agreement, which would offer hope to their countries for progress and peace. Israel originally rejected the plan on October 12, 1971. On February 2, 1972, Israel reversed its decision and agreed to begin “close proximity” talks with Egypt, who rejected this method.

Document 293: United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, Calling for a Cease-Fire and Implementation of United Nations Resolution 242 (October 22, 1973) [S.C. Res. 338, U.N. SCOR, 1747th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/338 (1979)]. At the height of the 1973 war, the United States and the Soviet Union worked jointly to present Resolution 338 to the Security Council, calling for an immediate ceasefire, implementation of Security Council Resolution 242, and the start of negotiations aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East. ∣A cease-fire was soon arranged, achieved at least in part as a result of efforts by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his shuttle diplomacy. Resolutions 338 and 242 have since formed the basis of most peace negotiations.

Document 294: United Nations Security Council Resolution 344, Noting that a Peace Conference for the Implementation of Resolution 242 Is to Begin Shortly in Geneva (December 15, 1973) [S.C. Res. 344, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/344 (1973)]. In Resolution 344, the Security Council calls for the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) at an anticipated peace conference in Geneva to be held under the auspices of the United Nations.

Document295: Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and IsraelRegardingthe Geneva Peace Conference (Sinai II Accords) (September 1, 1975) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. An agreement was reached between the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the government of Israel that furthered the disengagement of military forces. The leaders decided the conflict in the Middle East will be resolved by peaceful means rather than through military force. The parties agreed to strictly follow the cease-fire on land, sea, and air, and to refrain from using force or military blockades against one another. The agreement required a safe passage for all non­military cargoes headed for Israel through the Suez Canal.

The Sinai II Accords set up rules concerning the redeployment of military forces and their limitations in armament. It outlined the definitions of the lines, and created buffer zones. The provisions of the annex and map in the agreement include a partial pullback of Israel troops from the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai Peninsula and a return of the Abu Rudeis oil fields. In addition, the United States was called to perform continual aerial surveillance missions of the areas covered by the agreement, with results readily available to Israel, Egypt, and the chief coordinator of the U.N. Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

In memoranda agreements between Israel and the United States, the United States assured Israel it will support its best interests by aiding the government with military supplies and pursuing a final peace agreement between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan.

Document 296: Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt (September 4, 1975) [ available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/egypt_interim_eng.htm]. This detailed interim agreement between Israel and Egypt covers such topics as the definitions of boundary lines and areas, buffer zones, terms for the process of implementation, and inspections by the UNEF. It also includes a proposal from the United States drafted by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that describes the role that the United States could play in monitoring the border between Egypt and Israel.

Document 297: A Mideast Proposal by M. Cherif Bassiouni and Morton A. Kaplan (Revision) (1977) [M. Cherif Bassiouni & Morton A. Kaplan, A Mideast Proposal (2d ed. 1977)]. This Mideast proposal embodies the principle of land for peace, as later outlined in Sadat’s speech and the Camp David agreement. It recognizes both Israel’s need for security within the region and the Palestinians’ need for a homeland. It stresses that all involved parties must agree on certain principles in advance of the Geneva Conference for peace negotiations to succeed. It insists that the Arab states cannot make peace except on the condition of a return to the pre-1967 borders and a Palestinian settlement. It offers a fourteen-point protocol for peace, as well as commentary on such contentious issues as compensation, territorial access, and Jerusalem.

Document 298: United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Joint Statement (Vance- Gromyko Communique) (October 1, 1977) [77 Dep’t St. No. 2002, 639-40 (1977)]. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko issued this joint statement as co-chairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. The statement sets forth three major protocols: (1) a settlement that is comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestine Question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations; (2) negotiations to be held within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference; and (3) all the parties to the conflict must understand the necessity for careful consideration of each other’s legitimate rights and interests. The United States and the Soviet Union express their readiness to participate in these guarantees.

Document 299: Excerpts from Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's Address to the Knesset (November 20, 1977) [available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/ sadatspeech_eng.htm]. In a bold move aimed at clearing the way for peace talks while still technically in a state of war, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat went to Jerusalem to speak directly to Israeli leaders in the Knesset and, through them, to the Israeli people. He began his speech by emphasizing the value of peace, as well as the common bond of Muslims, Christians, and Jews to the land ofJerusalem and to a shared monotheistic tradition. Sadat laments the internecine nature of war that harms Arabs and Israelis alike. He argues that a durable and just peace cannot be reached between Israel and Egypt or any other Arab nation without first finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem—which Sadat identifies as the crux of the issue. Sadat outlines the conditions for a lasting peace, one that is principally based on Security Council Resolution 242 and the “land for peace” model. He insists that Israel completely withdraw from the Occupied Territories, including Arab Jerusalem. Peace negotiations followed Sadat’s address almost immediately.

Document 300: Address of Prime Minister Menahem Begin at the Knesset in Response to President Sadat’s speech (November 20, 1977) [available at http://wwwjewishvirtual library.org/jsource/History/begintoknessetsadat.html]. The prime minister starts by dwelling on the common heritage of Islam and Judaism, both of which heralded the universal principle of the ban on human sacrifice. He praises the courage of President Sadat, but takes issue with him by insisting on the unique bond between the Jewish people and the Land of Israel, for “we took no foreign land, we returned to our homeland,” and by claiming that it was Israel that had always extended its hand in peace and was turned down by the Arab side. He defines the meaning of the peace that needs to be made as a true reconciliation between the Jewish people and the Arab people. For this to be achieved, it would be necessary not to be daunted by the bitter memories of the past. Prime Minister Begin supports President Sadat’s claim that his is not an initiative for a separate peace with Israel, for Israel wants peace with all its neighbors. The peace that would be negotiated with Egypt should usher not only in the end of the state of war between the two nations but also in normal diplomatic relations and economic cooperation, for, as King Hassan of Morocco has rightly said, the combination of Arab and Jewish genius can together convert the region into a paradise on earth. In the peace negotiations, Mr. Begin promises that” everything will be negotiable,” but at the same time he dwells extensively on the unique bond between the Jewish people and Jerusalem. He also proposes to reconvene the Geneva Peace Conference to which he expects all Israel’s Arab neighbors should be invited.

Document 301: Six-Point Program signed by the leaders of the PLO’s Constituent Organizations in Tripoli, Libya (December 4, 1977) [ reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. Following Sadat’s visit to the Knesset, the PLO drafts the six-point program to protest Sadat’s “treasonous visit.” The program calls for the formation of the steadfastness and Confrontation Front, continued striving toward a Palestinian state, and a boycott of the sadat regime.

Document 302: Declaration of the Arab League Summit Conference in Tripoli, Libya (December 5, 1977) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The Arab League’s 1977 summit culminated in a declaration that served two major purposes. First, it complimented the PLO’s six-point plan by condemning Anwar Sadat and going so far as to halting diplomatic relations with Egypt. second, the declaration takes steps to applaud the PLO in its resistance against the Zionists.

Document 303: Statement by U.S. President Jimmy Carter (Aswan Formula) (January 4, 1978) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. In the Aswan Declaration, or Aswan Formula, Jimmy Carter addressed Egyptian President Answar Sadat and the people of Egypt. Carter commended President sadat’s initiatives towards seeking peace with israel. in his formula, some critical steps to peace were Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it began occupying after 1967 and securing borders in regulation with United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. He stressed the importance of recognizing the rights of the Palestinian people and resolving the Palestinian problem so that they are able to partake in the decisions affecting their own future. With this, he hoped to make 1978 the year that brings peace to the Middle East.

Document 304: Resolutions from the Arab Summit in Baghdad, Iraq (November 5, 1978) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. Arab leaders held a summit in Baghdad, Iraq, after the signing of the camp David Accords. At this summit the leaders discussed the importance of Pan-Arab responsibilities in their struggle against Zionist power and aggression against the interests of Arab nations. The summit affirmed the necessity of Arab nations to come together and make material and moral sacrifices for their common struggle for rights of the Arabs in Palestine and the occupied Territories. The leaders resolved that a settlement regarding Palestine would not be acceptable unless it is agreed upon and adopted by a resolution of an Arab summit conference. The discussions from the summit deemed it important that no nation should take unilateral action in the Arab-Zionist conflict. The leaders concluded that the agreements signed by the Egyptian government at camp David did not follow the resolutions of previous Arab summit conferences, specifically those at Algiers and Rabat. The agreements Egypt signed hurt the rights of Palestinians as well as the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine, so the summit called upon Egypt to end its unilateral action in these affairs.

Document 305: PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat: Interview on Camp David (November 19, 1979) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. In his interview with the Algerian newspaper Al-Sha'b, Arafat addresses the Camp David Accords as a counterattack on the Palestinian people in response to the steadfastness and Confrontation Front. Arafat describes Camp David as just one battlefront in the fight for Occupied Territories and Lebanon.

Document 306: The Baghdad Resolution issued by the League of Arab States (March 31, 1979) [reprinted in A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Charles L. Geddes ed., 1991)]. The Baghdad Resolution condemned the Egyptian government for acting unilaterally and against the sixth, seventh, and ninth Arab summits, which prohibited Arab leaders from signing a peace treaty with the Zionists. In doing so, the Egyptian government hurt the interests of Arab solidarity, specifically by going against its national duty to help liberate the occupied Arab land and help the people of Palestine. To reprimand Egypt, the Arab foreign ministers resolved to withdraw Arab ambassadors from Egypt, end political and diplomatic relations, move the headquarters of the Arab League from Cairo to Tunis, and to only continue working with the Arab people in Egypt that were not involved in working with the Zionist enemy. Because these leaders felt that the peace treaty Egypt signed violates the rights of the Palestinian people, they decided to work to keep other countries from supporting the treaty. Through the foreign, economic, and finance ministers, the Council of the Arab League decided to stop giving loans or offering economic aid to Egypt, and to cease supplying oil to Egypt because the treaty obligates Egypt to sell oil to Israel. The resolution also banned any trade with Egyptian establishments that trade with their Zionist enemy. This resolution left Egypt cut off from the Arab world, but after signing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Egypt itself announced that it would freeze relations with the Arab League, so this result was predicted.

Document 307: Plan issued by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz (The Fahd Plan) (August 7, 1981) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia outlined his plan for a settlement of the Palestinian process in an interview with the saudi Press Agency. The principles he necessitated for a peaceful settlement included the following: Israel’s withdrawal and removal of settlements from the territories occupied after 1967; the guarantee of freedom of worship for all religions; protection of the Palestinian people’s rights, with the right to return to their homeland; placement of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under U.N. control for a few months; the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital; and finally, the guarantee of peace for all states in the region.

Document 308: Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt (September 17, 1978) [17 I.L.M. 1466 (1978)]. The pivotal Camp David talks brought together Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and their advisors for the first time to conduct earnest peace negotiations. These ten-day talks took place at U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s presidential retreat, Camp David, in Maryland. After an unsteady beginning, the parties agreed to the Framework for Conclusion of a Peace between Egypt and Israel, which sets out the terms for normal relations between the two countries in return for Israel’s evacuation of the sinai. it is agreed that a formal peace treaty will be signed within three months.

Document 309: Annex to the Framework Agreements: Exchange of Letters between U.S. President Jimmy Carter, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (September 17-22, 1978) [The Quest for Peace: Principal United States Public Statements and Related Documents on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process 1967-1983 83-87 (U.S. Dep’t of State, 1984)]. In these letters, U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter serves as a secure conduit for Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to give notification of progress on the peace process and to express concerns. in the first letter, Begin reports that the Knesset will soon approve the removal of settlers from the Sinai. In response, Sadat affirms Egypt’s position that all settlers must be withdrawn as a prerequisite to a final peace treaty and states that Arab sovereignty should be restored in Arab Jerusalem. in response, Begin states that a unified Jerusalem is the capital of the State of Israel. In transmitting this letter to Sadat, Carter assures him that the United States does not accept or recognize Israeli measures as altering the status of Jerusalem. Sadat presses the issues of the West Bank and Gaza and restoring the rights of the Palestinian people. In a final letter from Carter to Begin, Carter acknowledges that in each paragraph of the anticipated treaty, Israel will understand the terms “Palestinians” or “Palestinian People” as referring to “Palestinian Arabs” and the term “West Bank” as referring to “Judea and Samaria.”

Document 310: Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt (March 26, 1979) [18 I.L.M. 362]. Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat signed this peace treaty on the front lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C. Thus, Egypt became the first Arab country to make peace with Israel. It contains nine articles, a military annex, an annex on relations between the parties, agreed minutes interpreting the main articles of the treaty, a withdrawal schedule, and security arrangements.

Document 311: Venice Declaration on the Middle East, Venice European Council (June 13, 1980) [6 E.C. Bull. 10 (1980)]. The Venice Declaration was issued in the wake of the U.S.-brokered peace treaty between Israel and Egypt to signal Europe’s intention to play a more active role in future peace deals.²³⁰ European Council members state that the traditional ties and common interests that link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role in securing regional peace. With the Venice Declaration, the nine member states of the European community set the basis of their unified policy as follows: the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by force, the necessity of a negotiated solution, security for all states in the region, and respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including self­determination. The declaration maintains that European council member states will not recognize any unilateral initiatives aimed at changing the status of Jerusalem.

Document 312: Crown Prince Fahd’s Eight-Point Peace Proposal (Fez Declaration) (August 8, 1981) [reprinted in A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Charles L. Geddes ed., 1991)]. Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia created eight principles to bring a lasting and peaceful settlement to Palestine, which were brought before the twelfth Arab summit. Fahd declared that a true peace needs to recognize the rights of both groups. The Fez Declaration competed with the Camp David Accord, so the U.S. Department of State declined to comment on it, and Ariel Sharon, then Israel’s Defense Minister, declared that he would establish eight additional settlements for each of Fahd’s principles. The heads of the Arab states at the summit adopted the plan after making slight changes. The leaders of the Arab states added the point that the Palestinian people’s rights need to be recognized under leadership of the PLO, as their legitimate representative. The leaders also added that the Security Council should help guarantee peace in the region, including peace in an independent Palestinian state. The summit declared that the Security Council should guarantee respect of these principles.

Document 313: Proposal by the Soviet Union for a Middle East Settlement (July 29, 1984) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. During the 1980s the Soviet Union and the United States put forth efforts to influence the Middle East. The USSR recommended proposals to finalize a settlement in the region. The Soviet Union maintained that all Israeli settlements set up after 1967 in Arab territories should be dismantled and the properties occupied by Israel after 1967 given back to the Arabs, resulting in fixed borders for the two groups. Agreeing with the declaration from the Arab Summit at Fez, the Soviet Union declared that the PLo should be recognized as the representative of the sovereign, independent, Palestinian state, and that the Palestinian territories should be supervised by the United Nations for the beginning months. The Palestinian state and other Arab states should likewise recognize the sovereignty of israel. The USSR further agreed with the Fez Declaration that East Jerusalem should be returned to the Arabs and all religions must be able to freely worship. The proposal stressed the importance of all parties being involved in the agreement and settlement process in order to ensure lasting peace in the Middle East. All concerned and participating parties should therefore convene at an international conference on the Middle East that should end in the signing of treaties approved by all countries that follow the principals of USSR’s proposal. The conference was meant to develop solutions to all other aspects of conflict in the region and establish an international guarantee that all parties maintain the settlement and allow for a lasting peace.

Document 314: Joint Statement Issued by Jordanian King Hassan II and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres (July 23, 1986) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. After a series of meetings, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and King Hassan of Morocco issued a joint statement. The meetings also included three of Peres’ advisors and Rafi Edri, a Moroccan member of israel’s Knesset. By participating in these meetings Hassan became the second Arab leader to officially and openly meet with Israel’s senior officials. The meeting was mostly devoted to discussing the Fez Declaration. The meeting was solely expletory, with no intentions to begin negotiations. King Hassan II reported back to the Arab leaders Mr. Peres’ observations and conditions he finds necessary to establish peace. Likewise, Mr. Peres reported to the israel government the explanations and viewpoint King Hassan offered with regards to each element of the Fez Declaration.

Document 315: The Peres-Hussein London Agreement (April 11, 1987) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. Negotiations between Israeli and Jordanian leaders led to this document, which would serve as the guidelines for finding a political settlement between the two nations as well as with Palestinian representatives. However the intended conference failed to develop as planned due to hesitation on both sides.

Document 316: Madrid Declaration (June 27, 1989) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. At the end of the semi-annual European Community Summit on June 26 and 27, 1989, the twelve heads of state released a formal statement on the situation in the Middle East. The Madrid Declaration says that through peaceful means a lasting settlement must be reached in which the PLo is involved and all states in the region, including Palestine and Israel, have secure and recognized borders. The European Council let known its appreciation of the decisions of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers to accept the Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizing Israel’s right to exist and renouncing terrorism.

The declaration appealed to Israeli authorities to end its repressive measures in the Occupied Territories, where the number of dead and wounded was constantly increasing. Particularly it called for the reopening of educational facilities in the West Bank, but also asked Israel to follow the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Populations in Times of War. The European Council also supported the idea of elections in the occupied Territories to contribute to the peace process towards a just and lasting settlement.

Document 317: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s Ten-Point Plan (July 1989) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. In order to facilitate the slow-moving process of Arab-Israeli negotiations, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak offered a ten-point plan regarding an election process in the West Bank. The points included that all Palestinians in the West Bank should be allowed to vote and run for office, without interference from Israeli authorities. On Election Day the Israeli army would withdraw from the polling places and only Israelis that live or work in the Occupied Territories should be permitted to enter. Israel must agree in advance that it will accept the outcome of the election and negotiate for peace, while also protecting its security. Mubarak’s ten-point plan also stated that both the United States and Israel should publicly accept and agree to adhere to the plan.

Document 318: Common Agenda between Israel and Jordan (September 14, 1993) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel- Jordan+Common+Agenda.htm]. The Common Agenda between Israel and Jordan was the blueprint for the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan that soon followed.²³¹ It addresses key issues such as security, water, borders, territorial matters, and refugees and displaced persons.

Document 319: Washington Declaration by Israel, Jordan, and the United States (July 25, 1994) [available at http://www.kinghussein. govjo/wash_decl2.html]. The Washington Declaration was signed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordan’s King Hussein in Washington, D.C., during a formal ceremony hosted by U.S. President Bill Clinton. Its major achievement is a series of agreements and

concrete steps that terminate the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel, with both states agreeing to seek a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The Washington Declaration further recognizes the special role of the Hashemite Kingdom with regard to Muslim Holy Shrines inJerusalem. Ultimately, the declaration signals Israel and Jordan’s intention to sign a formal peace treaty.

Document 320: Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan (October 26, 1994) [34 I.L.M. 43]. This treaty signed by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul Salam Majali establishes a solid framework for political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Among other arrangements, it includes provisions to control water usage from the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers. This peace treaty was only the second of its kind to be made between Israel and one of its Arab neighbors.

Document 321: Casablanca Declaration (November 1, 1994) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. To bring new economic cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa, hundreds of Arab and Israeli government officials and corporate executives met in Casablanca, Morocco. The Casablanca Declaration outlined a plan for regional economic growth that was linked to bringing Arab-Israeli peace. The business leaders from around the world and the representatives from sixty-one countries recognized their mutual dependence and common goals. Peace agreements forged by the government leaders should be made to foster incentives for trade and investment for private sectors to further the peace process.

The Casablanca Declaration expressed a need in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for economic development that required international attention to support the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles that is meant to enable the Palestinian people to participate at an equal level in the regional development. All attendees at the conference agreed to promote investment from inside and outside the region by overcoming obstacles to trade and investment, such as boycotts, and to play out the economic potential of the Middle East.

Document 322: Statement Issued at the Cairo Summit (February 2, 1995) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. Leaders from Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority met in their determination to facilitate the process towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In this statement issued at the Cairo Summit, the parties agreed to move forward in concluding the negotiations of the interim agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The leaders further condemned the violence in the Middle East and stated their intentions to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction in the region. They also agreed to work towards educational improvements as well as economic enhancement through cooperation and a regional development bank.

Document 323: Speeches Given by U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruk al-Shara at the Renewal of Syrian-Israeli

Negotiations (December 15, 1999) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The speeches by President Clinton, Ehud Barak, and Farouk al-Shara in this document reflect the starting point for an attempt at a new round of aggressive negotiations between israel and syria. Within the following weeks, however, the negotiations grinded to a halt and did not result in any agreements.

Document 324: Draft Agreement between Israel and Syria, Prepared by the United States (January 13, 2000) [available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/syrdraft. html]. The Clinton administration presented this draft peace treaty to the State of israel and the government of the syrian Arab Republic before his departure from office. It was never signed as talks broke down between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian President Hafez Assad.

Document 325: Riyadh Declaration (March 29, 2007) [available at http://www. saudiembassy.net/2007News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=703]. The two- day summit of the ninteenth session of the Council of the League of Arab States established a renewed roadmap for peace in the Middle East. The declaration called for solidarity among Arab states, renunciation of extremism, and a plan to reach a peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The summit reiterated its support for the so-called Saudi Peace plan (that was endorsed by the 2002 Arab League Summit in Beirut) that called for Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders with Syria and the Palestinians, resolve the refugees problem and the question of Jerusalem in exchange for full peace with the entire Arab world.

Document 326: Trip Report by Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan (April 22, 2008) [available at http://www. cartercenter.org/news/trip_reports/middle_east_2008.html]. President Carter visited several Mid-East leaders, including those from Syria and Hamas, to discuss the challenges and options available in the ongoing peace process for the region. His synopsis recalls meetings with various leaders and organizations, discusses his role on the trip, and provides a summary of the results. The report’s most substantive elements include Carter’s reflection on his meetings with Syrian and Hamas leaders, specifically noting those states’ concerns and peace process options to which they are most receptive.

5.