Conclusion

These two case studies reveal considerable variance in law-makers’ willing­ness to address and resolve procedural difficulties facing their respective assemblies. The United States Senate was able to call upon the thoughtful analysis of George Washington.

In 1799 the House disregarded best practices governing the exchange of views between its members. The resulting debacle reached a climax when Pitt and Tierney squared off, one after the other. But that breach of best practices must be set within a much larger frame. Pitt and Tierney disputed the ‘average price of war and peace’ after two very long intervals transpired in which Commons had abandoned its oversight role. The House of Com­mons failed to perform the ‘sacred, important, and indispensable duties’ of that body, as Petty reminded the House, ‘namely that of examining into the expenditure of public money’.⁷⁶ These lapses may be dated to the intervals 1787 to 1791 and 1793 to 1797.

A larger question now comes into focus. Do better procedural rules make better bills and resolutions? In this perspective, canals, treaties, account­ings and budgets - and their anticipated benefits and burdens - drop out of the analysis. In place of such narrow considerations, the investigator might explicitly ask: ‘what is required for a national legislative assembly to write rules that do not export burdens to civil society?’ After having posed the question in the negative, an investigator might also ask how a legislative assembly should go about writing procedures that affirmatively deliver ben­efits and alleviate burdens in political society.

Notes

1 A treaty of Peace and Amity between the Dey of Algiers and United States of America, 8 Stat. 133, 136; Article XXII.

2 London Encyclopedia, 473-474.

3 Cobbett’s, Parliamentary History, 33:351; 24 March 1797. Sheridan held his nose and voted for the Restriction Act. 37 Geo. 3 c. 45. There ‘might be hopes for the old gentlewoman once more regaining her credit and injured reputation. In order to facilitate this, he should support the amendment’.

4 Tierney, George. Accessed from the official online biography at www.history ofparliamentonline.org/volume/1790-1820/member/tierney-george-1761-1830. Last accessed 20 May 2016.

5 Parliamentary History, 34:1142; 28 June 1799.

6 Commons Journal, 54:673; 20 June 1799.

7 Cobbett’s, Parliamentary History, 34:1143-44, 28 June 1799.

8 Ibid, 34:1144.

9 Ibid., 34:1144-45.

10 Ibid., 34:1144.

11 Commons Journal, 54:731, 11 July 1794, Resolution 21.

Cobbett’s, Parliamentary History, 34:1145.

Ibid., 34:1146.

Lloyd’s Evening Post (London, July 3, 1799 - July 5, 1799; Issue 6530), 1. Ibid., 2.

Commons Journal, 54:673; 20 June 1799.

Cobbett’s, Parliamentary History, 34:1144, 1150.

Commons Journal, 54:736, 11 July 1799.

Ibid.

Figures drawn from Bank of England publications; last accessed 28 January 2017. bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/default.aspx affords access to the webpage titled ‘Three Centuries of Macro Economic Data’. The Table ‘threecenturies_ v2.3’ appears in Excel format; Sheet A- 18 supplies ‘National Debt 1691-2015’ figures per fiscal year. The figure for 1790/1891 was £233,000,000. 1775/1776 was the ninth year of a similar (and most proximate) interval in which the funded national debt experienced a similar decline in YoY reduction.

Commons Journal, 54:736, 11 July 1799.

Smith, Wealth, 908. ‘An immediate and great expense must be incurred in that moment of immediate danger, which will not wait for the gradual and slow returns of the new taxes. In this exigency, government can have no other resource but in borrowing’.

U.S. Const. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2; ‘The President... shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur’.

Documentary History, 2:31-35, 22 August 1789.

Ibid., 2:24, 6 August 1789. “Ordered... a committee... to wait on the Presi­dent of the United States, and confer with him on the mode of communication proper to be pursued between him and the Senate, in the formation of Treaties’. Ibid.

Washington, Writings, 30:373-74 ‘Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Commit­tee on the Mode of Communication between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations’, 8 August 1789; 30:377-79 ‘Sentiments Expressed to the Senate Committee at a Second Conference on the Mode of Communica­tion between the President and the Senate on Treaties and Nominations’, 10 August 1789.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

8 Stat 178-196; 19 Dec. 1801 (Final Ratification).

I. Draft Amendment. President Thomas Jefferson, on or before 9 July 1803. Founders Online, National Archives, last modified 28 December 2016; last retrieved 31 January 2017. http://founders.archives.gov/ documents/ Jefferson/01-40-02-0523-0002

Senate Executive Journal, 1:376-77; last retrieved from www.memory.loc.gov/ ammem/amlaw/lwej.html 18 October 2016.

Jefferson, Manual, 422.

Ibid.

United States Senate, Rules for Conducting Business in the Senate [printed with Joint Rules Acted on between the two Houses] (Washington, DC:1801).

Hatsell, 1774 Standing Orders. Hatsell, 1792 Standing Orders. Jefferson, Manual, 356.

Thorne, History, 4:302.

41 Daunton, Trusting, 44-47.

42 Parliamentary History, 33:1361; “Debate on Mr. Pitt’s Proposition for the Redemption of the Land Tax”; 2 April 1798.

43 Daunton, Trusting, 10-13.

44 Ibid., 13.

45 Ibid.

46 Commons Journal, 35:443, 15 November 1775.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Parliamentary Debates, 1:295, 299-300; 21 May 1806.

50 Roseveare, Treasury, 63-64.

51 Commons Journal, 15:367; 29 March 1707.

52 Ibid. 18:23 [Treasury officials required to certify recovery efforts on Crown creditor claims].

53 Einzig notes that ‘under the Hanoverian Kings no Public Accounts Committees were appointed until 1780’. Einzig, Control, 169.

54 Hatsell, Members/Speaker, 76.

55 As his authority for this ‘rule and order’, Hatsell settled on a citation to a Stand­ing Order governing House of Lords procedure:‘On the 31st of March, 1707, the Lords [direct as follows]’. Hatsell, Members/Speaker, 75 n. 1.

56 Hatsell, Members/Speaker, 75-76.

57 Commons Journal, 46:34; 4 December 1790.

58 Ibid., 46:390; 8 April 1791.

59 Ibid., 46:483; 10 May 1791.

60 Ibid., 46:614-16; 19 May 1791.

61 Ibid., 46:87-89; 15 December 1790.

62 See text at 61-62.

63 Commons Journal, 52:386; 10 March 1797.

64 Ibid.

65 State of the Nation, Unnumbered p. 4 of prefatory material in 1st of 4 vols.

66 Bank of England Restriction, 396.

67 London Gazette, 25-28 February 1797; Issue 13986; 204-205.

68 London Encyclopedia, 473.

69 Bank of England Restriction, 397. Pitt represented ‘the Bank as a passive, or even unwilling, instrument in the hands of the Privy Council’, the essayist argues. Pitt’s expedient of milking the Bank of England ‘was shallow, and unworthy of so great a man ; nor was it likely to deceive any person, however dull of compre­hension he might be’.

70 Duffy, Pitt, 122.

71 Ibid.

72 Rolliad.

73 Congress Journal, 20:545-48; 26 May 1781.

74 ‘Loughlin, ‘The Rule of Law: A Theme in Five Variations’, Frontiers of Law in China (Vol. 10, No. 3) 436, at 447.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid. at 295.