Conclusion

The rebirth of the compensatory jurisdiction is important in its own way. It made complete—at least in Australia and, seemingly, Canada—the suite of remedies equity had available to it.

This is not the place to enlarge on this.^[810] But it does take me back to the begin­ning of this chapter. If, as seems the case, the early nineteenth-century jurisdic­tion to make good representations embodied the essentially eighteenth-century notions of fair dealing and good faith, these were all but snuffed out in the second half of the nineteenth century. The legacy of the House of Lords' decisions begin­ning with Jorden v Money and ending in Derry v Peek was a new ideology in the law of obligations that made virtues of certainty and self-reliance.

In England, the constraining effect of this new order on equity jurisprudence was marked and still subsists^[811] (though with lessening intensity) to this day.^[812] Chancery's rear-guard action was fought in Nocton v Ashburton. It may have paved the way for the common law development in Hedley Byrne. Yet, in retrospect, its great achievement was to secure equity's ‘exclusive jurisdiction' from further dep­redations. This was there to be built on in Australia in the 1980s and beyond. And it was.^[813] Equitable doctrines and remedies were reformed. Fair dealing and good faith returned to their needed place in Australian jurisprudence.^[814] This time, though, they have been reinforced by comprehensive legislation.^[815]