Socio-Psychological Dimensions

It is difficult to understand this conflict without some insight into the ethos and pathos of the protagonists. There is in this respect much to be said, and what follows only scratches the surface.

Who is an Arab and who is a Jew? Both questions are far more complicated than one may imagine.

An Arab is someone who lives in a country whose official language is Arabic. Such countries, now twenty-two by their membership in the League of Arab States, vary culturally. They range from Morocco on the Atlantic to the Gulf States on the Indian Ocean to sub-Saharan Arab states, from Mauritania on the Atlantic to Djibouti on the Red Sea. These countries are essentially linked by their having been at one time part of the world of Islam dominated by Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, the Arab identity and its cultural characteristics merged with the values of Islam and were propagated in tandem with that religion. In time, as the Arabo-Islamic cultural characteristics were assimilated into local cultures, they produced a set of linked, though culturally unique, groups. The overlapping of these three circles and their interaction in different societies makes for real distinctions among Arab states and much more so between Arab Muslim states and non-Arab Muslim states. This is one of the challenges faced by Islamic nationalism.

As stated above, the three circles encompassing the Arab world are dominated by a shared Arabo-Islamic culture. The first is linked to the values and social characteristics of Arab Bedouin tribes. The second is linked to the earlier period of Islam under the Prophet and the four righteous Khalifas, and the values that they represented. But there is also a stratum of Western influence, which is in part European and in part American.

The Arab-Bedouin culture values hospitality, generosity, courage, honor, self-respect, formality, and face. These social values are reflected in the Arabic language, which holds an almost spellbinding effect on its people. Its rhetoric is made of exaggeration, over-assertion, and the evocation of poetic historical and mystical imagery. In this rhetoric, there is no necessary connection between words and reality. Promises and threats are as good as accomplished, and with the mere assertion of the word, the deed becomes almost superfluous.

The Arab personality has other characteristics which derive from the divergent national experiences of these groups. The pre-Islamic Bedouin tribal society of the Arabian Peninsula had anarchical traits by which it expressed its rejection of external authority. Consequently, Arab Bedouins did not form a cohesive society that pursued the same endeavors as sedentary civilizations. Instead, they were a collection of individualists with warrior qualities, craving conquest but with little social discipline. The early Islamic period changed the Arab-Bedouin society—and an Arabo- Islamic civilization blossomed from which Western civilization benefited extensively from the ninth to the twelfth century C.E.

Contemporary Arab societies, notwithstanding the influence of Islam, retained the characteristics of individuality, indecisiveness, inaction, and indolence. These characteristics however, in the modern period, have to be to preserve face and maintain the appearance of dignity, honor, courage, and wisdom. Thus, the word provides the necessary cover. The literature and public and private discourse exalt the virtues and character that these societies lack. Verbal expressions are a substitute for facts, and this negates opportunities for change.

The basic Arab ethics ofvirtue—courage, bravery, hospitality, generosity, honor, and dignity—are blunted by the absence of pragmatism.

Muslim beliefs may also feed some of these negative Arab charac­teristics. To accept the will of God becomes easily transformed into a sense of fatalism that weakens the will to change one’s destiny. This is also why the Arab mind often accepts words as equivalent to reality. If the willed reality does not manifest itself it is then turned into the unavoidable acceptance of reality as is the will of God.

While these and other traits make Arabs individualistic, sentimental, and appealing in their persona, it also makes them less capable of social solidarity and group discipline. The sentimental aspects overwhelmingly overtake the pragmatic aspects in individual action. In short, the endearing and engaging individual character traits of the Arabs are also their negative social and group characteristics.

In contemporary political dynamics, it is easy for Israel and its supporters to play on these personality characteristics, showing Arabs as unreliable, unable to meet the challenges of modernity, and essentially possessing contradictory values. Conversely, Jewish/Israeli’s characteristics of social organization, cohesion, group discipline, determination, and pragmatism reveal a closer affinity to present-day characteristics of Western societies. As Israelis identify themselves more and more with the West and the gap between the West and the Arabs increases, political consequences translate into greater support for the former and a lack of support for the latter.

While Israelis enhance their closeness to the Western world, Arabs merely express their resentment of it and do nothing to counteract it. In fact, throughout the conflict, Israel’s military, political, and public relations successes were resented by the Arabs and, in a perverse way, they blamed Israel and the Jews for their failures without admitting to them.

The Arab personality is at once complex and ambivalent. At times, it is the Arab factor that becomes more characteristic as in the era of Pan- Arabism from the 1920s to the 1970s, when it embraced the Post-WWII anti-colonial movement of these different countries. Since the 1970s, however, the Pan-Arab movement has waned, and the Islamic circle has become more prominent. The latter has worldwide reach, but in the Arab world, the Pan-Islamic movements also have nationalistic overtones.

Whereas Pan-Arabism is secular, Pan-Islamism aims at establishing Islamic national societies within the context of a broader Islamic umma. These movements, however, also oppose various Arab secular nationalistic movements seeking to establish Western-style democratic systems. Thus, the fact that the Arab nationalist movement and the Pan-Islamic movement decry corrupt Arab regimes in the Arab world does not, however, make them likely allies.

In the 1970s, Arab regimes saw secular nationalistic and pro-democracy movements as a threat, and to counteract them, these regimes reinforced the Islamic fundamentalist movements, only to face them later as even greater threats.

As the Islamic movement increased in popularity and political influence in the Arab states and made Israeli treatment of Palestinians and anti-Jewish sentiment among their primary concerns, Israel perceived it as a greater threat than Arab nationalism. It was joined in these perceptions by those in America who see themselves in a clash of civilizations, with the world of Islam. In turn, this reinforced the Islamic movement in its belief that Jews were agitating Christians against Muslims in order to instigate another era of crusades, pointing to Afghanistan and Iraq as evidence.

Who is a Jew is as difficult a question to answer as who is an Arab. According to Jewish Law, a Jew is a person who belongs to the Jewish faith and whose mother is Jewish or who has converted to Judaism. Conversion to Judaism is deemed by the dominant orthodox as only valid when done in accordance with orthodox practice. ButJewishness is a broader concept than being a member of the Judaic faith.

Jews since the Diaspora are generally considered part of either of two distinct Jewish cultural traditions: the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim. Both Ashkenazi and Sephardi Jews share the same beliefs, but they are also affected by different cultural experiences, as is even evident in contemporary Israeli society. Like their Arab cousins, rhetoric and debate is very much part of Jewish life, as is their history. Unlike the Arabs, however, they look at the mirror of history to remember the tragedies that have befallen them as a way of reminding themselves that they should never be lulled into complacency, lest the same fate befalls them again. Thus, they are hardnosed realists. They look to the future as a constant challenge and make themselves ready to face tomorrow’s obstacles.

Judaism binds its followers in the belief that they are the “chosen people,” sharing a unique covenant with God. This, in their own perception, distinguishes them from other groups. To many Jews, the appeal to Palestine is not only a form of nationalism, but the fulfillment of a Biblical promise by which the Creator bestowed the lands of Canaan upon the people of Israel. Thus, there is a dual perception of nationalism in the sense of the desire for a secular Jewish state, a safe haven, and a belief system that transcends pure nationalism.

The ethnic identity and religious beliefs of Jews constitute two over­lapping circles. The difficulty in achieving a complete overlap of these two circles owes to the cultural diversity of Jews, as well as the religious distinctions within Judaism. But the most significant social link between Jews is their more recent experience of European anti-Semitism from the Russian Pogroms of 1881 to the Nazi Holocaust of 1933-45.

Ashkenazi Jews in particular have embodied certain Western charac­teristics, placing a premium on achievement and work. As they have been discriminated against in Europe, they learned how to excel in order to be tolerated and accepted, if not to survive, in their respective societies. Thus, the contributions of Jews to science, technology, music, art, philosophy, and other subjects of learning have been extraordinary and far disproportionate to their numbers than any other ethnic or social group in the world. In a sense, the accomplishments of the Jews between the 1800s and 2000 are comparable to the accomplishment of the Muslims between 1200 and 1500. By then, the latter had settled in Spain, Southern France and Italy, all of North Africa, part of coastal East and West Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile Crescent and Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Indian sub-continent, extending into parts of China, the Trans­Caucuses and Russia. The Arabs who brought Islam to these societies, like the Jews who found themselves in the midst of many other cultures, were challenged by these different environments, and many successfully rose to that challenge. But as the Arabs benefited from their earlier advances, they fell into complacency until they were overcome by Western civilization and conquered by it, ultimately becoming colonial vassals, themselves, mostly of France or England.

Probably because Jews have been discriminated against for so long, they have developed such an insular culture, a mindset of us against the world or against whomever it may be that is the enemy of the day. This has produced an enduring sense of persecution or, at least, a high threshold of sensitivity to threats and the perception of threats. Thus, Arab rhetoric heightens Israeli threat perceptions. But, as the saying goes, even paranoids have real enemies, and certainly Israel has its share of enemies among the Arabs and the Muslims. Irrespective of whether it has helped this hatred, or whether it is the product of their opponents’ reactions, the fact remains that it is there. Contrary to Israeli perceptions, Arab moderates believe that this hatred is not so deep-rooted, that it is linked to the treatment of Palestinians and the arrogance of the power Israel has come to possess in the region.

As a result of their historic experiences,Jews have double standards with respect to their perceptions of “anti-Semitism” and their own conduct towards Arabs and Muslims. This is particularly evident since 9/11 in the United States with the pro-Israel lobby’s alliance with the Christian Right and with their support and encouragement of discriminatory governmental practices against Arabs and Muslims in America, as well as against Arabs and Muslims in general. In Israel, the same syndrome is evident. The discrimination that Israelis exercise against Palestinian Arabs, including those who are Israeli citizens, is tolerated by theJewish body politic. Furthermore, the constant degrading and humiliating treatment inflicted on the Palestinians is something no Jew in the world would have tolerated had it been inflicted by any group of people against Jews. Thus, Israel can target Palestinians for assassination and purport such action to be legitimate. There is no other country in the world that legitimates governmental assassinations (extrajudicial execution). Moreover, it is a violation of international human rights law.

The near perception of Jews that they are the only people who have suffered oppression throughout time leads to the conviction that the world still owes them and that no matter what they do to others, they are justified because of their past experience of persecution. Consequently, there is very little Israeli compassion for the plight of the Palestinian people and very little remorse for the harm they have inflicted. Since 1948, the only Israeli leader who has ever publicly expressed compassion toward the Palestinians was Prime Minister Ehud Barak in a 1999 speech to the Knesset.

The Palestinian Arabs and other Arabs see their conflict with Israel as an extension of European colonialism. Jewish immigrants who settled in Palestine in the early years of the last century were, after all, mostly European, and they arrived in Palestine as a result of the support of America and Europe. As is common among colonized people, Arabs have admired, and have even been submissive to, European and American economic and military superiority, while also harboring feelings of resentment against it. These feelings have been heightened by the wide disparity between some characteristics of contemporary Arab society and key elements of Western modernity. At times, these disparities produce a simmering anger that is compounded by a sense of pride in a glorious past.

To the degree that Arabs interpret the failures of their societies to fully embrace the positive elements of modernity’s transformative potential, they often adopt the position of victimhood, asking “Who did this to us?” Thereby, they reaffirm the notion that whatever is wrong with Arab society is the result of foreign conspiracies. Thus, they doom themselves to helplessness, while paradoxically hoping that some external power will extricate them from their predicaments. Blaming foreign powers, and yet seeking these foreign powers to save them, is a continuing paradox of Arab politics. It is easier to blame the outside world and to await relief than to bring about the necessary changes on the inside in order to bring about positive changes in their reality.

At different times in history a resurgence of Arab pride, inventiveness, initiative and action have brought about brief interludes of success. This has occurred throughout Arab modern history: Egypt and Algeria’s successful struggles for independence, the spread of Nasser’s Arabism in the 1950s, and Egypt’s 1973 crossing of the Canal, to mention only a few examples. But these successes were all too often heralded in Arabic rhetoric as momentous and long-lasting accomplishments, overshadowing the challenges that lay ahead. This led them to be comforted, if not lulled into complacency, by their few newly acquired laurels. This perception of reality became repeatedly distorted, as the mirror they looked at reflected the images of the past, not the challenges of the future.

In their military confrontations with Israel, Arab armies were frequently poorly equipped and trained because they were dependent on foreign military weapons, technology, and methods that suppliers could turn on or off at will to suit their own political needs. Conversely, Israel developed its own military technologies and capabilities, as well as their own tactics, which fit their needs. But, it is the Arab social structure that placed the most limitations on their military capabilities. The class distinctions, absence of leadership accountability, lack of social organization and personal discipline, and above all, the loss of the historic values of Islam’s early days are among the relevant factors for the Arabs’ poor performance.

The Arab struggle for independence from European colonialism gave way to American neo-imperialism in the region, and most Arab regimes have since then owed their existence to American support. Long gone are the heady days of Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s pan-Arabism, which Sadat supposedly redeemed in 1973. While Nasser remained defiant and inactive in defeat, Sadat was resilient and decisive about peace. But the Arabs also lost the historic opportunity between WWII and now to modernize, develop democratic institutions, and govern themselves in accordance with the rule of law. Instead, their regimes are characterized by dictatorships, corruption, and inefficiency. This resulted in the frustration of Arab masses who found it easier to blame Israel than blame themselves for their failures.

Divisions within the Arab world brought on by the signings of the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace agreements and the failure of Syrian and Iraqi Ba’athism transformed Arab nationalism into a sentimental illusion, leaving Arab countries each with their respective brand of nationalism. But these too failed as a result of corrupt and inefficient governments. The brief emergence of Marxist ideology among some Arabs was short-lived, and that too dissipated into thin air after the end of the Cold War. Only one path was left to the Arab masses—Islamicism. In some countries, like the Sudan and Algeria, and among Palestinians, Islamicism had strong nationalistic overtones; thus combining nationalist aspirations with an appeal to values deeply ingrained in Arab Muslims. The call for a new jihad became inexorable, and many among the hopeless and downtrodden heeded the call. The emergence of Pan-Islamism united Palestinian Muslims and other Muslims in the struggle against Israel.

Unfulfilled expectations, repressed pride, and deepening humiliation are the ingredients that lead Palestinians to violence. Israel exploited this situation by branding the Palestinians as terrorists. For sure, suicide bombing is an act of terrorism, but for those who have no other military option, fighting an asymmetric war, it is perceived as an act of heroism. Repressive reactions by the Israelis have left the Palestinians with the belief that these acts of violence are no different than those of the Israelis. Thus, both sides accuse each other of terrorism, while seeing themselves as victims and heroes.

As the cycle of violence has increased in the last few years, so has the gap in perceptions about peace. Security has become the overwhelming concern for Israel, thus leading to the conclusion that peace and security can only come through a separation from the Palestinians.

Extremists on both sides see the only tangible solution as the elimi­nation of one another. For Israeli extremists, it includes the removal of Palestinians from their ancestral lands and fulfilling the biblical promise of “Eretz Israel,” the land of Israel that once stretched from al-Arish in the Sinai to the Euphrates. But even extremist Israelis do not go that far, extending their claims only to what they call “Judea and Samaria” (i.e., the West Bank) and some parts of the Gaza Strip. Arabs see these claims as part of the creeping expropriation of Palestinian lands, and their total expulsion from Palestine, except for those willing to remain in an enlarged Israel as second-class citizens. The claim by some extreme right wing Israelis to remove Palestinians from “Judea and Samaria” reinforces these threat-perceptions. Paradoxically, the Sharon government’s separation wall allays some of these fears while reinforcing those of the Palestinians.

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