B. Suez War: 1956

On July 26, 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, an important act that represented the close of the last stage of Western colonialism in Egypt.

Britain and France, who both had serious stakes in the canal, however, were determined not to lose control of it. They devised a plan in a secret meeting that involved Israel attacking Egypt and then Britain and France engaging, as well, after delivering a twelve-hour ultimatum to the two parties to end the fighting, occupying the Suez Canal. Britain and France were to invoke their rights under the 1888 Constantinople Convention, which established the international right of freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. Israel cooperated in part out of frustration over the blockade of the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba to its commercial shipping and Fedayeen attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel originating from Gaza.

Israel launched the initial attack against Egypt on October 29, 1956, under Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan. The Israeli campaign was swift and effective. Within days of its first assault, the Gaza Strip and the entire Sinai Peninsula fell to Israel. As planned, on November 5, 1956, British and French forces began their invasion of Egypt, with British troops capturing Port Said and seeking to advance south in the direction of Suez City. A United Nations cease-fire stopped them.

The United States and the Soviet Union condemned the attacks and demanded that Israel return to its previous borders. They also demanded that British and French forces withdraw from all Egyptian territory. After extensive negotiations, Israel complied with the demands, but only on the condition that the United Nations place a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai and at Sharm el-Sheikh to guarantee the free passage of Israeli ships through the Gulf of Aqaba.

The unprecedented common stance of the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1956 war, at the height of the Cold War, owed to U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s sense of betrayal at not having been informed of Britain and France’s joint plan of attack ahead of time and the Soviet Union’s strong ties to Egypt.

i. Pre-WarDevelopments

Document 114: Decree on the Procedure of Ship and Airplane Searches and of Seizure of Contraband Goods in Connexion with the Palestine War (February 6, 1950) [published in Egyptian Official Gazette (No. 36), Apr. 8, 1950]. In this decree, Egyptian King Farouk authorizes the search of all ships and aircraft in order to ensure that no arms or other instruments of war would be shipped to Israeli forces in occupied areas of Palestine. The decree authorizes the use of force against any ship that attempts to avoid search and permits the seizure of any contraband found in violation of the order.

Document 115: Cablegram from the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO Transmitting a Report to the Security Council (June 12, 1951) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2194 (1951)]. This cablegram resulted from a meeting of the Egyptian-Israel Special Committee meant to determine whether or not the Mixed Armistice Commission had the right to demand that Egypt not interfere with the passing of goods to Israel through the Suez Canal. Finding for Egypt, the chief of staff explains that, while such interference by Egypt is hostile, it is not technically an “aggressive action” under the definition provided by the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Egypt, upon which the authority of the commission rests. In the spirit of the agreement, however, the chief of staff requests that Egypt stop such interference. He further recommends that the question be referred to a higher authority such as the Security Council or the International Court ofJustice (ICJ).

Document 116: United Nations Security Council Resolution 619, Concerning Restrictions on the Passage of Ships through the Suez Canal (September 1, 1951) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)].

Document 117: United Nations Security Council Resolution 95, Calling upon Egypt to Terminate Restrictions on Passage in the Suez Canal (September 1, 1951) [S.C. Res. 95, U.N. SCOR, 558th mtg., at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/2322 (1951)]. Due to Egypt’s policy of refusing Israeli cargo ships and ships bound for Israel to pass through the Suez Canal or the Straits of the Tiran, the Security Council passed Resolution 95, calling upon Egypt to terminate its restrictions on international commercial shipping.

Document 118: United Nations Security Council Resolution 101, Calling Israeli Attack at Qibya a Violation of Cease-Fire (November 24, 1953) [S.C. Res. 101, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S∕3139∕Rev.2 (1953)]. After Israeli forces attack Qibya, Jordan, on October 14 and 15, 1953, the Security Council adopts Resolution 101, which finds that the retaliatory action by Israel and all such actions constitute a violation of the cease­fire and are inconsistent with the parties’ obligations under both the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan and the Charter of the United Nations. The Security Council expresses the strongest censure of the action.

Document 119: United Nations Security Council Resolution 106, Condemning the Israeli Attack on Gaza of February 28, 1955 (March 29, 1955) [S.C. Res. 106, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/3378 (1955)]. After Israeli forces attacked Egyptian troops in the Gaza Strip, the Security Council adopted Resolution 106, condemning the attack as a violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. It calls upon Israel to refrain from any future actions that would further violate the agreement.

Document 120: United Nations Security Council Resolution 107, Calling on Egypt and Israel to Cooperate with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO in Preserving Security on the Armistice Demarcation Line (Gaza) (March 30, 1955) [S.C.

Document 121: United Nations Security Council Resolution 108, Calling on Egypt and Israel to Cooperate with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO in Preventing Violence on the Armistice Demarcation Line (Gaza) (September 8, 1955) [S.C. Res. 108, U.N. SCOR, 700th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3435 (1955)]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 108 notes with approval Egypt and Britain’s acceptance of the UNTSO chief of staff’s appeal for an unconditional cease-fire. It calls upon both parties to appoint representatives to meet with the UNTSO chief of staff in order to implement his proposals.

Document 122: United Nations Security Council Resolution 111, Condemning the Israeli Attack on Syrian Territory of December 11, 1955 (January 19, 1956) [S.C. Res. 111, U.N. SCOR, 715th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3538 (1956)]. Given reports from the chief of staff of the UNTSO in Palestine that Israeli forces had attacked Syrian forces on Syrian territory on December 11, 1955, and that Syrian authorities had interfered with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias in violation of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, the Security Council in Resolution 111 calls upon both parties to cooperate with the chief of staff to carry out the provisions of the armistice agreement. The Security Council calls upon both parties to arrange with the chief of staff for an immediate exchange of all military prisoners.

Document 123: United Nations Security Council Resolution 113, Calling for Measures to Reduce Tensions along the Armistice Demarcation Lines (April 4, 1956) [S.C. Res. 113, U.N. SCOR, 722d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3575 (1956)]. In Resolution 113, the Security Council notes the failure of the parties to comply with Resolutions 107, 108, and 111, and with any of the proposals by the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO in Palestine.

Document 124: United Nations Security Council Resolution 114, Calling on the Parties to the Armistice Agreements to Carry out the Measures Agreed upon with the Secretary­General (June 4, 1956) [S.C. Res. 114, U.N. SCOR, 728th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3605 (1956)]. In Resolution 114, the Security Council commends the secretary-general and concerned parties on progress achieved following a mission by the secretary­general that garnered assurances from all parties to unconditionally observe the cease-fire. Believing that further progress should be made in consolidating these gains resulting, the Security Council declares that the parties should speedily carry out the measures agreed upon with the secretary-general. The Security Council endorses the secretary-general’s view that the reestablishment of full compliance with the armistice agreements represents a necessary stage before progress is possible on the main issues between the parties.

Document 125: Order of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser Nationalizing the Suez Canal Company (July 26, 1956) [American Foreign Policy, 1956, Current Documents 604-06 (U.S. Dep’t of State ed., 1959)]. In a speech at Alexandria, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announces the nationalization of the Suez Canal, transfering all of the canal’s assets, rights, and obligations to Egypt and dissolves all of its previous management. The Suez Canal, Egypt’s largest territorial asset, was run by the Paris-based Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal on a lease set to expire in 1968. This order stipulates that shareholders are to receive compensation, and commercial shipping in the canal is not to be disrupted.

Document 126: United Nations Security Council Resolution 118, Describing Requirements for a Settlement of the Suez Question (October 13, 1956) [S.C. Res. 118, U.N. SCOR, 11th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec., 743d mtg., at 47-48, U.N. Doc. S/3675 (1956)]. In Resolution 118, the Security Council agrees that any settlement of the Suez question should meet the following requirements: (1) there should be free and open transit through the canal without discrimination, overt or covert; (2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected; (3) the operation of the canal should be insulated from the politics of any country; (4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; (5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development; and (6) in the case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian government should be settled by arbitration.

ii. 1956 War: October 29, 1956-March 6, 1957

Document 127: Statement by Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Reasons for the Military Operation in Sinai (October 29, 1956) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Foreign%20Relations∕Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947∕194 7-1974/1%20Foreign%20Ministry%20Statement-%2029%20October%201956]. The Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued this statement on its military operations in Egypt after commencing its official attack. The Israeli Ministry for Foreign Affairs blames the assault on the situation created in Israel by Fedayeen

attacks and on Egypt’s attempt to stifle the Israeli economy by preventing Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal. The ministry asserts that Israel’s attempts to make peace with Egypt have been answered with “heightened propaganda” and “hostile activities against the very existence of Israel.”

Document 128: Excerpts from the Speech by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States Rejects the Use of Force (October 31, 1956) [published in 28 Dep’t St. Bull. 743 (1956)]. In this address, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower assures the nation that the United States does not support the military actions undertaken by Israel, Britain, and France in the Middle East. The president notes that they are irreconcilable with the purposes of the United Nations and promises that the United States will not involve itself in the hostilities. Eisenhower expresses the United States’ intention to bring a request to end hostilities before the General Assembly because Britain and France had vetoed such a resolution in the Security Council.

Document 129: United Nations Security Council Resolution 119, Calling an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to Consider the Invasion of Egypt (October 31, 1956) [S.C. Res. 119, U.N. SCOR, 751st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3721 (1956)]. In Resolution 119, the Security Council, considering that a grave situation has been created by action undertaken against Egypt, decides to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly in order to make appropriate recommendations.

Document 130: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 997, Calling Israeli Invasion of Egypt a Violation of the General Armistice Agreement (November 2, 1956) [G.A. Res. 997 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956)]. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 997 notes that Israeli armed forces have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel and that French and British armed forces are also conducting military operations against Egyptian territory. It urges all parties to agree to an immediate cease-fire and halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area. It also recommends that all member states refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities. Finally, the secretary-general is requested to observe and report promptly on the compliance with this resolution. The United States submitted the draft of this resolution.

Document 131: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 998, Requesting the Secretary­General to Establish an Emergency International United Nations Force (November 4, 1956) [G.A. Res. 998 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956)]. In Resolution 998 (ES-I), the General Assembly requests the secretary-general to submit a plan for establishing an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 997 (ES-I).¹⁶³ The United Nations subsequently stationed 3,300 troops in Gaza and along the Sinai border to act as a buffer between Israel and Egypt.

Document 132: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 999, Calling for a Cease­Fire (November 4, 1956) [A. Res. 999 (ES-1), U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/999 (1956)]. Passed on the same day as General Assembly

Resolution 998 (ES-I), this resolution authorizes the secretary-general to arrange with the concerned parties for the implementation of the cease-fire (pursuant to Resolution 997 (ES-I) ¹⁶5). It also requests that the Secretary-General and the UNTSO to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines.

Document 133: Exchange between Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (November 5-8, 1956) [available at http://www.mfa.gov. il/mfa/foreign+relations/israels+foreign+relations+since+1947/1947-1974/7+ exchange+of+letters-+bulganin-+ben-gurion-+5+and.htm]. In his letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin repeats the Soviet condemnation of Israel, Britain, and France’s aggression against Egypt. Bulganin accuses the Israeli government of acting as a tool of foreign imperialist powers and appeals to Israel to stop the aggression and withdraw its troops from Egyptian territory. In response, Ben-Gurion explains that Israel acted out of self­defense, as Egypt had orchestrated Fedayeen attacks against Israeli citizens inside Israel and had established a blockade against Israel’s freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and the Straits of Eilat. Ben-Gurion assures Bulganin that Israel is a sovereign and peace-loving state.

Document 134: Exchange between U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion (November 5-8, 1956) [35 Dep’t St. Bull. 797-98 (1956)]. In this letter to Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower indicates his strong disapproval of the tripartite invasion of Egypt. Eisenhower requests that Israel clarify its position with regard to its withdrawal from the Sinai given statements attributed to the Israeli government that it did not intend to comply with United Nations resolutions. Reminding Ben-Gurion of the United States’ long-standing support for the Jewish state, Eisenhower makes it clear that Israel needs to comply with the United Nations resolutions. In response, Ben-Gurion assures Eisenhower that Israel would withdraw its forces upon conclusion of satisfactory arrangements with the United Nations in connection with an international force entering the Suez Canal area.

Document 135: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1002, Noting the Establishment of a UNEF (November 7, 1956) [G.A. Res. 1002 (ES-I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956)]. In Resolution 1002, the General Assembly, recalling its previous resolutions, calls again upon Israel to immediately withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines and calls again upon the United Kingdom and France to immediately withdraw all their forces from Egyptian territory. The General Assembly urges the Secretary-General to communicate this resolution to the concerned parties and requests him to promptly report on compliance with this resolution.

Document 136: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1120, Noting with Regret that Forces Have Not Been Withdrawn behind the Armistice Line (November 24, 1956) [G.A. Res. 1120, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1120 (XI) (1956)]. In Resolution 1120, the General Assembly notes with regret that all the Israeli forces, all the British forces (though some arrangements are being made for the withdrawal of one British battalion), and two-thirds of the French forces remain in Egypt. The General Assembly reiterates its call to France, Israel, and Britain to comply with General Assembly Resolutions 997 and 1002.).¹⁶6

Document 137: Special Message from U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower to Congress on the Situation in the Middle East (January 5, 1957) [available at http://www. eisenhower.utexas.edu/midleast.htm]. In this special message to ajoint session of Congress, the newly reelected U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower requests that Congress and the president act together to protect Middle-Eastern nations against the communist threat. Eisenhower proposes authorizing the United States to cooperate with and assist any nation or group of nations in the Middle East in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence. He also proposes authorizing the executive to undertake programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation or group of nations in the region that desires such aid. Finally, he proposes authorizing assistance and cooperation to include the employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of nations requesting aid against overt armed aggression from a communist nation. This message came to be known as the “Eisenhower Doctrine.”

Document 138: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1123, Noting with Regret and Concern the Failure of Israel to Comply with United Nations Terms (January 19, 1957) [G.A. Res. 1123, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1123 (XI) (1957]. In Resolution 1123, the General Assembly notes with regret and concern Israel’s failure to comply with Resolutions 997, 998, 999, 1002, and 1120, and requests that the Secretary-General continue efforts to secure Israel’s withdrawal from Egypt.

Document 139: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1124, Deploring the Non­Compliance of Israel to Complete Its Withdrawal behind the Armistice Demarcation Line (February 2, 1957) [G.A. Res. 1124, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1124 (XI) (1957)]. In Resolution 1124, the General Assembly deplores the non-compliance of Israel of withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line. It calls upon Israel to do so without further delay.

Document 140: United States Aide Memoire to Israel (February 11, 1957) [36 Dep’t St. Bull. 392-93 (1957)]. This aide memoire poses a diplomatic solution to Israel’s continuing security concerns that have thus far prevented Israel from completely withdrawing from Egyptian territory. Although its position is that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, the United States proposes posting the UNEF in the Gaza Strip and along the boundary between Israel and the Gaza Strip to minimize the threat of armed infiltration. The United States also proposes moving the UNEF into the Straits area to aid in guaranteeing the right of free and innocent passage to all parties. The aide memoire also gives notice that the United States is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and to join others to secure general recognition of this right.

Document 141: Statement by Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir to the United Nations General Assembly on Guaranteeing Navigation in the Suez Canal (March 1, 1957) [U.N. GAOR, 11th Sess., 666th plen. mtg., at 1275-76 (1957)]. In this statement to the General Assembly, Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir announces Israel’s intention to carry out a full and prompt withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line. Meir proposes a meeting between the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Army and the commander of the UNEF to discuss arrangements for the United Nations to take over security in Gaza. Meir also formulates Israel’s policy with regard to the right of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Straits of Tiran following the withdrawal. Meir states that because they are international waters, no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage of Israeli ships in them. Meir warns that Israel will regard any such interference as an attack, thus prompting its right of self-defense.

Document 142: Excerpts of General Moshe Dayan’s Eulogy in Ro’i Rothberg's Funeral [reprinted in Benny Morris, Righteous Victims. A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881-1999 287-88 (1999)]. On April 29, 1956, the security officer of Kibbutz Nahal-Oz, Ro’i Rothberg, was cut down by an Egyptian ambush on the border with the Gaza strip. The eulogy delivered by the israeli army’s chief of staff, General Dayan, is one of the most frankest reflections on the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conundrum that an Israeli leader has ever pronounced. An uncompromising warrior in the war against Israel’s Arab enemies, Dayan was candid enough to appreciate how just was the cause of the disinherited Palestinians, and howjustified was their hatred of the Israelis who settled on their confiscated lands. But, acknowledging the reason of the conflict did not make Dayan a preacher of peace and reconciliation; it only strengthened his conviction about the insolubility of the conflict and his understanding that this was a war for generations. “That is the fate of our generation,” he said, “to be ready and armed, tough and harsh, or let the sword fall from our hands and our lives be cut short.”

iii. Post-WarDevelopments

Document 143: Declaration by the Government of Egypt Concerning the Suez Canal (April 24, 1957) [U.N. SCOR, Supp. for April-June, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/3818 (1957)]. This declaration by the government of Egypt begins with a statement by Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi announcing the Suez Canal is open for normal traffic. This declaration outlines the basic principles governing the suez Canal and the arrangements for its operation. Article 3(a) guarantees “free and uninterrupted navigation for all nations within the limits of and in accordance with the provisions of the Constantinople Convention of 1888”; thus, implicitly recognizing Israel’s right of passage through the canal. It also stipulates that all disputes arising from operation of the Suez Canal should be referred to the ICJ.

Document 144: Aide Memoire Prepared by United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold on Conditions for the Withdrawal of UNEF (August 5, 1957) [reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 593-602 (1967). Following the 1956 war, United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold prepared this aide memoire for his own files. It concerns the presence of the UNEF in Egypt and the circumstances under which it may be withdrawn. This document later plays a role in the 1967 war when United Nations Secretary-General U Thant withdraws UNEF from the Egypt-Israel demarcation line without consent from all parties.

Document 145: United Nations Security Council Resolution 127, Regarding the Status of the 7.o'ue between the Armistice Demarcation Lines (January 22, 1958) [S.C. Res. 127, U.N. SCOR, 810th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/3942 (1958)]. The Security Council adopted Resolution 127 after complaints were received from Jordan about activities conducted by Israel in the zone between the armistice demarcation lines, in the area of Government House in Jerusalem. The Security Council notes that the status of the zone is affected by the provisions of the Israel-Jordan General Armistice Agreement and that neither Israel nor Jordan enjoys sovereignty over any part of the zone. The Security Council endorses the recommendations of the acting chief of staff, namely that: (1) the parties should discuss through the Mixed Armistice Commission civilian activities in the zone; (2) activities in the zone should be suspended until a survey has been completed and provisions made for their regulation; (3) discussions should be completed within two months; and (4) the Security Council should be advised of the result of the discussions. The Security Council calls upon the parties to cooperate with the chief of staff and the Mixed Armistice Commission in carrying out these recommendations.

Document 146: Excerpts from the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (April 29, 1958) [15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205]. The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone protects innocent passage through territorial seas so long as it is done in observance of the laws of the coastal state. Coastal states are permitted to temporarily suspend passage when it is essential for the protection of the coastal state’s security; but no suspension of innocent passage is allowed through straits used for navigation between high seas.

Document 147: United Nations Security Council Resolution 128, Complaint from Lebanon (June 11, 1958) [S.C. Res. 128, 825th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/4023 (1958)]. In Resolution 128, the Security Council, concerned about complaints of interference by the newly formed United Arab Republic in Lebanon’s internal affairs, decides to urgently dispatch to Lebanon an observation group to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese border. On July 15, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower sends 5,000 U.S. marines to Lebanon to protect the pro-Western Lebanese government after a revolt in nearby Iraq results in the ousting of the Iraqi monarchy.

Document 148: United Nations Security Council Resolution 171, Calling on Israel to Scrupulously Refrain from Military Action in Violation of the General Armistice Agreement (April 9, 1962) [S.C. Res. 171, U.N. SCOR, 1006th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/5111 (1962)]. In Resolution 171, the Security Council deplores the hostile exchanges between Syria and Israel that began on March 8, 1962, and calls upon the two concerned governments to comply with their obligations under the United Nations Charter. The Security Council determines that the Israeli attack of March 16-17, 1962, constitutes a flagrant violation of Security Council Resolution 111 (1956) and calls upon Israel to scrupulously refrain from such action in the future. The Security Council endorses the measures recommended by the chief of staff of the UNTSO for the strengthening of that organization and calls upon the Israeli and Syrian authorities to assist the Chief of Staff in their early implementation.

Document 149: Arab League Summit in Cairo, Decidingto DivertJordan River (January 13— 17, 1964) [available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/watsum.html]. This declaration was issued at the first session of the Council of the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab League, held at the Arab League Headquarters in Cairo. In it, the council announces the adoption of practical resolutions to protect against threats posed by Israel that entail enabling the Palestinian people to participate in the “liberation of their country and attain[ment] of self-determination.” The council further rallies the support and assistance of all parties to the Bandung Principles and the Addis Ababa Charter in the struggle against Israel.

Document 150: Declaration Issued by the Council of Kings and Heads of State of the Arab League at Its Second Session (September 5—11, 1964) [available at http://www. mideastweb.org/arabsummit1964.htm]. The Council of the Kings and Heads of State of the Arab League held its second meeting at Alexandria, Egypt. In its declaration, the council unanimously defines objectives for the liberation of Palestine from “Zionist colonialism” and calls upon all states to use their resources and capabilities to confront Israel. It also announces that the council has adopted resolutions for the implementation of an Arab plan to begin immediate work on projects for the exploitation of the waters of the River Jordan and its tributaries. The council further welcomes the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to consolidate a Palestinian entity.

C.