June War or Six-Day War: 1967
Skirmishes broke out along Israel’s borders with Syria and Jordan in March and June of 1967. In April, Syria informed Egypt as part of their five-year mutual defense pact that Israel was about to attack it.
The Soviet Union confirmed the threat. As tensions escalated, Egypt requested that Secretary-General U Thant withdraw the UNEF from positions along the Egypt-Israel demarcation line. Egypt also closed the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal to Israeli commercial navigation.Israel launched a preemptive attack against Egypt on June 6, 1967, destroying the Egyptian air force. Crippled by the blow, Egypt called on Jordan and Syria to join in fighting against Israel on the basis of the 1950 Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation of the Arab League. The war engulfed Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan—though Israel secretly urged Jordan not to join the war.
Between June 6 and 12, the Security Council passed multiple resolutions calling for a cease-fire. Israel did not stop its offensive until it had secured all of its military objectives. At the end of fighting, Israel controlled the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and, arguably the most important acquisition of all, East Jerusalem.
For relevant documents on Jerusalem and the Occupied Territories, see Section 6, Jerusalem and the Holy Sites; and Section 8, Status of the Palestinians.
i. Pre-War Developments
Document 151: United Nations Security Council Resolution 228, Censuring Israeli Military Action in Hebron (November 25, 1966) [S.C. Res. 228, U.N. SCOR, 1328th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/228 (1966)]. In Resolution 228, the Security Council deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel in the southern Hebron area on November 13, 1966.
Document 152: Cable Containing Instructions for the Withdrawal of UNEF, Sent by the Secretary-General to the Commander of UNEF (May 8, 1967) [U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6730, Add.1-3, A/6730/Add.3/Corr.1 (1967)]. After the United Arab Republic rescinded its consent to the presence of UNEF in the Sinai, United Nations Secretary-General U Thant relayed this cablegram to the Commander of UNEF, which includes procedures and instructions for the immediate withdrawal of UNEF forces. The withdrawal was carried out without the consent of the General Assembly, the Security Council, or the State of Israel.Document 153: Statement by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser to Members of the National Assembly (May 29, 1967) [N.Y Times, May 26, 1967, at 16, cols. 2-5]. In this statement to the Egyptian National Assembly, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announces Egypt’s plan to close the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat. The blockade cut off Israel’s only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran. Israel considers the act a casus belli.
Document 154: Statement by U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson Expressing U.S. Support for the Independence ofAll Nations in the Area (May 23, 1967) [available at http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28265&st=Israel&st1=thant]. In this statement, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson expresses the United States’ commitment to the political independence and territorial integrity of all nations in the Middle East. Johnson expresses regret that the General Armistice Agreements of 1949 have failed to prevent hostilities and deplores the military buildup in the region. Johnson also expresses dismay at the withdrawal of the UNEF from the Egypt- Israel armistice demarcation line.
Document 155: Exchange of Letters between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (May 26-June 1, 1967) [available at http://www.mfa. gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20sinc e%201947/1947-1974/9%20Exchange%20of%20Letters%20Kosygin-Eshkol- %2026%20May%20and%201]. In this exchange of letters, Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin warns Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol that Israel should not attack Syria or Egypt.
Kosygin implicitly threatens intervention in such a conflict. In his reply, Eshkol calls on the Soviet Union to use its influence to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East.ii. 1967 War (June 5-11, 1967)
Document 156: United Nations Security Council Resolution 233, Concerning the Outbreak of Fighting and Callingfor an Immediate Cease-Fire (June 6, 1967) [S.C. Res. 233, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/INF.22/Rev/2 (1968)]. The Security Council issued Resolution 233 at the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The resolution calls for an immediate cease-fire.
Document157:IsraelMilitary OrderNo. 2 Concerning Quarantine (June 7, 1967) [reprinted in Richard T. Drury & Robert C. Winn, Plowshares and Swords: The Economics of Occupation in the West Bank 139-40 (1992)]. With this military order, the commander of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) imposed a quarantine on the West Bank effective June 7, 1967, following Israel’s occupation of the area. Any person violating the quarantine is to be punished by three years imprisonment.
Document 158: United Nations Security Council Resolution 234, Demanding a Cease-Fire (June 7, 1967) [S.C. Res. 234, U.N. SCOR, 1350th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/234 (1967)]. In Resolution 234, the Security Council demands that all concerned governments should observe a cease-fire as a first step to ending hostilities. Israel announces that it will accept the cease-fire provided that Arab states do likewise. on June 7, the cease-fire goes into effect on the Jordanian front.
Document 159: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Resignation Broadcast (June 9, 1967) [available at http://www.usna.edu/Users/history/tucker/hh362/The% 20Six-Day%20War.htm]. In this broadcast, President Gamal Abdel Nasser notes the “grave setback” suffered by the armies of the Arab states involved in the war and cites clear evidence of “imperialist collusion” with Israel in the form of American and British military support.
Nasser accepts full responsibility for the defeat and announces his resignation from the presidency. He appoints Zakariya Muhiedin to succeed him. The following day, Nasser withdraws his resignation after a major show of public support for him in Egypt and throughout the Arab world.Document 160: United Nations Security Council Resolution 236, Callingfor the Prompt Return to the Cease-Fire Line (June 11, 1967) [S.C. Res. 236, U.N. SCOR, 1357th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/236 (1967)]. In Resolution 235, the Security Council addresses the situation between Israel and Syria, calling for any troops that may have moved forward subsequent to the June 10 cease-fire to promptly return to their cease-fire positions.
iii. Post-War Developments
In the years following the 1967 war a new phase was inaugurated in the struggle for Palestine with Arafat’s PLO definitely succeeding in dragging Israel into a total war on a global scale. Defeated and humiliated, the Arab states lost, for the moment, their will to fight the Zionist enemy. The PLO thus became the vanguard of the Arab struggle against the Jewish state. As soon as the war was over, the PLO started to stage guerrilla operations throughout the West Bank and Gaza. In July 1968, a new form of Palestinian terrorism was inaugurated with the hijacking of an El Al jet to Algiers. During the autumn and winter of that same year a car bomb exploded inJerusalem, Tel-Aviv central bus station was stormed and El Al passengers were the target of a Palestinian terrorist squad at Athens airport. Israel retaliated. In March 1968, it conducted a massive incursion against PLO forces that had been using Jordanian territory for their war against Israel. The battle of Karameh would symbolize the rise of the PLO to prominence. Arafat became now a pan-Arab hero, and his picture occupied the front page of every major newspaper in the West. Jordan served as the battleground between Israel and the PLO until King Hussein ordered his army to break the power of the state within a state which Arafat had created on Jordanian territory.
In the ensuing civil war, thousands of Palestinians were killed and many more left the country. The PLO moved now to Lebanon where it again established its own state within a state. Lebanon’s territory became Arafat’s playground, from which it conducted attacks on Israel, some, like the blowing of a bus packed with school children near Avivim in 1972, and the storming of the school Ma’a lot in 1974, remained carved in the Israelis collective memory to this day.Document 161: Statement of United Nations Secretary-General U Thant on the 1957 Hammarskjold Aide Memoire (June 19, 1967) [reprinted in 3 The Arab Israeli Conflict 746-49 (John Morton Moore ed., 1974)]. United Nations Secretary-General U Thant issued this statement to clarify the legal status of the 1957 Dag Hammarskjold aide memoire regarding the UNEF in the Sinai. U Thant stresses that the aide memoire is not an official United Nations document, but is rather of “a purely private character.”
Document 162: Abba Eban’s Speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations (June 19, 1967) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. Following the Six-Day War, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban addressed the Special Assembly at the United Nations. Eban attributed the cause of the conflict to the aggression on Israel’s right to exist and that the tension in the Middle East will continue as long as that cause remains. His speech follows with a narrative of the lead up to the six-Day War from the Israeli perspective and ends with an indictment against the soviet Union for its interference in Middle Eastern affairs.
Document 163: Speech by Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff of the IDF: The Right of Israel (June 28, 1967) [available at http://www.usna.edu/Users/history/tucker/hh362/ The%20Six-Day%20War.htm]. Upon accepting a Doctor of Philosophy from the Hebrew University ofJerusalem, Yitzhak Rabin gave this speech, which recalls his experiences as commander of the IDF.
Rabin speaks of the spiritual resources that carried the Israeli army to victory in the recent war. This occasion marks the first time that Israelis could visit the Hebrew University campus (located in East Jerusalem) since the 1948 war.Document 164: Statement by the President of the Security Council on Stationing United Nations Military Observers in the Suez Canal Sector (July 9, 1967) [U.N. SCOR, 1366th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/8053/Add.3 (1967)]. In this statement, the president of the Security Council determines that the chief of staff of the UNTSO should be requested to work with the United Arab Republic and Israel to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal under his supervision.
Document 165: The Yigal Allon Peace Plan (July 26, 1967). [Documents on Palestine, vol. 3, p. 91 (Mahdi Abdul Hadi ed., 2007)] Shortly following the 1967 war, Israeli Defense Minister Yigal Allon presented a plan to the Israeli prime minister to address the future of the Occupied Territories. The plan called for a partition of the West Bank that would effectively create a new security border between Israel and Jordan. The plan, however, was not implemented.
Document 166: Resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference (Khartoum Resolutions) (September 1, 1967) [available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/ khartoum.htm]. Eight Arab heads of state attended an Arab summit conference in Khartoum, Sudan, from August 29 to September 1, 1967, which resulted in the formation of a common policy that was to underlay the decision making of most Arab states participating in the conflict until the early 1970s. The Khartoum Resolutions call for continued struggle against Israel, the creation of a fund to assist Egypt and Jordan financially, the lifting of an Arab oil boycott against the West, and an agreement to end the war in Yemen. But the most well-known resolutions are the “Three No’s,” which resolve that Arab states will follow the policy of no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel.
Document 167: United Nations Security Council Resolution 240, Condemning Violations of the Cease-Frre (October 25, 1967) [S.C. Res. 240, U.N. SCOR, 1371st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/240 (1967)]. In Resolution 240, the Security Council condemns violations of the cease-fire without identifying which states had done so.
Document 168: United Nations Security Council Resolution 248, Condemning the Military Action Launched by Israel in Violation of the Cease-Fire Resolutions (March 24, 1968) [S.C. Res. 248, U.N. SCOR, 1407th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/248 (1968)]. In Resolution 248, the Security Council observes that the military action by Israel against Jordan was both of a large scale and carefully planned. It condemns that action as a violation of the United Nations. Charter and cease-fires.
Document 169: United Nations Security Council Resolution 256, Condemning Massive Air Attacks by Israel on Jordanian Territory (August 16, 1968) [S.C. Res. 256, U.N. SCOR, 1440th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/256 (1968)]. In Resolution 256, the Security Council deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from both massive air attacks by Israel on Jordanian territory and condemns the further military attacks by Israel in violation of the United Nations Charter and Security Council Resolution 248.
Document 170: United Nations Security Council Resolution 258, Insisting on Respect for the Cease-Fire and Urging Cooperation with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (September 18, 1968) [S.C. Res. 258, U.N. SCOR, 1452d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/258 (1968)]. In Resolution 258, the Security Council, gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, insists that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council in its resolutions be rigorously respected. Reaffirming United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, it urges all parties to extend full cooperation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the fulfillment of the mandate entrusted to him under that resolution.
Document 171: United Nations Security Council Resolution 262, Condemning the Israeli Attack on the International Airport of Beirut (December 31, 1968) [S.C. Res. 262, U.N. SCOR, 1462d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/262 (1968)]. In Resolution 262, the Security Council observes that that the military action by Israeli forces against the International Airport of Beirut was premeditated, of a large scale, and of a carefully planned nature. The Security Council considers that Lebanon is entitled to appropriate redress for the violation.
Document 172: The Seven Points Declaration passed by the Central Committee of Fatah (January 1969) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin 2001)]. Following the merging of the PLO and Fatah, the Central Committee of Fatah published a sevenpoint manifesto declaring its intentions. The points focus on the struggle against Israel and the intent to achieve self-determination for the Palestinian people.
Document 173: United Nations Security Council Resolution 265, Condemning the Recent Premeditated Air Attacks Launched by Israel on Jordanian Villages (April 1, 1969) [S.C. Res. 265, U.N. SCOR, 1473d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/265 (1969)]. In Resolution 265, the Security Council expresses deep concern that recent air attacks on Jordanian villages and other populated areas are of a pre-planned nature and warns that if such attacks are repeated, it will have to consider further and more effective steps to curb such actions.
Document 174: United Nations Security Council Resolution 270, Condemning Israeli Air Attack on Villages in Southern Lebanon (August 26, 1969) [S.C. Res. 270, U.N. SCOR, 1504th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/270 (1969)]. In Resolution 270, the Security Council condemns the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and previous Security Council resolutions. The Security Council deplores all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire and the extension of the area of fighting.
Document 175: United Nations Security Council Resolution 279, Demanding the Immediate Withdrawal of All Israeli Armed Forces from Lebanese Territory (May 12, 1970) [S.C. Res.
279, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/279 (1970)]. In this single-sentence resolution, the Security Council demands that Israeli armed forces immediately withdraw from Lebanese territory.
Document 176: United Nations Security Council Resolution 280, Condemning the Large- Scale and Premeditated Military Attack by Israel against Lebanon (May 19, 1970) [S.C. Res. 280, U.N. SCOR, 1542d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/280 (1970)]. In Resolution
280, the Security Council condemns Israel for its attack on Lebanon and declares that if Israel repeats such armed attacks, the Security Council will consider further steps to give effect to its decisions.
Document 177: Cease-Fire Agreement between Israel and the United Arab Republic (August 7, 1970) [U.N. GAOR, 1851st mtg., at 66, U.N. Doc. A/PV 1851 (1970)]. This agreement between Israel and the United Arab Republic draws a cease-fire line to be effective immediately. Both sides agree to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and to accept the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in carrying out their obligations under that convention.
Document 178: United Nations Security Council Resolution 285, Demanding Withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from Lebanon (September 5, 1970) [S.C. Res. 285, U.N. SCOR, 1551st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/285 (1970)]. This one-sentence resolution demands the complete and immediate withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from Lebanese territory.
Document 179: United Nations Security Council Resolution 286, Appealing to States to Take Steps to Prevent Hijackings (September 9, 1970) [S.C. Res. 286, U.N. SCOR, 1552d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/286 (1970)]. In Resolution 286, the Security Council appeals to all parties for the immediate release of all passengers and crew held as a result of hijackings and calls on states to take all possible legal steps to prevent future hijackings.
Document 180: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2645, Aerial Hijacking or Interference with Civil Air Travel (November 25, 1970) [G.A. Res. 2645, U.N. GAOR, 1920th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. 2645 (XXV) (1970)]. In Resolution 2645, the General Assembly condemns all acts of aerial hijacking and calls upon states to take appropriate measures to deter such acts. The General Assembly also calls upon states to make every effort to adopt a convention on the unlawful seizure of aircraft.
Document 181: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2628, Callingfor Talks under the Auspices of the Secretary-General’s Special Representative with a View to Implementing Resolution 242 (November 4, 1970) [G.A. Res. 2628, U.N. GAOR, 1896th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2628 (1970)]. In Resolution 2628, the General Assembly calls for talks to be held under the auspices of the Secretary-General’s special representative with a view to implementing Security Council Resolution 242.
Document 182: Report by United Nations Secretary-General U Thant on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East, Gunnar V Jarring (January 4, 1971) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/10070 (1971)]. In this report, United Nations SecretaryGeneral U Thant describes the activities of Ambassador Gunnar V.Jarring, the newly appointed special representative to handle negotiations and diplomatic relations in the Middle East on behalf of the United Nations. The SecretaryGeneral reports that Jarring had been in consultation with the representatives of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Republic on the subject of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Syria, having rejected the resolution, is not involved in discussions. Annexes I and II are letters to Jarring from the concerned states presenting their unique positions on the subject.
Document183: United Nations Security Council Resolution S∕10070∕Add.1, Further Report by the Secretary-General on the Activities of the Special Representative to the Middle East (February 1, 1971) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S∕10070∕Add.1 (1967)]. This report by United Nations Secretary-General U Thant notes Ambassador Jarring’s discussions with the involved parties and expresses the Secretary-General’s optimism that the parties have resumed negotiations and progress has been made.
Document 184: Aide Memoire to Israel and the United Arab Republic by the United Nations Special Representative to the Middle East, Gunnar V. Jarring (February 8, 1971) [U.N. SCOR, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/10403 (1971)]. In this report, Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring, the United Nations Special Representative to the Middle East, concludes that the only possibility for breaking the deadlock between Israel and the United Arab Republic is to seek from each side parallel and simultaneous commitments that seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement. Jarring outlines the necessary steps to be taken by each side in order to proceed with negotiations.
Document 185: Reply of the United Arab Republic to the Jarring Aide Memoire (February 15, 1971) [available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/ab4e84c20927cc8185 256a780064642f?OpenDocument]. This response from the United Arab Republic to the Jarring aide me-mm∕ emphasizes the need for the concerned parties to implement Security Council Resolution 242, which calls upon Israel to withdraw from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip immediately.
Document186: Reply ofIsraelto the JarringAideMemoire (February 26, 1971) [U.N. SCOR, Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/10403 (1971)]. In this response, Israel outlines provisions for a peace agreement with the United Arab Republic, without referencing Security Council Resolution 242. Israel agrees to negotiate on the issue of refugees, but does not address the issue of withdrawing from the territories it has occupied.
Document 187: United Nations Security Council Resolution 313, Demanding that Israel Desist from All Military Action against Lebanon (February 28, 1972) [S.C. Res. 313, U.N. SCOR, 1644th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/313 (1972)]. In this one-sentence resolution, the Security Council demands that Israel immediately desist and refrain from any ground and air military action against Lebanon and withdraw all its military forces from Lebanese territory.
Document 188: Consensus of the Members of the Security Council Concerning the Increase of the Number of Military Observers in the Lebanese-Israeli Sector (April 19, 1972) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/10611 (1972)]. In place of a formal meeting of the Security Council, which was considered unnecessary in this instance, the members of the Security Council issued this consensus on how to respond to the Lebanese government’s request for additional United Nations observers to be stationed in the Israel-Lebanon sector. The Security Council president had informed the Secretary-General on March 31 that it was the members’ view that the request should be met. In this consensus, the members of the Security Council invite the Secretary-General to consult with the Lebanese authorities on the implementation of these arrangements.
Document 189: United Nations Security Council Resolution 316, Callingfor the Immediate Release of All Syrian and Lebanese Military Personnel Held by Israel (June 26, 1972) [S.C. Res. 316, U.N. SCOR, 1650th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/316 (1972)]. In Resolution 316, the Security Council condemns all acts of violence and the repeated attacks of Israeli forces on Lebanese territory and population in violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council expresses the strong desire that all Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted by Israeli armed forces on June 21, 1972, on Lebanese territory be released as soon as possible. In the event that such personnel are not released, the Security Council resolves to reconvene.
Document 190: United Nations Security Council Resolution 317, Deploring that Israel Has Not Released Abducted Syrian and Lebanese Military and Security Personnel (July 21,
1972) [S.C. Res. 317, U.N. SCOR, 1653d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/317 (1972)]. In Resolution 317, the Security Council, deploring that Israel had not released Syrian and Lebanese military and security personnel abducted from Lebanese territory, calls upon Israel to return them without delay.
Document 191: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2949, Declaring Changes Carried Out by Israel in the Occupied Arab Territories Null and Void (December 8, 1972) [G.A. Res. 2949, U.N. GAOR, 2105th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2429 (1972)]. In Resolution 2949, the General Assembly reaffirms that the territory of a state shall not be the object of occupation or acquisition by another state resulting from the threat or use of force. The General Assembly affirms that changes in the physical character or demographic composition of Occupied Territories are contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
D.