Yom Kippur War/Ramadan War/October War: 1973i''

The 1973 war began on October 6, 1973, with Egypt and Syria launching a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish high holiday of Yom Kippur. The holiday was strategically chosen as most Israeli soldiers would be engaged in religious observance and/or on leave from their military positions.

The bulk of combat was fought in the Suez Canal in the south and in the Golan Heights in the north between Israel and Egyptian-Syrian forces, with at least ten other Arab states symbolically aiding in the war effort with personnel, military equipment, or financial support. Some Palestinian Arabs fought with the Egyptian-Syrian forces and shelled Israeli towns from Lebanon.

Initially, Israeli aircraft and tanks were destroyed at a high rate. By October 9, Israel grew increasingly concerned that the Arab armies would cross the 1967 borders in an attempt to destroy the state. Fearing that Israel might resort to using nuclear weapons to end the war, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger decided that they could not refuse to provide assistance to Israel for defense. On October 14, the first American Galaxy transport aircraft arrived with supplies for Israel and other U.S. planes delivered military assistance to Israel in the Sinai. This turned the tide of the war, as Israel broke through Egyptian positions in the Sinai.

On October 16, Israeli forces, under the command of General Ariel Sharon, crossed the Suez Canal and advanced south toward the City of Suez. That operation, in an area of the canal called the “ DeversoiP (spillway), cut the supply line to Egypt’s Third Army, east of the canal, while Sharon’s division was behind it.

On the economic front, the Organization ofArab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) announced on October 17 that it would reduce its oil production until Israel withdrew from the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 war. This was followed by a total oil embargo on the United States and the Netherlands. The prevailing Cold War atmosphere also complicated the war. Because the Soviet Union backed the Arab states and the United States backed Israel, it became increasingly possible that the two superpowers would clash over the Middle East.

Both Israel and Egypt accepted the United Nations cease-fire agreement laid out in Security Council Resolution 338 on October 22, but it was soon broken. On October 23, the Security Council adopted Resolution 339, which confirms Resolution 338 and calls for the dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise a cease-fire. IWithin two days, the Security Council established a UNEF, and on October 27, fighting officially ended. The primary lesson for Israel was Egypt’s success in crossing the Suez Canal and briefly defeating Israeli forces.

It is important to note that the United Nations issued virtually no formal resolutions or reports on the situation during the course of hostilities. The first United Nations decision to address the war, Security Council Resolution 338, was passed only when it was apparent that Egypt’s offensive was stopped and Israel had moved its military from the defensive to the offensive. In adopting this strategy, the United Nations tacitly confirmed Egypt and Syria’s right to reclaim their territories from Israel. More importantly, the Security Council wanted to avoid a confrontation between the United States and the USSR, and to reduce the tensions in the Middle East between the two superpowers.

i. Pre-WarDevelopments

Document 192: United Nations Security Council Resolution 331, Requesting the Secretary­General to Submit a Comprehensive Report on the Efforts of the United Nations Pertaining to the Middle East Situation sinceJune 1967 (April 20, 1973) [S.C. Res. 331, U.N. SCOR, 1710th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/331 (1973)]. In Resolution 331, the Security Council requests a report from the Secretary-General with a full account of the efforts undertaken by the United Nations with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict sinceJune 1967. It also invites Mr. Gunnar Jarring, the special representative of the Secretary-General, to render assistance to the Security Council in the course of deliberations.

Document 193: United Nations Security Council Resolution 332, Condemning the Repeated Military Attacks Conducted by Israel against Lebanon (April 21, 1973) [S.C. Res. 332, U.N. SCOR, 1711th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/332 (1973)]. In Resolution 332, the Security Council condemns the repeated military attacks conducted by Israel against Lebanon that result in the loss of life of innocent individuals.

Document 194: Excerpts from the Report of the Secretary-General under Security Council Resolution 331 (May 18, 1973) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/10929 (1973)]. In compliance with Resolution 331, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim submitted this report on United Nations efforts with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict since June 1967. The Secretary-General highlights the presence of monitors as a means of maintaining cease-fire agreements and notes the difficulty of implementing Security Council resolutions that address the monitoring of human rights abuses, the status of Jerusalem, and the problem of Palestinian refugees. The Secretary­General cites the lack of cooperation from both parties as a source of difficulty and hopes that over time the Security Council will be willing to once again consider the problem as a whole in order to find a way to implement a just and lasting settlement.

Document 195: U.S.-Vetoed Security Council Draft Resolution S/10974, First U.S. Veto of a Security Council Resolution Criticizing the Israeli Occupation (July 24, 1973) [S.C. Draft Res. S/10974, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/10974 (1973)]. This vetoed draft resolution reiterates many of the statements and demands made in Security Council Resolution 242 (1967). That it is the first resolution criticizing Israel to be vetoed by the United States is of particular historical interest.

Document 196: United Nations Security Council Resolution 337, Condemning Israel for Violating Lebanon’s Sovereignty (August 15, 1973) [S.C. Res. 337, U.N. SCOR, 1740th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/337 (1973)]. After receiving a report from Lebanon concerning the hijacking of a Lebanese civilian airliner on lease to Iraqi Airways by the Israeli air force, the Security Council, in Resolution 337, condemns Israel for the violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the seizure. The Security Council considers these actions a violation of the Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement of 1949 and the 1967 cease-fire resolutions.

ii. 1973 War (October 6-24, 1973)

Document 197: Vetoed Security Council Draft Resolution S/11036, Calling upon All Parties to Cease All Firing and Terminate All Military Activity (October 21, 1973) [S.C. Draft Res. S/11036, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/11036 (1973)]. This draft Security Council resolution, presented by the USSR and the United States, would have been the first United Nations resolution passed after fighting broke out in the 1973 war. It calls upon parties to immediately terminate all military activity—and, subsequent to that, to start implementing Security Council Resolution 242. It also decides that peace negotiations should start under appropriate auspices concurrently with the cease-fire.

Document 198: United Nations Security Council Resolution 339, Confirming Resolution 338 and Requesting the Dispatch of United Nations Observers to Supervise the Cease-Fire (October 23, 1973) [S.C.

Document 199: Speech by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meierto the Knesset Regarding Israel’s Acceptance ofthe Cease-Fire (October 23, 1973) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/nr/ exeres∕698608ed-49a0-4bd0-9c24-75b96b054c39.htm]. Prime Minister Golda Meir gave this statement before the Knesset the day after Israel and Egypt accepted a United Nations cease-fire, explaining Israel’s reasons for doing so.

Document 200: United Nations Security Council Resolution 340, Deciding to Set Up a UNEF(October25, 1973) [S.C. Res. 340, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/340 (1973)]. In Resolution 340, the Security Council, reiterating that the cease-fire is being continually violated, orders further military observers to be dispatched on both sides of the cease-fire line and decides to set up a UNEF.

Document 201: United Nations Security Council Resolution 341, Establishing a UNEF for Six Months (October 27, 1973) [S.C. Res. 341, U.N. SCOR, 1752d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/341 (1973)]. In Resolution 341, the Security Council decides to establish a UNEF for six months, then for a longer period if necessary, in accordance with the Secretary-General’s report on implementation of Security Council Resolution 340.

Document 202: Declaration ofthe European Community on the Middle East (November 6,

1973) [reprinted in 3 The Arab Israeli Conflict 1147-48 (John Morton Moore ed.,

1974) ]. In this statement, nine members of the European Community strongly urge both sides of the conflict to return to their previous positions in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 339 and 340. The European Community also emphasizes the necessity of implementing Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 if a permanent peace settlement is to be reached.

Document 203: Cease-Fire Agreement between Israel and Egypt (November 11, 1973) [U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/11056 (1973)]. Israeli and Egyptian military representatives signed this cease-fire agreement at kilometer marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road in the presence of the interim Force Commander of the UNEF. The agreement covers such topics as the return to the October 22 borders, humanitarian aid for the town of Suez, the transfer of the checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road from Israeli control to UNEF control, and the exchange of prisoners of war.

iii. Post-WarDevelopments

Document 204: Declaration of the Arab Summit Conference, Algiers (November 29, 1973) [available at http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/History/arabsum73.html]. The Arab Summit Conference issued this declaration, which states that the Egypt-Israel cease-fire agreement will only lead to peace when Israel evacuates all the occupied Arab territories and when Palestinians achieve full national rights. The conference also produced a set of secret resolutions that detail the military, economic, and political tools to be implemented by members in order to achieve the aims of the conference. These include the use of an oil embargo to strengthen support for the Arab cause.

Document 205: Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Egypt (January 18, 1974) [U.N. Doc. S/1198/Rev. 1/Add. 1 (1974)]. This separation of forces agreement between Israel and Egypt defines demarcation lines, zones of disengagement, and the interpretive role of the UNEF. The implementation of the agreement is left to be worked out by Egyptian and Israeli military representatives, who will agree on the stages of the process. It is emphasized that the agreement does not constitute a final peace agreement, but represents a first step toward establishing peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338.

Document 206: United Nations Security Council Resolution 346, Extending the Mandate of the UNEFfor a Further Six Months (April 8, 1974) [S.C. Res. 346, U.N. SCOR, 1765th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/346 (1974)]. In Resolution 346, the Security Council decides to extend the mandate of the UNEF for another six months, viewing the Emergency Force as essential not only for the maintenance of quiet in the Egypt- Israel sector but also to assist if required in efforts for the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Document 207: Interim Report Issued by the Agranat Commission of Inquiry (April 1974) [reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation: A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. This report is written by the five member Commission of Inquiry set up by the Israeli government to investigate and report to the cabinet on the matters of the enemy’s intentions and decisions preceding the Yom Kippur War, the IDF’s preparation preceding the war, and the IDF’s actions to contain the enemy. The members of this commission were Supreme Court Chief Justice Shimon Agranat, Supreme CourtJustice Moshe Landau, State Comptroller Yitzhak Nebenzahl, and former chiefs of staff of the IDF, Yagael Yadin and Haim Laskov. Their final report was released to the public in January of 1995.

The interim report primarily places the blame of misevaluations in the hours preceding the surprise attack from Egypt and Syria on the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), who expected the attack to commence later in the day. The DMI and the Research Division of the Intelligence Branch also did not correctly evaluate warnings in the days preceding the war, falsely assuming that Egypt and Syria would not attack unless Egypt had sufficient air power against the Israeli air force. The conception that Egypt and Syria were incapable of starting total war resulted in troops not being mobilized properly and the reserves not called early enough.

The report maintains that among the three authorities that deal with security matters, the government and prime minister, the minister of defense, and the chief of staffwho heads the IDF, there is no clear division of authority and responsibilities. This creates problems in the field of security, and impedes effectiveness of work. In the case of the Yom Kippur War, the General Staff s Intelligence Branch was detrimentally the only evaluation of the situation. The report finally concludes that despite the drawbacks, the IDF triumphed successfully against one of the most difficult confrontations an army can face.

Document 208: Report by the Agranat Commission (1974) [reprinted in The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 2001)]. The Israeli government appointed the Agranat Commission to investigate what led to the Yom Kippur War and the failures and successes seen during the conflict. It reports on disciplinary issues, the inability to

read the progress of the battle, and how the failings of field intelligence resulted in unpreparedness for the surprise attack,

Document 209. Two-Phased Plan Issued by the PLO (June 1974) [ reprinted in Arab-Israeli Conflict and Conciliation. A Documentary History (Bernard Reich ed., 1995)]. After the Yom Kippur War, the PLO adopted a program to recover the national rights of Palestinians in order to establish a just and lasting peace. The Palestinian National Council stated that it would not accept Resolution 242, which treats their issues as a problem of refugees and ignores the national right of the people. The plan states that to establish the democratic Palestinian state, the PLo should work to liberate Palestinian territories by any means, including armed struggle. A national authority can thus be created over all of the liberated Palestinian land. in order achieve these national duties, the PLo should work to increase national unity and solidarity with other forces of liberation around the world to thwart the aims of Zionism and imperialism. In two stages, the PLO first wishes to create the Palestinian state in territory that is not occupied by israel and then proceed with the military attack to gain back their land that is in Israel’s control.

Document 210: United Nations Security Council Resolution 347, Condemning Israel for Violating Lebanon’s Territorial Integrity (April 24, 1974) [S.C. Res. 347, U.N. SCOR, 1769th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/347 (1974)]. The Security Council, in Resolution 347, condemns Israel’s violation of Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and calls once more upon the government of Israel to refrain from further military actions and threats against Lebanon. It also calls upon Israel to release and return abducted Lebanese civilians to Lebanon.

Document 211: Separation of Forces Agreement between Israel and Syria (May 31, 1974) [U.N. Doc. S∕11302∕Add.1∕Annex 1 (1974)]. Like the agreement between Israel and Egypt, this separation of forces agreement between Israel and Syria defines demarcation lines, zones of disengagement, and the interpretive role of the UNEF. It allows for the exchange of wounded soldiers, as well as the exchange of the bodies of dead soldiers. It emphasizes that the agreement does not constitute a final peace agreement, but represents a first step toward establishing peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338.

Document 212: United Nations Security Council Resolution 350, Welcoming the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces and Establishing the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (May 31, 1974) [S.C. Res. 350, U.N. SCOR, 1774th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/350 (1974)]. In Resolution 350, the Security Council welcomes the Israeli-Syrian Agreement on Disengagement negotiated as part of the implementation of Security Council Resolution 338. The Security Council decides to set up a disengagement observer force for an initial period of six months, subject to renewal.

Document 213: Seventh Arab League Summit Conference, Resolution on Palestine, Rabat, Morocco (October 28, 1974) [available at http.//www.mondediplo.com/focus/ mideast/rabat74-en]. In this resolution, members of the League of Arab States agree to use their collective resources to strengthen the Palestinian national entity in support of Palestinian sovereignty and national rights, despite the Israeli occupation and disenfranchisement. The Arab League agrees to five resolutions that outline this commitment, including to support the PLO in the exercise of its responsibility at the national and international levels. This resolution was issued two weeks after the United Nations General Assembly voted to acknowledge the PLO as the valid representative of the Palestinian people and invited its participation in the General Assembly on the Question of Palestine in plenary meetings.

Document 214: U.S. Senate Resolution 214, Expressing Concern over Attempts to Expel Israel from the United Nations (July 18, 1975) [S. Res. 214, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 18, 1975)]. Expressing concern over attempts to expel Israel from the United Nations, the U.S. Senate resolves in this Senate resolution that if such a measure is carried out, it will review all U.S. commitments to third world nations involved in the expulsion and consider the implication of continued membership in the United Nations.

Document 215: Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the United States (SeptemberJ 1975) [availableathttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/ Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1974-1977/112%20Israel-Un ited%20States%20Memorandum%20of%20Understandi]. In this memorandum of understanding, the United States pledges its assistance and support to Israel as a firm ally. The United States vows to make every effort to be responsive to Israel’s military, energy, and economic needs within the limits of its resources and congressional authorization and appropriation. This memorandum was released on the same day as the interim agreement between Israel and Egypt was signed.

Document 216: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3379, Calling for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (November 10, 1975) [U.N. Doc. A/ RES/3379 (1975)]. In Resolution 3379, the General Assembly determines that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination, noting several relevant decisions by international bodies, including Resolution 77 (XII) of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity.

Document 217: Address by Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Chaim Herzog to the General Assembly of the United Nations in Response to Zionism Is Racism Resolution (November 10, 1975) [available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ UN/herzogsp.html]. Ambassador Herzog’s speech draws the attention of the international community to the fact that the U.N. resolution comes on the thirty­seventh anniversary of Kristallnacht, the night that marked the beginning of the destruction of Germany’s Jewry by Hitler. He defines the U.N. resolution as sheer anti-Semitism, and the General Assembly as stage where Hitler would have felt at home. Hatred and ignorance, the ambassador explains, is what stand behind this resolution, and he accuses its promoters for subverting U.N. institutions so that a resolution that was initially conceived as a condemnation of racism and colonialism turned, thanks to an automatic majority, into a contemptuous maneuver against Zionism. In his description of the history of Zionism, Ambassador Herzog points out at the support it had in the past from the Soviet Union, the same which now leads this coalition of hatred and ignorance to a crusade against Zionism. He wonders how countries in the Soviet block and in the Arab world, where human rights are trampled daily and minorities are suppressed, dare talk of racism against a country, Israel, whose treatment of its Arab minority, however imperfect, is an example of co-existence. The issue is then, neither Zionism nor Israel. The issue is the fate of the United Nations that, by producing a resolution based on falsehood and arrogance, one that is devoid of any moral or legal value, has been dragged to its lowest point of discredit by a coalition of despots and racists.

Document 218: Basic Law of the State of Israel: The Army (March 31, 1976) [30 LSI 150 (1975-76)]. This Basic Law of the State of Israel passed by the Knesset defines the army of the State of Israel, its subordination to civil authority, and the power of the Chief of the General Staff in relation to the Minister of Defence.

Document 219: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 31/62, Peace Conference on the Middle East (December 9, 1976) [G.A. Res. 31/62, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/62 (1976)]. Gravely concerned at the lack of progress towards the achievement of peace in the Middle East, the General Assembly passed Resolution 31/62, requesting that the Secretary-General resume contacts with all parties to the conflict and the co-chairmen of the peace conference on the Middle East. It calls for the early convening of the peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States, no later than the end of March 1977.

Document 220: Law of the State of Israel: No. 16 Emergency Regulations (Judea and Samaria, Gaza Region, Golan Heights, Sinai and Southern Sinai-Criminal Jurisdiction and Legal Assistance) Law (December 28, 1977) [32 LSI 58 (1977-78)]. The Knesset passed this law, extending the emergency regulations for another two years (until December 31, 1979). It defines the emergency regulations’ area of jurisdiction as Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Region, the Golan Heights, and Sinai and Southern Sinai.

Document 221: Speech by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the Knesset: Autonomy Plan for the West Bank and Gaza Strip (December 28, 1977) [available at http://www. knesset.gov.il/process/docs/autonomy1977_eng.htm]. In this speech to the Knesset, Prime Minister Menachem Begin announces that the military government in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza will be abolished and replaced by an administrative council consisting of eleven elected members to be based in Bethlehem. Begin also announces that residents of Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza district will be granted free choice of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship and will be granted rights according to the laws of each state. Additionally, the prime minister reasserts Israel’s claim of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. In the knowledge that other claims exist, however, it proposes that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open for the sake of peace. Begin also advocates the drawing of a proposal that would guarantee freedom of access to all Holy Places in Jerusalem.

Document 222: Statement by the Government of Israel on the Bombing of the Iraqi Nuclear Facility (June 8, 1981) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign% 20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1981-1982/26 %20Statement%20by%20the%20Government%20of%20Israel%20on%20the%2 0Bo]. In this statement, the Israeli government announces that reliable sources had informed Israel that the “Ossirac” reactor outside of Baghdad was designed to produce atomic weapons intended for use against Israel. Israel states that it was compelled to strike before such weapons were created.

Document 223: United Nations Security Council Resolution 487, Condemning Israeli Air Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Installations (June 19, 1981) [S.C. Res 487, U.N. SCOR, 2288th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/487 (1981)]. Noting that Iraq was a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that Israel had not adhered to that treaty, the Security Council condemns the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installation as a violation of the United Nations Charter. The Security Council finds the attack to be a serious threat to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. It also recognizes the right of Iraq to develop nuclear programs for peaceful purposes and considers that Iraq is entitled to redress from Israel.

Document 224: Memorandum of Understanding between Israel and the United States on Strategic Cooperation (November 30, 1981) [available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/US-Israel+Memorandum+of+Un derstanding.htm]. In this memorandum, Israel and the United States agree to protect their mutual interests. They also recognize the need to enhance their strategic cooperation in order to deter Soviet threats to the Middle East.

Document 225: Law of the State of Israel: The Golan Heights (December 14, 1981) [36 LSI 7 (1981-82)]. With this law, Israel extends its jurisdiction and administration to the Golan Heights, which was seized from Syria and occupied during the 1967 war.

Document 226: United Nations Security Council Resolution 497, Israeli Decision to Impose Its Laws, Jurisdiction, and Administration in the Occupied Syrian Golan Heights Is Null and Void (December 17, 1981) [S.C. Res. 497, U.N. SCOR, 2319th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/497 (1981)]. In Resolution 497, the Security Council determines that the Israeli decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction, and administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect and demands that Israel rescind its decision. The Security Council further requests that the Secretary-General report on the implementation of this resolution within two weeks and decides that in the event of non-compliance the Security Council will meet urgently, and not later than January 5, 1982, to consider taking appropriate measures in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

E.