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Transformation

The Ultramares rule reigned for decades until, by the early 1960s, a confluence of intersecting activities by the Bench, Bar and academy caused courts to reconsider its restrictive approach to liability for negligent misstatement.

In this period, a significant body of scholarly commentary highlighted the issue of liability for neg­ligent misstatement and challenged the Ultramares rule, a number of important decisions allowed actions for negligent misrepresentation in various types of situ­ations, and Restatement (Second) of Torts §552 was adopted by the American Law Institute and then widely followed.

A small but important body of scholarly literature argued for expansion of liability for negligent misstatement. The literature identified misstatement and some related cases as presenting a distinctive class and it highlighted some of the difficulties with the old law and supported new approaches. The most prominent example is an article, ‘Misrepresentation and Third Persons’ by the pre-eminent torts scholar William Lloyd Prosser.[1268] Prosser had first published his authorita­tive treatise on torts in 1941, with successive editions through 1971.[1269] The treatise contained an odd but irresistible mix of critique of older law and the policy under­lying it with a comforting resort to reformulated doctrine. Its overall approach recognised the element of critique that courts in tort cases were engaged in policy making but it ordered neat groups of cases that took on the status of doctrinal rules. ‘ Misrepresentation and Third Persons' likewise reviewed the history of the area, finding ‘ a great many more cases' than previously had been recognised and that patterns and conclusions could be drawn from the cases. It also analysed the elements of the doctrine and grouped the cases in separate categories for doctrinal treatment, concluding that:

One who makes a false representation is liable, whether on the basis of intent, negligence or strict liability, to those whom he intends, for his own purposes, to reach and influence by the representation [and] those members of a group or class whom he has special rea­son to expect to be influenced by the representation,

with some uncertainty about the latter group in the case of negligence.[1270]

Two construction cases decided in 1962 were among the few direct authorities available to the drafters of §552 and so were much cited in later cases.

In M Miller Company v Central Contra Costa Sanitary District[1271] the Court applied the recently formulated California test for determining a duty of reasonable care in all types of cases[1272] [1273] to permit an action by the contractor on a sewer project against the design engineer and the engineer who conducted the soil tests and provided a report on the tests for bidders on the project. Because the material underlying the construc­tion site was unstable in a manner not anticipated by the report, the successful bidder's construction cost was greater than it had projected. The Court held that the bidder stated a cause of action against the soil engineer because the engineer was alleged to know that its report would be relied on by prospective bidders. Texas Tunneling Co v City of Chattanooga23 involved an action by a subcontractor against the engineer on a sewer project for failing to include in the bid documents certain information about test bore drillings, as a result of which the subcontrac­tor underestimated its expenses on the project. The Court noted that foreseeability is required to establish a duty in negligence, and ordinarily the specific injury that the defendant suffers need not be foreseen if the type of injury was foreseeable. The particular plaintiff need not be foreseeable either, if the ‘class of persons which a given act may foreseeably affect' is known.[1274] Accordingly, it held that an action for negligent misrepresentation was available and it stated three policy bases for rejecting the Ultramares requirement of a bond approaching privity:

[T]he growing complexity of business relations and the growing specialization of business functions all require more and more reliance in business transactions upon the representations of specialists... Further, the New York rule has the effect of plac­ing the burden of loss, as between the negligent maker of a misrepresentation and the plaintiff, upon the latter, though he be both injured and innocent.

Finally, the trepidation expressed by the New York court at the unlimited areas of liability which it was ‘invited’ to recognize, may be no more than a tilting at windmills. [T]here are methods for limit­ing liability for negligent misrepresentation which are less artificial and less drastic than the rule adopted in the Ultramares case.[1275]

The adoption of §552 was the signal event in this period that transformed the approach of most courts. Section 552 provides:

§552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others

(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuni­ary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.

(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered

(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and

(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.

(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.

The Texas Tunneling Court cited the first Restatement of Torts §552, which had expressed a rule analogous to the Ultramares rule. Under the original §552, ‘As in the case of fraudulent misrepresentations the liability is confined to those who are intended to rely upon the information and who rely upon it in a type of transac­tion in which it is the maker’s purpose to influence their conduct’.[1276] Until this period, courts generally had been chary in applying the section, seldom expand­ing liability beyond the ‘end and aim’ logic of the section and Ultramares.

In the process of redrafting §552 for the Restatement (Second), Prosser, the Restatement’s Reporter, noted this reluctance, reworded the section to ‘clarify its meaning’[1277] and expanded the official comments.

Following the drafting of the revised §552 a number of notable cases quickly applied it in an expansive fashion and asserted the policy basis for a broad applica­tion. Rusch Factors Inc v Levin was the first accountant liability case to depart from Ultramares.[1278] Noting the breakthrough it was making, the Court offered a policy defence of its position:

Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an accountant’s professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn’t a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary tech­niques of the accounting profession? For these reasons it appears to this Court that the decision in Ultramares constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the principle that ‘the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed’.[1279]

In Rozny v Marnul,[1280] liability was imposed on a surveyor in favour of a subsequent purchaser of negligently surveyed property. The Court distinguished between the reluctance to impose liability when the harm to the third party was merely ‘foreseeable’ and the willingness to impose liability ‘when the reliance of the third person might have been said to be known’. [1281] The Court considered and rejected the Ultramares limitation on liability in favour of foreseeability:

We agree that the unknown and unlimited liability factor, as so ably stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo in the Ultramares case, is not to be lightly discounted. But we deal here with a defendant who has included on his inaccurate plat an ‘ absolute guarantee for accuracy.’ As might reasonably have been foreseen by defendant who admitted that he knew the plats were customarily used by lending agencies and others, that plat was subsequently relied on to his damage by a third party in connection with the financing and purchase of the surveyed property.

Under these circumstances it seems to us fortuitous that the ultimate loss resulting from the faulty survey fell upon one other than the person for whom the survey was made should not absolve defendant from responding in damages. The situation is not one fraught with such an overwhelming potential liability as to dic­tate a contrary result, for the class of persons who might foreseeably use this plat is rather narrowly limited, if not exclusively so, to those who deal with the surveyed property as purchasers or lenders. Injury will ordinarily occur only once and to the one person then owning the lot.[1282]

The American Law Institute is in the process of drafting the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, with the first sections recently having been adopted. The R estatement (Third) begins with a rule that there is no general duty to avoid negligently inflicted economic loss.[1283] Although there is no general duty, duties arise in particular classes as recognised in subsequent sections of the Restatement, and residual duties may be identified in appropriate circumstances.[1284] Negligent misstatement is an instance of ‘ invited reliance,' one of the established exceptions to the Restatement’s rule of no general duty.[1285] Section 5 of the Restate­ment (Third) repeats the terms of §552 with only minor changes in language.[1286] The Restatement also specifies an action for negligently inflicted economic harm, with the elements of the causes of action essentially the same as for negligent misstatement;[1287] the two actions are intended to be ‘complementary'.[1288]

IV.

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Source: Barker Kit, Grantham Ross. The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v Heller. Hart Publishing,2015. — 410 p.. 2015
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