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Cossack Government in Exile and the End OfUkrainian Sovereignty

Following Mazepas death the General Secretary Pilip Orlyk was elected Hetman of the Zaporozhian Army and was promptly recognized by King Charles XII and the Ottoman Sultan Ahmed III as the head of an independent Ukraine.1 A year later in 1710 Pilip Orlykproduced a remarkable document, much ahead of its time.

It had the long and descriptive title:

An agreement and the Establishment of the Rights and Freedoms of the Zaporozhian Army and all the Free People of Lesser Rus (Ukraine), Between His Excellency Hetman Pilip Orlyk and the General Officer (Corps), the Colonels, and the Mentioned Za- porozhian Army, Which Following Ancient Custom and the Mil­itary Rules, and Agreed Upon by Both Sides by Free Voting, and Strengthened by the Most Enlightened Hetman’s Solemn Oath.2

With a preamble and 16 clear clauses, the document pro­ceeds to define a constitution of Cossack Ukraine, known by its short Latin title as “Pacta et Constiutionesw or simply as “Pilip Orlyks Constitution.” John Locke in his well-known 1690 “Two Treatises of Government,” inspired by the English Lev­ellers, had prescribed the separation of powers between the leg­islative (Parliament) and executive (the Monarch) branches of government. Pilip Orlykwent further, to separate all the three powers of government—the executive, the legislative, and the judicial—preceding Montesquieu by almost 40 years.3 Is it pos­sible that the great French political theorist had been influenced by the Orlyk Constitution, which was circulating in Europe at the time in Latin, and other languages?4

Orlyks Constitution covers most of the fundamental points of a democratic government and the rule of law. The leg­islature, to be known as the General Rada, is to consist of elected delegates, representing rank-and-file Cossacks, the officers, Za- porozhian Cossacks from “Down Under,” as well as the peasants, and was to sit three times a year during the main re­ligious holidays at Christmas (January), Easter (April), and the Feast of the Holy Protection (October).

One of the General Radas functions besides passing laws was to examine complaints against the hetman and other members of the ex­ecutive whose powers were to be limited by clauses 6, 7, and 8—the hetman could not touch government revenue or dispose of government lands and property, conduct independent foreign affairs and negotiations, or establish administrative of­fices or appoint individuals to such positions; and above all, he was forbidden to punish any individual thought to be guilty of an offense. Such determination was the responsibility of judges of the CossackArmy, whose court was to be completely inde­pendent of other office or institution, including the General Rada and the Hetmans office, as stipulated in clause 7. This meant that the court could try anyone without exception, in­cluding the hetman himself, so that no one was above the law.5 Towns and cities under the Magdeburg Lawwere to retain their

traditional government, but all regimental colonels were to be elected and confirmed in their posts by the hetman. The Greek Orthodox Church was to be removed from the authority of the Moscow Patriarch and returned to the jurisdiction of Constan­tinople. The document was based on the Cossack concept that each individual was endowed with a “natural right” given by God, and is a written testimony to the democratic culture which emerged from the Ukrainian Revolution. Itwas also the begin­ning of laying the foundation for a Cossack Ukrainian state, at least on paper and in exile.

For a long time the Latin version of the document drew much skepticism, and was considered by many to be a forgery. How could such an enlightened constitution have been drawn up by ordinary Cossacks who didn’t even have a proper state, when democratic constitutions appeared only much later, fol­lowing the American and the French revolutions towards the end of the 18th century? Then during the winter of2009 a dis­covery was made which removed all doubt as to the authenticity of Pilip Orlyk s Constitution.

A young Kyiv historian, Olek- SanderAffiorov, was examining the unsorted Files on Ukraine in the Central Russian Archives of Older Documents in Mos­cow, when he came across a Ukrainian language version of the document, written in the official Middle Ukrainian. It had been kept at the Zaporozhian Sich until 1775, when it was seized to­gether with other papers by General Tekeli s Imperial troops, which in that year captured and destroyed the Sich on Khortyt­sia Island. There was also a charter from King Charles XII of Sweden recognizing Pilip Orlyks election as Hetman and ac­knowledging the validity of the Constitution.6

Meanwhile following his victory at Poltava and the bloody repression which followed, Peter I stepped up the Muscovite policy of restricting Ukrainian independence and converting the left bank into an autonomous province similar to the newly conquered Baltic territories. In this he was supported by Het­man Ivan Skoropadsky, who “had put his head under the Tsar s yoke” as was charged by the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The het- man’s seat was moved to Hlukhiv closer to the Muscovite border, the Ukrainian Cossack Army was placed under the Tsar s commander with many colonels and captains appointed by Peter I himself, and the jurisdiction of the Cossack main court was curtailed as was the freedom of the press. Ten regi­ments of the Tsar,s army were stationed on the left bank of Ukraine, two of which were assigned to Skoropadsky at Hlukhiv headed by Peter Is “resident” who was to keep an eye on the hetman. Ivan Skoropadskywas also “asked” to give his 15-year- old daughter in marriage to one of Peter Is favorite command­ers, P. Tolstoi.

Many Cossacks who had supported Skoropadsky during the war now turned against him. The main reason for his un­popularity was the forced drafting of Cossacks for hard labor to work building St. Petersburg on the unhealthy Finnish bog.

Also in 1716, 10,000 left-bank Cossacks were sent to dig the canal between the Volga and Don rivers near Tsaritsyn, two years later Cossacks were put to work building forts along the Terek River in the foothills of the Caucasus Mountains, and in 1721 some 12,000 were ordered to dig a canal near Lake La­doga.

The following year they were joined by 12,000 draftees with casualties reaching 30 percent and many of the survivors returning home as invalids.7 For a population of just over one million the losses were significant and were meant in part to cow Ukrainians into submission.

The freedom from Polish-Lithuanian serfdom in Ukraine following the revolution had created not only a free peasantry, but had also released private manufacturing and trade activities particularly in the free towns and cities under the Magdeburg Law. Following the devastation of the civil war and the foreign intervention that followed Bohdan Khmelnitsky s death, eco­nomic activity resumed, particularly under Hetman Mazepa when left-bank Ukraine experienced a great growth in manu­facture and foreign trade with the rest of Europe. Ukrainian merchants and Cossacks exported wheat, flax, hemp, cattle, wax, honey, tallow, hides, and tobacco, while importing south­ern produce such as figs, raisins, wines, and European woven and manufactured goods, although local glass-making, iron works, brewing, and the production of saltpeter and other chemicals was widespread. Most of the trade and production was carried out by private capitalist-style entrepreneurs who hired readily available labor, and artisans and tradesmen were also active in what was becoming a monetary economy. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Cossack officers as entre­preneurs would not come into conflict with the large land­owners who owed their estates to Tsar Peter I and Hetman Sko­ropadsky. The Cossacks were not a homogeneous social class, and their interests and social views at times tended to vary con­siderably. Although social distinctions and privileges of the no­bility had largely been “cut down by Cossack sabers” under Bo- hdan Khmelnitsky, social stratification was slowly appearing once again.

With political control established over left-bank Ukraine, Peter I—now “Emperor of all the Russias”—proceeded to place restrictions and controls over the economy to reduce compe­tition with his monopolized state industries by: redirecting Ukrainian exports to ports in Greater Russia; establishing Rus­sian state monopolies; banning import of non-Muscovite goods; and imposing custom duties and deploying border pa­trols to enforce them.8

Ukraine, however, retained much of its distinctive culture, its way of life, and political organization.

This was remarked by Jul Just, the Danish envoy to Peter Γs court when he traveled through left-bank Ukraine in 1711. He was pleasantly surprised by the neatness and orderliness of the villages, and noted that: “[The] Kozaks, being a freedom-loving people, are dissatisfied with the appointment by the Tsar, of Muscovite commanders for their garrisons. And considering themselves a free people, they are resentful in that they are compelled to serve the Tsar and execute his orders.”

JulJust was hosted in Hlukhiv by the acting hetman Andriy Martinovich, in a “splendid” reception where he had the op­portunity to sample the local life and culture: “The inhabitants of Kozak Ukraine live in prosperity and often sing. They sell and buy all sorts of merchandise without paying taxes, and can choose whatever handicraft is to their liking, and trade with whatever they want. They are subject to only a small taxation to the Hetman.”9 The Hetman s tax also went to the upkeep of the Cossackregiments, as well as of the central Cossack admin­istration, which given the lack of state institutions was not very extensive. The Danish envoy was not received by Skoropadsky himself since the Hetman was away on a campaign in Peter s war with the Ottoman Empire.

An autocratic control of the Hetman and the Cossack offi­cer corps had a negative impact on morale which, added to the disregard for the Cossacks’ health and physical well-being, con­tinued to erode their fighting capabilities. In 1721 Peter I began a war with Persia and 10,000 Ukrainian Cossacks were sent to Derbent; a year later 10,000 more were dispatched against the Persians, three years later 12,000 more Cossacks were sent to the unhealthy conditions around Derbent and by the following year only 6,800 were left, most having perished in the hot, un­healthy climate. No year passed without more being sent to far­away places, particularly in 1731 when 20,000 Cossacks and 10,000 peasants were pressed to build fortifications along the shores of the Sea of Azov to be joined in the following year by 30,000 more.10 The final blow to Ukrainian autonomy came in 1721 when Hetman Skoropadskywas informed of the creation of the Collegiate for Lesser Russia, to consist of six Imperial Russian officers who were to supervise all affairs on the left­bank regimental territories.

Hetman Skoropadskywas informed of the effective end to his authority when he attended the victory celebrations in Moscow to mark the victory of the Great Northern war, to which he had contributed in no small measure. On his way back to Ukraine he fell ill, and a few months later he was dead. The main initial task of the new Col­legiate, headed by General Veliaminov, was to raise revenue in Ukraine by widespread taxation, and three years later in 1724 the General could boast that Ukrainian taxes had increased by 600 percent!

Following Skoropadsky s death the senior Cossack officers elected the colonel of the Chernihiv regiment, Pavlo Polubotok, as the next hetman. Born in 1660, he sided with Peter against Mazepa, and had come close to being elected Hetman in place of Skoropadsky. He received land from the Tsar and was active in trade and commerce, which, with 3,200 tenant households on his estates, made Polubotok one of the wealthiest men in Ukraine.11 Peter I had decided to terminate the position of Het­man and refused to confirm the election, even though Polubotokhad demonstrated his Ioyaltybyleading 10,000 Cos­sacks in 1721 to work on the Ladoga Canal where a third of them perished.

The establishment of the Collegiate was unacceptable even to the pliable Polubotok and the wealthy circle of senior officers who resented the loss of autonomy and objected to the payment of new taxes, as they made clear in a petition to Peter. Polubotoks petition also asked that the Tsar approve the election of a hetman “without whom government and army af­fairs presented in St. Petersburg cannot proceed lawfully, and Lesser Russia finds itself in total darkness.”12 Peter Is despotic position, however, was firm. All practices and institutions be­yond his control were to be abolished, as he made clear in an angry and paranoid reply:

As is known to all from the time of the first Hetman Bohdan Khmelnitsky, even to Skoropadsky, all hetmans turned out to be traitors, and what misfortune was suffered by our state, particu­larly Lesser Russia, as is still fresh in the memory of Mazepa... and until a faithful well-known person is found, a government has been appointed for the benefit of your country... and there is no question of electing a hetman, and it is no use to belabor the point.13

Hetman Pavlo Polubotok, the Cossack chief judge and the general secretary, along with their entourage were charged with treason and complicity in treason, and were imprisoned in the Peter and Paul fortress where Polubotok soon died (18 Decem­ber 1724). After Polubotoks demise a legend began to grow that the hetman had stashed away a great treasure in a London bank, and apparently the story still circulates to this day. The following year another legend grew surrounding Peter Γs death which has it that he died of a fever soon after diving into the cold waters of the Neva River to rescue a fisherman. In actual fact, Peter I died in bed three months after the alleged incident, in IateJanuary 1725, apparently due to a urinary ailment from which he had been suffering for some time.14

Emperor Peter I died without leaving an evident heir, and refused to name one. His several sons from Catherine had died at an early age, and his heir apparent, Alexei—whose mother, Evdoxia, Peter had put away in a monastery—showed no incli­nation for military life, being attached to theology and Christian pacifism. When Alexei s wife died in 1715, the following year the 26-year-old Tsarevich was ordered by Peter I to report to the military. But taking advantage of his father s visit to Den­mark, Alexei fled to Vienna with his new mistress where they received sanctuary. When Peter I sent a delegation with the promise that no harm would come to his son, the young Tsare- vich returned to Moscow where he was promptly arrested in June 1718 and tortured to extract a “confession” of a plot against his father. Alexei was condemned to death by an obedient as­sembly of 120 nobles for supposedly planning a rebellion to overthrow the Tsar. He died soon after in the Peter and Paul fortress under mysterious circumstances, leaving behind a 3- year-old son, Peter. Now at an advanced stage of mental illness, Emperor Peter I created a Secret Chancellery to investigate his sons activities and those of others, and although no evidence was found of plotting, the Secret Chancelleryuncovered much opposition to the Tsar, including the Church, which soon led to the abolition of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Were Peter Γs “reforms” a success for society, a step to­wards progressive and meaningful change, to modernize Mus­covy and improve the welfare of all? Or did they simply represent a veneer of progress, driven by the needs of an auto­cratic monarchy and supported by a wealthy nobility? Most Contemporaryforeign observers indicate the Iatterwas the case, such as the Danish envoy Jul Just. Representing a friendly power and not the Roman Catholic Church, he would not have had hostile “a-priori” views of Muscovite society: “Although at the present time the Muscovites... are trying to emulate in monkey fashion the other nations, and though they don French attire and in their external appearance they appear more civilized, in­wardly, however, there sits a “cholop” (peasant, serf).”

Crude behavior was also observed during high receptions, such as the one given for Peter I at Narva:

The Tsar’s entourage behaved without conscience or shame; they shouted, whistled, belched, spat, berated each other, and even shamelessly spat in the face of decent people.

What good can one expect from those who openly proclaim that they are working for their own gain and comfort, and pay no attention to whether foreigners talk well or ill of them.... Gener­ally speaking, when dealing with Muscovites you must talk sharply and vulgarity to them, then they give in; when one be­haves graciously with them, nothing is to be obtained from them.15

While ramming through “reforms” Peter I was ignoring the most important activity—education. With the exception of foreigners surrounding him the most senior Muscovite offi­cials had very little of it, if any, and some were illiterate. For­eigners were always surprised how little education Peter I had himself. As observed by Jul Just, the Onlyhigher school was the “gymnasium” (high school) known as the Patriarchal School, with a rector from Lviv (Galicia) and all professors were either Ukrainians or Galicians (“Orthodox from Poland”), as were most of the students.

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Source: Basilevsky Alexander. Early Ukraine: A Military and Social History to the Mid-19th Century. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers,2016. — 397 p.. 2016

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