Ecclesiastical Activity

The Orthodox church in Ukraine had been a pillar of the tsarist regime. After the metropolitan of Kiev was placed under the authority of the patriarch of Moscow in 1686, it adopted Muscovite ecclesiastical usages, reinforced Russification, and preached loyalty to tsar and empire.

The revolution and the concomitant desire for national self-expression were bound to have an impact upon the church in Ukraine. At the eparchal assemblies and congresses of soldiers and peasants that were held in 1917–18, proposals were raised advocating that the church in Ukraine sever its ties with Moscow and constitute itself as an independent (autocephalous) body. The idea appealed to the lower clergy and the urban intelligentsia in particular. Consequently, in January 1918, an All-Ukrainian Church Council was formed to work toward this goal. However, the left-leaning Central Rada showed little interest in the matter and it was the conservative government of Hetman Skoropadsky, especially his ministers of religion, Vasyl Zinkivsky and Oleksander Lototsky, who unequivocally advocated severing ecclesiastical ties with Moscow. After the fall of Skoropadsky, the Directory also came out in favor of ecclesiastical independence. But because both governments were short-lived, their support did not produce concrete results.

Paradoxically, the drive for an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church reached its high point under Soviet rule. Because the Soviets perceived the Russian Orthodox church, led by the newly chosen Patriarch Tikhon, as their most dangerous religious opponent, they were not averse to the appearance of religious groups that undermined the influence of the established church.

Opposition to this tendency was nonetheless significant. It consisted primarily of Patriarch Tikhon in Moscow and almost all the Orthodox hierarchy in Ukraine. Using the threat of excommunication and anathema, the hierarchy repeatedly blocked all attempts of the All-Ukrainian Church Council to expand its influence. This sharply negative attitude discouraged many priests and members of the laity from casting their lot with the Ukrainizers.

These obstacles notwithstanding, on 21 October 1921, at an assembly attended by about 500 delegates (including 64 priests), the council took a radical step. Disregarding canonical law and ignoring threats by the hierarchy, the council elected one of its members, the priest Vasyl Lypkivsky, as metropolitan; he immediately consecrated an archbishop and four bishops. These, in turn, anointed several hundred priests and deacons. The council then reaffirmed an earlier decision to create the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church (UAOC).

The new church grew rapidly. By 1924 it boasted 30 bishops, about 1500 priests, over 1100 parishes (out of a total of approximately 9000), and millions of adherents. Many Ukrainian parishes in the United States, Canada, and Europe joined its ranks. In contrast to traditional Orthodoxy, which prided itself on conservatism, the Ukrainian church introduced numerous innovations, such as the use of the Ukrainian language instead of Church Slavonic in church services. It modernized the appearance of its clergy by banning the traditional robes, long hair, and beards. A radical departure from ancient practice was the church’s acceptance of married bishops. Reflecting the spirit of the times, the Ukrainian church also adopted a democratic approach to self-administration. It rejected the authoritarianism of the patriarchal system and vested the highest authority in the church in an elected council of bishops, priests, and representatives of the laity.

Its achievements, however, could not obviate the fundamental weaknesses of the new church. Its radical departure from canonical practice, the repeated declarations by Patriarch Tikhon that it was illegal, and the failure of Orthodox patriarchs outside the USSR to recognize it imposed upon the UAOC an aura of illegitimacy that confused and alienated many early adherents. Furthermore, the UAOC’s espousal of elective and democratic principles gave rise to numerous anarchic conflicts between the clergy and laity. Because of its newness, the church had almost no economic base. Even more serious was the problem of personnel. The hurried, haphazard consecration of bishops and priests meant that unsuitable or poorly trained individuals often rose to responsible positions. In time, they proved to be especially vulnerable to government pressures. As these weaknesses surfaced, the UAOC’s growth slowed. And although it continued to pose a serious challenge to the Patriarchal or Russian Orthodox church (which was backed by the clergy and especially the monks, the Russian minority, and conservative elements in the Ukrainian population), it retained the loyalty of the vast majority of the Orthodox in Ukraine.

A more menacing set of difficulties arose as a result of government policies. Worried by the unexpected strides made by the Ukrainian church, the Soviet authorities made it a target of their divide-and-rule tactics. They encouraged the rise of dissident church groups in Ukraine that not only undermined the Russian Orthodox church but its Ukrainian rival as well. In the early 1920s, they backed a “progressive” group called the Activist Church of Christ, which was a breakaway faction of the Patriarchal church.

Despite these tactics, the government failed to destroy or subjugate the UAOC. On the contrary, its weaknesses notwithstanding, the UAOC continued to grow. Therefore, in 1926, the Soviets launched a frontal attack by imposing extremely heavy taxes on the Ukrainian parishes and restricting the activities of their clergy. Soon thereafter, they accused Metropolitan Lypkivsky and a number of his associates of Ukrainian nationalism, had them arrested, and dissolved the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Although the UAOC was allowed to exist for several years more, it was evident that its future, as well as that of religion in general in the USSR, was grim.

The relative weakness and restraint that the proponents of communism exhibited in the 1920s assured that nationalism (or at least national consciousness), which spread rapidly among Ukrainians during the revolution and Civil War, would continue to grow. Because the Communist party was intent on achieving a monopoly in the political sphere, Ukrainian national tendencies in this area were limited. However, the fact that the Ukrainians did obtain a semblance of statehood should not be underestimated, for it encouraged among them a feeling that they were a full-fledged nation with all the rights and aspirations that status implied.

The main arena in which the nationalism that had been frustrated from 1917 to 1920 found an outlet was culture. A large number of gifted writers, poets, artists, and scholars transformed Ukrainian culture from being a concern of a small, prerevolutionary intelligentsia to a matter of interest for large segments of the populace. The process of Ukrainization not only disseminated cultural achievements among the people but it identified Ukrainian culture with education, socioeconomic modernization, and even the state. Consequently, it seemed that a creative symbiosis of nationalism and communism was about to emerge that could address the Ukrainians’ national as well as socioeconomic needs. But subsequent events would prove that this symbiosis was not to be.