From Neoabsolutism to the Austro-Polish Compromise

The transition to the neoabsolutist decade (1849-59) brought about a decline of overt political activity among all Austrian nationalities. The Supreme Ruthenian Council dissolved in 1851.

Austria’s defeat in the Italian war in 1859 led to an era of constitu­tional experiments. The Galician provincial Diet met for the first time in 1861. The Ruthenian membership was still comparatively strong, one- third of the chamber. But the situation was much less favourable for the Ukrainians than in 1848; the relative strength of the Poles had increased both in the province and in Vienna, and the support of the central govern­ment had become vacillating. The leadership of the Ukrainian commun­ity rested with the conservative “Old Ruthenians,’’ who were quite une­qual to the requirements of a complex and shifting political constellation. Their paternalistic approach to the peasantry prevented them from build­ing up a strong and reliable mass base among their own people, which would have enabled them to brave the storm.

The period of constitutional experiments came to an abrupt end with Austria’s defeat by Prussia in 1866 and the establishment of the Dualist system. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 found its corollary in the simultaneous Austro-Polish Compromise. The more ambitious Polish plan to obtain a special constitutional position for Galicia mis­carried; legally Galicia remained on the same footing as the other “crownlands’’ of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. Yet for all practical purposes, full control over the land was turned over to the Pol­ish upper classes. The fate of the Ukrainians was similar to that of the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary. In both cases, the dynasty and the central government sacrificed their loyal supporters of 1848. To one of the chief authors of the Dualist system, Foreign Minister Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, is attributed the saying that “whether and to what extent the Ruthenians may exist is left to the discretion of the GaIician Diet.’’²⁹

A few brief indications must suffice to give an idea of the power struc­ture in Galicia and the respective position of the two nationalities during the Dualist epoch.³⁰ The viceroy of GaIicia was always appointed from the Polish aristocracy. In Vienna a special “Minister for Galician Af­fairs” guarded Polish interests. The electoral system, based on the repre­sentation of curiae, or economic groups, secured a strong Polish prepon­derance both in the provincial Diet and in Galicia’s representation in the Reichsrat (central parliament). Ukrainians could expect to be elected only from the peasant curia, but their share was further reduced by ad­ministrative pressure and electoral corruption.³¹ Both the state adminis­tration, headed by the viceroy, and the autonomous provincial adminis­tration, under Ihejurisdiction of the Diet, were staffed almost exclusively by Poles, and transacted business in Polish.

Twenty years after their political debut in 1848, the Galician Ukrain­ians had suffered a disastrous defeat. What they saved from this ship­wreck was very little—the entrenched position of the Greek Catholic Church, elementary schools in the native languages, a token recognition of their claim to a place in secondary and higher education, certain mini­mal linguistic rights in their dealings with authorities. However, despite the upper-class bias of the Austrian constitution and the malpractices of the Polish-controlled Galician administration, the Ukrainians in Austria still enjoyed that most important benefit, a constitutional rule of law. They could publish newspapers and books, form associations, hold pub­lic meetings, take part in elections (even if against great odds), express their grievances from the parliamentary tribune, and fight legally for the improvement of their position. First, however, they had to learn how to make effective use of these opportunities. This necessitated a profound change of attitude on the part of their leaders; they had to learn how to stand on their own feet politically, not to expect favours from the govern­ment, or any outside help, and to rely, first and last, on the organized strength of their own people.