German and Romanian Occupation
As the largest and most populous of the four administrative units dividing up the Ukrainian territories, Reichskommissariat Ukraine possessed approximately fifteen to seventeen million people living in a 340,000- square-kilometre area.
To extract the most agricultural products, raw materials, and slave labour from this area, Hitler appointed Erich Koch as the head of RK Ukraine. In seeking to implement Hitler’s ideologically charged policies, Koch ordered his subordinates never to meet directly with the people they ruled. He also allegedly asserted, “If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table with, I must have him shot.”101 Koch, a hardliner, always demanded the harshest possible treatment of RK Ukraine’s population. “No German soldier will ever die for that nigger people,” he proclaimed, referring to Ukrainians.102 In a speech to Nazi party officials in Kiev in March 1943, he asserted that “we are a master race that must remember that the lowliest German worker is racially and biologically a thousand times more valuable than the population here.”103Despite the merciless methods employed to gather Ukraine’s natural resources, the Germans fell short of their assigned goals. Even with grain surpluses in 1942 and 1943, agricultural deliveries to Germany “turned out much smaller than [they] had budgeted for, while [their] attempts to revive the Donbass, Krivyi Rih, and other industrial areas, became a complete failure; the Germans actually sent coal to the Ukraine from Germany.”104 Not only did the extractors experience a shortage of skilled and unskilled labour in those areas with an abundance of natural resources, they also encountered the local population’s passive resistance to the entire German colonial project. As these plans miscarried and the Germans started to lose the war on the eastern front, they abandoned all restraint and ignited a killing spree, reminiscent of Belgian King Leopold’s crimes against humanity in the Congo at the beginning of the twentieth century.105
Within the General Government’s jurisdiction, Ukrainians did not experience the viciousness their compatriots experienced in Reichskommissariat (RK) Ukraine.
Although the Germans in this administrative zone still considered Ukrainians as Untermenschen, they raised their status above that of the Poles and Jews, and sought to use them as a counterweight to the Poles. In Eastern Galicia, “the antagonism between the Poles and Germans was less pronounced than in central Poland.” Some Polish peasants actually gained from the German reprivatization of land, which had been collectivized by the Soviets. The occupational authorities permitted a modest Polish cooperative system, a network of social support, and a modest Polish school system, closely supervised by the Germans.106Although both the Poles and Ukrainians suffered from the harsh wartime conditions (especially the scarcity of food, the spread of infectious diseases, forced requisitioning, the Ostarbeiter program, the expropriation of housing), the Ukrainians enjoyed a preferential status in the public, national, and cultural spheres. They now staffed and headed the local government, local judicial offices, and auxiliary police. The German authorities actively discriminated against and brutally repressed the Poles, especially their intelligentsia, and started to round up Polish Jews, placing them into makeshift ghettos and then exterminating them. With the introduction of food rationing, the Germans restricted the foodstuffs the Poles could consume; Jews received even lower rations and starved to death in their ghettos and labour camps.107
Under the leadership of the geographer Volodymyr Kubijovic, the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow (the only officially recognized Ukrainian organization in the General Government or in Reichskommissariat Ukraine) served not only as a social welfare agency, but also as the centre of the Ukrainian community. Despite various restrictions, this committee expanded the number of Ukrainian-language schools from 2,510 in 1939 to over 4,000 in 1942, enlarged the cooperative movement in the countryside, and sought to expand its political and administrative powers on behalf of Ukrainians.108 Although it could not play a significant role in helping Ukrainians in Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the Ukrainian Central Committee did play a major role in the creation of the SS-Waffen Division Galicia in 1943.
Even before the German loss at Stalingrad, the Waffen-SS, the official designation for combat units of the SS, started to create military detachments of non-Germans who did not meet SS racial standards. Separated into special national formations, these SS field formations spent the entire war under the tactical command of the army and “may be considered a defacto branch of the Wehrmacht,” not the SS.109
Three months after Stalingrad, on 28 April 1943, German occupation authorities in Galicia, in cooperation with the Ukrainian Central Committee and the tacit approval of the Greek Catholic Church, issued a call for Ukrainian volunteers for a new “Galician” SS division, which would recognize the distinctiveness of Galicia, but not necessarily support Ukrainian national aspirations.110 Members of this new military formation would “fight Bolshevism” and participate in the struggle “for faith and fatherland, for family and native soil” and “for a fair new order of the victorious young Europe,” a well-understood reference to the Nazi-led struggle against the communist cause.111 Many Ukrainians in Galicia realized that the tide had turned against the Germans and that Soviet troops would inevitably arrive at their doorstep. Very few wanted a return to the oppressive and anti-Ukrainian environment of 1939-41. To check this onslaught, many young men enlisted, including an unknown number of those who served as auxiliary policemen.
The response exceeded all expectations. Nearly 100,000 Ukrainians volunteered; fewer than 30,000 were accepted.112 Although Ukrainians constituted its rank and file (Poles and Jews need not apply), the overwhelming majority of its officers and non-commissioned officers consisted of Germans, many who entertained negative racial stereotypes of Ukrainians.113 Apart from politically conscious Ukrainians who hoped that their military service would help defend Galicia from the future Soviet onslaught and that their unit could become the nucleus of a national army under the right political circumstances, men who hoped to escape duty in construction battalions or labour service in Germany also joined.
The authorities also assigned a small number of political prisoners to the division. Peasants who eked out a living from their small plots of land (which always needed to be tended) and who experienced extensive German requisitions were less enthused about enlisting.114The Polish underground, communists, and members of the OUN-B (who called the Galician Division “a German colonial unit”) opposed the division’s formation.115 Even Erich Koch, the head of Reichskommissariat Ukraine, openly questioned the division’s reliability before it completed its training.116 For Koch, the ideological consideration that Ukrainians were and always would be Untermenschen overshadowed the pragmatic necessity to compromise in order to win the war.
In May 1944, the division completed its training in Germany. Redesignated as the 14th Waffen-Grenadierdivision der SS (galiz. Nr. 1), its 15,290 men were sent to the eastern front, to the Brody-Tarnow pocket in Galicia. After several days of heavy fighting in July, only three thousand broke out of their encirclement by Soviet troops and survived.117 The Germans reconstituted the division at Neuhammer and sent it to Slovakia to quell the communist-inspired Slovak Uprising.
On 12 March 1945, when the Soviet army almost reached Berlin, the German minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Alfred Rosenberg, recognized the Ukrainian National Committee as the sole representative body of the Ukrainian people. He promised that all Ukrainians serving in various formations of the German army would now constitute a Ukrainian National Army, which would renew the fight for Ukrainian statehood.118 The Galicia Division would become the First Division of the Ukrainian National Army. Another regiment, formed around Berlin, would become the nucleus of the UNA’s Second Division.
Those encased in bombarded bunkers for days at a time in Berlin obviously did not realize the reality of the situation at hand.
Nazi racial policies had brought the brutalities of the war to Berlin. Recognition of Ukrainian national aspirations during the Third Reich’s last hours would not save it. Transferred to Slovenia from Slovakia, the Galicia Division marched towards Austria, where most of its men surrendered to the British.119Romania, an ally of Germany’s during the Second World War, received Hitler’s blessings to administer the territory of Transnistria on 30 August 1941. Located between the Dniester and the Bug/Buh Rivers, this 40,000-square-kilometre area contained 2.25 million people. Tiraspol served as its first capital, Odessa as its second. Governed by G. Alecsianu (1941-4), the Romanian authorities sought to exploit the territory economically and favoured the small Romanian minority. They banned all Ukrainian cultural activities. In 1941-3, the Romanian government deported over 101,000 Jews from Bessarabia and Bukovina and over 23,000 Gypsies (Roma) from Romania to Transnistria, where most died. Soviet military forces regained Transnistria in March 1944.120
More on the topic German and Romanian Occupation:
- 43 Ukrainian Lands during World War II, 1941-1944
- Conclusion
- “the kindly uncircumcised”
- The Struggle in the West
- Chapter 24 The Second Soviet Republic
- From European war to World War
- CHAPTER ONE The New Jerusalem: Kiev
- Ukraine: Between Empires and National SelfDetermination