From European war to World War

In a speech to the Reichstag on 6 October 1939, Hitler made a vague peace overture to the Allies, Britain and France, by offering the restoration of a rump Polish state in exchange for peace.

U-boat (English abbreviation of Unterseeboot)

A German submarine.

appeasement

A foreign policy designed to remove the sources of conflict in international affairs through negotiation. Since the outbreak of the Second World War, the word has taken on the pejorative meaning of the spineless and fruitless pursuit of peace through concessions to aggressors. In the 1930s, most British and French officials saw appeasement as a twin-track policy designed to remove the causes of conflict with Germany and Italy, while at the same time allowing for the buildup of sufficient military and financial power to bargain with the dictators from a position of strength.

British battleship Royal Oak at Scapa Flow in northern Scotland. Two months later, after a series of dramatic running battles, British cruisers forced the crew of the Admiral Graf Spee to scuttle their pocket battleship off Montevideo harbour.

The American newspapers aptly dubbed this period of relative lethargy the ‘Phoney War'.

Fighting a long war made strategic sense. However, there were political complications associated with it. Public opinion in France and Britain was now spoiling for a fight against ‘Hitlerism’, but instead, the electorates had to stomach the loss of Poland without any compensating gain. Upbeat newsreel reports about the impenetrability of the Maginot Line or the expanding size of the British army did little to quell apprehension about ultimate victory, especially as Stalin appeared to be supporting Hitler. Germany could count on Russia as a secure source of raw materials to circumvent the Allied naval blockade. Not only had the Red Army invaded Poland, but in November 1939 Russia also launched an unprovoked attack on Finland. In 1940, some in the Allied camp favoured assisting the Finns and drawing Russia into the fray. The French proposed bombing Russia’s oilfields in the Caucasus to block part of the Reich’s fuel supply. A foray into the Balkans to draw German divisions away from the western front was likewise proposed. The mushrooming of these perilous schemes for a quick victory reflected unease at the top, especially in Paris, about a long war. In fact, in terms of heavy armaments, the Allies were taking the lead over their foe. By May 1940, the Western forces, including those of neutral Holland and Belgium, could muster 152 divisions to oppose Germany’s 135.

On 21 March 1940 mounting political pressure in the Allied camp to do something claimed its first victim: Daladier was replaced by Paul Reynaud, his supposedly more dynamic finance minister. Ironically, Daladier had become an early enthusiast for an attack in northern Europe. Some decision-makers on both sides of the Channel looked to intervention in Scandinavia for decisive results. The key was Germany’s dependence on Swedish iron ore. If ore shipments could be stopped, so experts believed, then Hitler’s resource-starved war industries would soon grind to a halt. Since Sweden’s ports were locked in ice most of the year, the iron ore had to be transported north by railway first to the Norwegian all-weather port of Narvik, and then shipped southward along the Norwegian coast to Germany. For the Western Powers, the complicating factor was that they could not openly flout Norway's neutrality. The Anglo-French Supreme War Council agreed on a plan to mine Norway's territorial waters to force German shipping out to the open seas, where the Royal Navy could intercept it. The hope was that the mining operation would force the Germans to invade Scandinavia. In turn, the German invasion would trigger the swift dispatch of an Anglo-French land force to secure Narvik, thus denying the German war economy a reliable supply of ore. The snag in this scheme was that the Führer had also become concerned about the security of Germany's prime source of iron ore and, unbeknown to Allied intelligence, had ordered his own invasion plan into motion days before the British could lay their naval mines.

On 9 April, the first day of the German attack, Denmark fell.

On 10 May, the German western offensive began with air, airborne and armoured attacks into Holland, Belgium and France. Six weeks later France sued for peace. How can this triumph be explained? Scholars usually point to the German doctrine for the aggressive use of tanks in co-operation with dive­bombers and motorized infantry, what the Allies called Blitzkrieg. To be sure, the German army was unrivalled in operational finesse, yet France was not Poland. The German high command expected a long war in the west, and set industrial priorities for defensive weapons and entrenching equipment which reflected this expectation.

Schlieffen Plan

The German pre-1914 plan for a pre-emptive military offensive against France, which would involve troops passing through neutral Belgium. It is named after the German army chief of staff, General Alfred von Schlieffen.

Vichy France

The regime led by Marshal Petain that surrendered to Hitler's Germany in June 1940 and subsequently controlled France until liberation in 1944.

Nazi New Order

The German propaganda euphemism for the racial transformation and economic reordering of Europe to conform with the barbaric principles and criminal practices of German national socialism.

As the French realized that metropolitan France was lost, Reynaud proposed fighting from abroad with the forces of the empire and navy, but Marshal Philippe Petain and General Maxime Weygand, both of whom were appointed to positions of authority to stiffen French resistance, argued that the war was lost.

The French defeat confronted Churchill with two problems. One was the rescue of the British Expeditionary Force, the other was whether to sue for a compromise peace. From 26 May to 3 June, under heavy Luftwaffe attack, the Royal Navy and a fleet of small civilian boats launched an improvised evacuation from Dunkirk. The rescue of some 338,226 British and French troops was a great success, but the British army had lost most of its heavy equipment. The question now was: could Britain fight alone? On 25 May the chiefs of staff answered yes. The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force were strong enough to repel a German invasion, and (allegedly) there were signs that Germany's overstretched economy was weakening under the strain of war. For the next three days, the cabinet discussed the issue. Lord Halifax, the foreign secretary, argued that a balanced appraisal of the situation required an indication of what terms might be expected. Would Britain be forced to disarm? However, exploiting his position as cabinet chairman, and convinced that Britain could and should fight to either total victory or defeat, Churchill obstructed a dispassionate analysis of the pros and cons of negotiated peace, and rejected a ‘parley' with Hitler as the slippery slope to surrender. In Clausewitz’s famous dictum, war is an extension of politics, and in wartime passion reigns over reason. In May 1940, Churchill believed that the British people were determined to fight, come what may. Most shared his belief that everything depended on American intervention. Many in the political elite, who had always despised the French alliance, were almost jubilant at the prospect of replacing France with the United States. In the meantime, Britain would have to repulse German air and sea attacks alone. On 3 July 1940, to prevent the Germans from seizing French warships, the Royal Navy attacked the French fleet anchored at its Algerian base of Mers el-Kebir.

The events of May-June 1940 had profound repercussions, especially for those states not yet engaged in the conflict. The sudden shift in the European military situation opened an opportunity for Mussolini. In April 1939 Italy had invaded Albania (a weak state long dominated by Rome) and in May had signed the Pact of Steel with Germany. However, Italy did not stand beside its northern partner in September 1939. Objections from the crown as well as strategic considerations determined the decision, for many officials argued that an early war against France and Britain would spell disaster. ‘Non-belligerence’ was a bitter pill for the Duce to swallow, for his policy programme and the authority of his regime were pre­mised on military expansion and the warrior ethic. Thus when in 1940 the German battlefield victories pushed aside the materiel and domestic political obstacles to intervention, he decided to enter the fray. On 10 June 1940 Rome declared war on Paris and London. Ten days later the Italian army launched a poorly executed offensive into the French Alps. In his sudden bid for spazio vitale, Benito Mussolini spilled blood just in time to qualify for Italy’s own armistice with the hapless French.

Hitler’s triumph and Mussolini’s intervention shattered Roosevelt’s post­Munich policy. The Czech crisis had convinced the president and his advisers that they needed to contain the European dictators by supplying the Allies with arms and promoting the buildup of American air power. ‘Had we had [in September 1938] 5,000 planes and the capacity to immediately produce 10,000 per year, even though I might have had to ask Congress for authority to sell or lend them to the countries of Europe,’ Roosevelt said, ‘Hitler would not have dared to take the stand he did.’ Although more slowly than in Britain and France, American opinion also began in 1939 to shift against Nazi Germany. In this new political climate, Congress passed an amended Neutrality Act which permitted sales of American-made arms to belligerents on a ‘cash and carry’ basis. Since the British and French navies controlled the Atlantic, this policy favoured the Allies. While all of this was good news for London and Paris, in no way did it signal an American intention to enter the war. However, the French catastrophe, the British decision to fight alone and what appeared to be well co-ordinated Axis aggression in 1940-41 confronted the Americans with a stark choice: they could either convert the Americas into a fortress of isolation or take up arms and lead the anti­Axis coalition. As Roosevelt stated in late 1940, the United States would not live ‘at the point of a gun’. To survive in an Axis world, he added, ‘we would have to convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy’. The first choice, which meant an end to the American way of life, was

Axis

A term coined originally by Mussolini in November 1936 to describe the relationship between Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The German-Italian Axis was reinforced by the so-called Pact of Steel signed by Rome and Berlin in May 1939. More broadly speaking, the term is often used (as in Chapter 8 of this book) to refer to the relationship between Germany, Italy and Japan. These three Powers were formally linked by the German-Japanese Anti­Comintern Pact of November 1936, which Italy signed one year later, and the Tripartite Pact of September 1940.

see Chapter 3

Tripartite Pact

A mutual aid treaty signed between Germany, Japan and Italy in Berlin on 27 September 1940. The pact was intended to deter the United States from interfering in the creation of a German new order in Europe and a Japanese new order in Asia. Article 3 of the pact as well as additional secret clauses were drafted that stated that the pact did not commit the parties to go to war on each other's behalf.

Lend-Lease

With the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, the US Congress empowered the president to lease or lend arms and supplies to any foreign government whose defence the administration considered essential to US national security. The programme, originally intended to rescue Britain, was eventually extended to more than thirty­eight states fighting the Tripartite Pact Powers.

no choice at all. Therefore, in response to the escalating Axis threat, President Roosevelt authorized a gigantic American arms programme and searched for ways to keep the British fighting. In September 1940 the British agreed to lease bases in Bermuda and Newfoundland to the Americans for hemispheric security, and in exchange acquired fifty old American destroyers to escort Atlantic convoys. That same month, Japan, Italy and Germany signed the Tripartite Pact in an effort to deter Washington from entering the European war or interfering in Japan's southward advance, but this move quickly backfired. The United States refused to be deterred, and saw the Tripartite Pact as symbolic of the moral distinction between the two emerging coalitions: one dedicated to peace and liberty, the other to war and slavery. By March 1941, under Lend-Lease, the United States had saved Britain from bankruptcy and capitulation, while the US navy's Atlantic fleet began to engage in an undeclared war against German U- boats.

For Russia, May-June 1940 was a disaster. The Soviets had reckoned that the war in the west would become a prolonged deadlock, and that while the capitalists exhausted themselves, Russia would have ample time to grow stronger. Indeed, the ineffectual performance of the Red Army in the Finnish War underscored the urgent need for thorough military reform. Once France caved in, though, the Soviets faced the all-conquering Wehrmacht alone on the European continent. In response, Stalin turned to economic appeasement combined with unflinch­ing territorial expansion. Convinced that Hitler would not move eastwards while Britain remained dangerous, and while Russia provided the resources Germany needed to finish Britain off, Stalin and Molotov agreed that they should display no weakness. This, after all, had been the chief lesson of Soviet relations with Japan. In 1939, when the Kwantung Army provoked fighting along the Manchurian-Mongolian frontier, Stalin, well aware from espionage that Tokyo did not desire war, ordered that the Japanese be given a bloody nose. Afterwards, relations improved.

The result was that in late 1940 and 1941 tensions with Berlin rose as Russia tightened its grip on Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, demanded Bessarabia and Bukovina from Romania, and attempted to dominate Bulgaria. Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union long before Molotov asserted Soviet rights, yet the latter's hard-nosed bargaining reinforced the Fuhrer's fixation with the east. The Germans responded by wooing the Finns, signing up Hungary, Romania (a vital source of oil for the German war machine) and Slovakia to the Anti-Comintern Pact, and marshalling the bulk of the Wehrmacht into Eastern Europe for a knockout blow against Moscow. In reply, Stalin ordered that nothing should be done by way of military preparations that could be interpreted as provocative. The Soviet leader was convinced that ‘hawks' in Berlin were trying to provoke him into some precipitous action, which would turn Hitler against him. British warnings of a German war plan were likewise dismissed as provocations designed to bring Russia into the conflict, especially after Rudolf Hess, Hitler's deputy, crash-landed a plane in Scotland in a bizarre bid to end the Anglo-German war. Although Russian intelligence and the Soviet ambassador in Berlin repeatedly warned of what was coming, the German attack on 22 June 1941 came as a surprise to Stalin.

In 1940—41, Hitler's choices had a far-reaching impact. His attack on Russia hardened American attitudes, especially towards Japan. It also initiated in Tokyo the debate that ended with Japan's decision to fight. It is worth remembering that war with Russia was not the only course open to Hitler. For instance, prepara­tions for Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of England, began in July 1940. Air superiority over southern England, however, was a crucial prerequisite to Sea Lion. Field Marshal Goring promised that the Luftwaffe could achieve this, but the Royal Air Force proved a remarkably resilient foe. Even so, there were other compelling reasons for steering clear of a seaborne invasion of England. The Royal Navy had a crushing superiority in big warships. Much of the German surface fleet had been sunk or damaged in the Norwegian campaign. Many historians doubt that Hitler ever had any intention of carrying through with Operation Sea Lion and believe that the invasion preparations were only meant to intimidate the British. Moreover, even when Admiral Erich Raeder, the head of the German navy, proposed an alternative route to Britain's downfall, the Mediterranean, Hitler was not convinced. For him, southern Europe was always a minor theatre. Moreover, the capture of Gibraltar and the use of the French fleet would require co-operation with Vichy and Spain. Hitler had no desire to make General Petain an ally, and, despite Spain's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact in March 1939, and General Franco's frequent declarations of wholehearted sympathy with the Axis cause, the Spanish dictator kept Spain out of the war.

Ribbentrop suggested an alliance with Russia as another way to crush Britain and counteract American interference. It was not a preposterous idea. Japan was courting Russia, and signed a neutrality pact with Moscow in April 1941. As allies, Germany, Russia and Japan would add up to an invincible Eurasian bloc. Yet Hitler made up his mind in late July 1940. From the inception of his ideological programme, Hitler looked to the creation of a vast autarkic Nazi empire and the consummation of his race revolution inside Germany through the conquest of Lebensraum in the east. On 31 July, he ordered the Wehrmacht to be ready by the spring of 1941 for Operation Barbarossa, the ‘destruction' of the Soviet Union. Hitler's motives have been hotly debated. At the time, he justified his decision on strategic grounds. ‘With Russia smashed,' he told his commanders, ‘Britain's last hope will be shattered.' He later argued that war against Russia was a pre-emptive strike timed to knock Russia out before the Red Army became too strong. Indeed, it may be that the Soviet posture of asserting their territorial claims while supplying Hitler with the resources to wage war in the west appeared to be a long­term stratagem designed to lure him into a false sense of security while Soviet strength grew. While these explanations are plausible, the fundamental reason for Hitler's choice can be seen in the nature of his savage war in the east. Far from attacking out of fear of the Bolshevik giant, Hitler and his generals boasted that the Red Army would be crushed in a few weeks. Hitler ordered that the conduct of this campaign should be radically different from that of the west. Provision for the execution of Soviet commissars and systematic murder of Jews was made. Instead of exploiting long pent-up hatred of the Stalinist system or Ukrainian nationalism to the Wehrmacht's advantage, the Germans arrived in the east as an all-conquering master race with economic and resettlement plans that pre­supposed the enslavement and death of millions.

see Chapter 3

The final step on the road to global war was Hitler's (and Mussolini's) declaration of war on the United States on 11 December 1941. This arose in part out of the parallel crisis in the Pacific that had been developing since the summer of 1940, which came to its conclusion in December 1941 when the Japanese took the decision to go to war against the United States, Britain and the Dutch East Indies. For Hitler, the outbreak of war in the Pacific provided an opportunity to take the offensive in the Atlantic. For months, the German navy had been urging Hitler to declare war on the United States so that they could unleash U-boats against vulnerable American merchant ships. The US navy, in any case, was already fighting an undeclared anti-submarine war against them. For Hitler, who had always ridiculed the war-making potential of the United States, this reason was as good as any to bring forward the final showdown.