HRYHOR ORLYK’S MISSION TO THE CRIMEA

While the upheavals in Constantinople in 1730 did not bring Orlyk any immediate benefits at the Porte, they did work to his advantage in the Crimea. As a result of Ibrahim Pasha’s overthrow, Kaplan Girei, another old veteran of the Bender days, returned again to the throne from exile in Chios.³⁹ On his way home, Kaplan Girei stopped in Constantinople where he had a long discussion with Villeneuve.

On 9 December 1731, Hryhor arrived for the second time at Stanislaw’s residence at Chambord. He presented him with a report of the past year’s activity and about plans for the future.⁴² Stanislaw quickly gave his support to the idea of establishing direct contact with the Khan and trying to bring the elder Orlyk into closer proximity to him. Adding his own lengthy recommendations and instructions to those Hryhor already had from Villeneuve and his father, he sent the young man off to Versailles. There, during the last week of December, Hryhor had meetings with Chauvelin and Fleury to discuss his plans and to obtain formal French support for them.

In one of these, Hryhor dealt with the question of Cossack-Tatar and, partly, Cossack-Ottoman ties. After pointing out that the Russians could have no claim to his father because of his Polish origin, Hryhor added the usual remarks about Russian oppression in Ukraine. Throughout the memorial he stressed that the Cossacks were “une nation libre” and that, in order Iopreserveorregain this status, they had the right to seek protection from whoever would provide them the greatest benefit:

Whereas the Zaporozhian Host, of which my father is the leader, has always been a free people, it has l∞ked for pro­tection where it was most advantageous.... The conclusion of this eternal alliance (the 1711 treaty) unites and serves inseparably the interests of both peoples (the Ukrainian Cos­sacks and Tatars), and no one can come between them except by unanimous consent of both peoples.⁴⁴

As an example of how deep and widespread the appreciation of this treaty was among the Tatars themselves, Hryhor pointed to the revolt of the mirzas in 1724, emphasizing the connection between the uprising and Saadet Girei^,s attempt to break the treaty by handing the Zaporozhians back to the Russians. This event, ac­cording to Hryhor, only underscored the eternal alliance and the

common interests linking the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars. However, and this was probably for the benefit of Stanislaw and the Poles, the younger Orlyk also added that the alliance with the Tatars did not mean that the Zaporozhians were indefinitely bound to remain under the Khan’s protection, but that they could always ch∞se the overlord who best suited their interests. But, in the near future, the Ukrainians should renew their treaty with the Tatars and, when the time came for Stanislaw to make his bid for the Polish crown, the two allies could attack the Russians from the south while the Swedes attacked from the north.

The French response to these arguments was favorable.⁴⁵ Ap­parently, the analogy with 1711-1712 and the documents from that period impressed Chauvelin and, contrary to the Hetman’s fears, neither he nor Cardinal Fleury found anything to criticize in the charter of Ahmet III. As a result of these conferences, Hryhor was provided with funds for his journey to the Khan’s capital at Bakh- chesarai and promised even greater remuneration if his mission were successful.⁴⁶ Most important, however, the French agreed to give the younger Orlyk a royal letter of recommendation to the Khan.⁴⁷ As Hryhor later informed his father, even Stanislaw was surprised that such a recommendation was given. The young Orlyk explained the French willingness to comply by their desire, in view of the imminent crisis in Poland, to embroil the Russians and Austrians in Tatar and Ottoman problems.

When, in March of 1732, Hryhor set out for his second mission to the East—this time he traveled under the name of La Motte—his father again showered him with instructions.⁴⁸ Orlyk advised his son to remind Kaplan Girei of that hoary “document” from the Bender period in which were outlined the alleged plans of Peter I for the conquest of Ukraine, Poland and the Crimea. The Hetman also noted that the Treaty of 1711 would probably have to be re­newed but only on the condition that general war was imminent and the Zaporozhians were consulted. Finally, Orlyk brought up a disquieting matter. In a previous letter to his son, the Hetman had warned him not to try to contact or visit the Zaporozhians. This had puzzled Hryhor. Now Orlyk explained the reasons for this ad­vice. Recently he had heard that, “It was not my name, but that of the colonel of Myrhorod (Danylo Apostol, the current Hetman in Ukraine) which was read out in church services at the Sich."⁴⁹

This fact was only a reaffirmation of other information that Orlyk had received concerning the growing strength of the pro­Russian orientation among the Zaporozhians.

Undaunted by this unpleasant information and unwilling to change his plans, in early July 1732, Hryhor set out from Con­stantinople to the Khan’s capital at Bakhchesarai.⁵¹ S∞n after his arrival there, he was received in audience by the Khan.⁵² The dis­cussion concentrated on the Tatars’ support of Stanislaw, which, as far as the French were concerned, was the primary goal of the mission. Kaplan Girei again promised his aid but feared that the position of the Porte was not yet clear on this issue due to Austrian and Russian bribes, and suggested that the French and Stanislaw concentrate their efforts at the Porte. In his next audience, Hryhor hoped to bring up the matter of his father and the Zaporozhians. At this point, however, complications arose. A Polish envoy, who knew Hryhor personally, arrived at the Khan’s court from August II. Because Hryhor did not wish to be recognized by the Poles, he stayed away for several weeks from the Khan’s court. Later, other obstacles arose, so that it was almost two months before the young Orlyk again saw the Khan.

In October, Hryhor was granted two final audiences: one with the Khan and the other with his Vizir, Haci Ali Aga. He tried to convince the Khan that the Zaporozhians and Ukrainian Cossacks in general did not want to be under Russian or Polish control and that they were satisfied with their union and treaty with the Tatars —a union which, he added, was equally beneficial to the Khanate in view of increasing Russian pressure.

The Khan, ch∞sing to overlook the recent difficulties with the Zaporozhians, replied:

It is not only from today that he is aware of the advantages a liaison with the Cossack nation offers and which he always tried to preserve. He tried not to violate any of the articles of the treaty and he hopes that now the Host is content after he has come on the throne. He now protects it (the Host) against the moves of its enemies better than ever before. And since the treaty has made them guests and friends, he, during his exile in Brusa, always regretted the manner in which this Host was being neglected since the Zaporozhian Cossacks only wait for an opportunity to cause discomfort to the Muscovites.⁵³

Concerning the specific problem of releasing Orlyk from Saloni­ka, the Khan convinced Hryhor that he was sincere in his efforts to help the Hetman. He blamed the pro-Russian Chief Dragoman, Ghika, for sabotaging his attempts to free Orlyk from his intern­ment. Kaplan Girei stated that, instead of sending the Hetman to Jassy as he had previously suggested, it would be better to bring him to the Crimea, since the Moldavian Hospodar was also sus­pected of pro-Russian sympathies. Furthermore, the Khan prom­ised to write a letter in Orlyk’s behalf to the Grand Vizir.

Shortly thereafter, Hryhor had a long meeting with the Vizir, Haci Ali Aga.⁵⁴ He described him as a man of experience and another old acquaintance of his father’s from the Bender days. When the problem of Tatar-Zaporozhian relations came up in the conversation, the Vizir showed himself to be more straightforward and frank than the Khan. Although he admitted that the Poles and Russians were mistreating the Ukrainian Cossacks, that did not mean that the Tatars should interfere in the affairs of their non­Muslim neighbors. Haci Ali Aga made it clear that, to date, he per­sonally was not sure whether the Tatars’ relationship with the Zaporozhians had brought the Khanate more good than harm.

Hryhor admitted that the Zaporozhians were of a “turbulent and inconstant humor” and sometimes let themselves be carried away. But he attributed their anarchistic tendencies to the lack of a strong commander who could establish military discipline among them. Clearly, the elder Orlyk was the man who could do this, and this again provided the reason for his release from Salonika. Hryhor reminded the Vizir that, in general, it was in the interests of the Tatars to have the Zaporozhians on their side and that he should not allow the action of a few rogues blind him to their common interests. In conclusion, Haci Ali Aga admitted to Hryhor that he agreed with his arguments and said that he would advise that pro­tection to the Zaporozhians be continued, “since they reject the Muscovites as well as the Poles and have no other support than our aid.”⁵⁶

Before leaving Bakhchesarai, Hryhor received important letters from the Khan to Louis XV, Stanislaw, Villeneuve and Orlyk. He assured his correspondents of his best intentions and promised them his active support.⁵⁷ Thus, to a great extent, Hryhor’s mis­sion could be considered a success. This certainly was the opinion of Villeneuve when the young Orlyk returned to Constantinople on 14 November.

There were several reasons for the Orlyks’ success with the Khan as opposed to their failure at the Porte. First, the Tatars had always been more attuned to Russian expansion southwards and they had long ago realized the need to c∞perate with the Zaporozhians against this common threat. Secondly, the return of Kaplan Girei and his associates—almost all of them veterans of the Bender period—assured the Orlyks of an understanding for their goals and problems which previous Khans like Saadet or Mengli Girei were unwilling or incapable of providing. Finally, Russian influ­ence at the Khan’s court, unlike that at the Porte, was virtually nonexistent and therefore could not work to the detriment of the Hetman’s interests.