HRYHOR ORLYK’S FRENCH-SPONSORED MISSION TO THE OTTOMAN PORTE

Although it was Leszczynski who directed French attention to Orlyk, Versailles had other reasons than the election of its candi­date to the Polish throne for being interested in the Hetman.

The man entrusted with the implementation of these plans was the new French ambassador to Constantinople, Marquis Louis- Sauveur de Villeneuve.²² He arrived in the Ottoman capital in the fall of 1728 and remained there for more than a dozen years in the course of which he earned for himself a well-deserved reputation as one of France’s greatest diplomats. Initially, Villeneuve’s major goal was to coax the passive Ottoman government to take a more resolute stand against the Russians. In connection with this task, the French ambassador attempted to establish closer contacts with Orlyk.²³ But the Hetman’s isolation in Salonika st∞d in the way of any meaningful cooperation. A solution to this problem came from an unexpected quarter.

Late in October of 1729, Jozef Potocki, the wojewoda of Kiev, and his brother, Teodor, the primate of Poland, established contact in Poland with the Hetman’s eldest son, Hryhor, who was serving in August IΓs army on a commission provided by the now deceased Flemming.

Through the mediation of G. Zulich, another old acquaintance of Orlyk’s from the Bender days and the current Swedish ambassa­dor in Warsaw, a meeting was arranged at which Hryhor, the Potockis, Zulich and the Marquis A. Monti, the French ambassa­dor to Poland, were present.²⁴ Zulich provided Monti with an his­torical sketch of Mazepa’s and Orlyk’s activity, concluding with the statement that the Zaporozhians remain faithful to Orlyk and “only wait for an opportunity to rebel against Russia and regain their old liberties.”²⁵ The outcome of this meeting was that Hry- hor, armed with the recommendations of the Potockis, Zulich and Monti, was secretly dispatched to France to present his father’s case before higher authorities.

This co-option of Hryhor by Stanislaw’s supporters introduced into Orlyk’s future political plans and orientation a factor whose importance cannot be overestimated. Hryhor was to become a mobile and effective representative of his father’s interests and of “the cause of Cossack liberties” in royal courts from Stockholm to Bakhchesarai. It was he who, more or less in accordance with his father’s wishes, would present the arguments for “a revolution in Ukraine” to the courts of the Sultan and the Khan.

Hryhor was well-received in France.²⁶ On 10 December, Stanislaw welcomed him at his residence in Chambord, where he received further instructions and more letters of recommendation to Chau- velin, the French Foreign Minister, and to Leszczynski’s daughter, the Queen of France. After a series of meetings with Chauvelin, the French government agreed to finance Hryhor’s journey to Salonika for consultations with his father and then to Constantinople to collaborate with Villeneuve for Orlyk’s release and permission for him to join the Zaporozhians.²⁷

In early April, Hryhor boarded ship in Marseilles and, on 15 May, his father could happily note, “On Monday, on exactly the same day as the one on which, in 1721, God afflicted me with the death of my exceptionally beloved and dearest son, Jakub, in His unbounded and unending pity, He cheered me with the arrival to this port from France of my dearest and deeply beloved son, Hry- hor.”²⁸ For fear of spies, Hryhor was traveling under the name of Captain Hag, a Swiss officer, and, after not having seen each other for almost a decade, father and son had to pretend in public that they were strangers to each other.

However, during Hryhor’s nearly four week stay, father and son had ample opportunity to converse in private about preparations for Hryhor’s mission to the Porte. Orlyk instructed his son about the arguments which might convince the Grand Vizir to release him from Salonika and allow him to join or move closer to the Zaporozhians.

The Hetman’s main objective was to convince the Grand Vizir of his usefulness to the Porte.²⁹ Referring to the constant problems which the Grand Vizir and the Crimean Khan had with the Zapo- rozhians, Orlyk argued that such difficulties would not arise if he were allowed to return to the Zaporozhians, restore discipline among them and maintain smooth relations between them and the Khan. He added that, “It was my long absence from the Host which has not only brought the Zaporozhians but the entire Cossack people to dire straits.”³⁰ Although the Hetman carefully avoided giving the impression that he hoped for an Ottoman-Russian war, he did emphasize the superior fighting skill of the Zaporozhians and their potential usefulness to the Porte.

Orlyk also prepared a lengthy set of instructions for Villeneuve indicating the arguments which the French ambassador should raise while discussing his case with the Grand Vizir.³¹ Villeneuve was asked to stress the positive role the Sieh could play in the future both of Ukraine and of the Ottoman Empire:

With their (i.e., the Zaporozhians’) return to Muscovite rule, all hopes of liberation among the people of Ukraine who suffer under the tyrannical (Muscovite) yoke, would disap­pear since they would no longer be able to escape to their brothers-in-arms at the Sieh and they could no longer con­template an uprising. In this manner the Porte would lose its advantage.³²

In his advice to Villeneuve, Orlyk also discussed in greater detail the service he could render to the Porte if he were transferred to Bender or Khotyn, that is, closer to the Zaporozhians.

In mid-June, Hryhor personally delivered his father’s letter to the Grand Vizir and his instructions to Villeneuve in Constan­tinople. But Hryhor s∞n discovered that, in contrast to his easy successes in Warsaw and Versailles, dealing with Ibrahim Pasha was a frustrating undertaking.

Because of difficulties which the Russians were creating for the Ottomans in Persia, the Grand Vizir did not want to discuss Orlyk’s case. According to Villeneuve, he feared that the Hetman might either provoke a war with the Russians or defect to their side if brought closer to the Zaporozhians.³⁴ Upon learning about the Grand Vizir’s fears, Orlyk, in a letter to Hryhor, gave vent to his contempt for Ibrahim Pasha. He also provided a very sober and realistic view of his own capabilities:

I am not, thank God, so deprived of intelligence and so des­perately mad as to attack thoughtlessly with a handful of men, and irregulars at that, such a great power (as Russia), starting out like a lion and perishing like a fly.³⁵

In a moment of anger, Orlyk at last revealed a more realistic and straightforward assessment of his own situation. There was no talk here about an imminent “revolution in Ukraine,” and the reference to the Hetman’s potential force was not to a 60,000 or 100,000 man Cossack army, but rather to “a handful of men, and irregulars at that.”

The Hetman also pointed out that the Russians had over 30,000 regular tr∞ps in Ukraine. These could be resisted by the Zaporo- zhians and other Cossacks only if they recaptured the artillery that Peter I had seized when he destroyed Baturyn and the Sich_t and if Poland and Sweden came to their aid.

However, Orlyk did make a suggestion to Hryhor. If it appeared that the Ottomans were beginning to concentrate their attention on the Persian front, he should state that, if his father were allowed to join the Zaporozhians, he would station them on the Dniester and protect this Ottoman border in case the Russians felt tempted to take advantage of Ottoman involvement in Persia.³⁷ This was a landmark proposal in the history of Orlyk’s relations with the Porte. Almost twenty years earlier, in 1712-1713, when the Porte had wanted the Hetman to perform just this type of function by taking the Right Bank under its protection, Orlyk refused to do so because he felt it was demeaning to serve as a guardian of “infidel” borders. Now he pleaded for a chance to perform this very service. Although this was partially a ploy to obtain his release from Sa­lonika, it also indicated how much Orlyk’s position had deterio­rated since the Bender days.

As for the Porte’s fear that he might defect to the Russians, Orlyk stated that he “would prefer to die a thousand times than to do homage to that ‘Moldavian scum’,” Apostol (the current Hetman in Ukraine), by placing at his feet the insignia of the hetmancy which Orlyk felt only he rightfully possessed. In conclusion, Orlyk expounded on how little one could trust Russian promises and how his former compatriots, who had mistakenly believed the Rus­sians and returned to Ukraine, were now suffering imprisonment and exile. “In the end,” he remarked, “let him who does not know what the Muscovite fides is, rashly depend on it! I, (for my part), have had t∞ much experience with that people’s inherent slyness, falsehood and deceit.”³⁸

Neither Hryhor nor Villeneuve would have another chance to approach Ibrahim Pasha in Orlyk’s behalf again.