Leszczynski, orlyk and the “UKRAINIAN REVOLUTION”

On Saturday 1 June 1726, Orlyk noted in his diary that

After Mass, a Frenchman who works for various French mer­chants here came running to my lodgings and informed me that some officer who had just arrived from France and was in the harbor asking about me and saying that he had a letter for me....

The letter began with an expression of sympathy for the Het­man’s fallen fortunes and a promise to do everything possible, with the aid of French as well as English and Dutch contacts, to alleviate Orlyk’s predicament. However, Stanislaw did not propose to free the Hetman from the Ottoman grasp. On the contrary, he wrote that, “Your Excellency should not leave the land where he is at present because peace between the Porte and Moscow cannot last long and Your Excellency’s fortunes can rise only in the event of such a war.”⁷ After elaborating on the power and anti-Russian feelings of the Hannover League, the Polish ex-king revealed his reason for writing to the Hetman: he proposed that, for Orlyk’s private interests and for the “public good,” the Hetman should work “to raise a revolution in Ukraine.”⁸

Stanislaw did not elaborate on this phrase, nor did he need to. Orlyk knew exactly what was meant. In case of an open conflict with Russia, Orlyk, supported by the Tatars and Ottomans, was to organize a diversionary movement among the Ukrainian Cossacks and thus prevent the Russians from concentrating their full strength in Poland. This was a variant of the strategic plans drafted by Charles XII during his offensive against Peter I and Orlyk was expected to play a role similar to that of Mazepa in 1708.

One might have expected Orlyk to welcome Stanislaw’s advances as a means to rise from the political obscurity of Salonika and resume his anti-Russian activity. But Orlyk was not enthusiastic about the letter from France. He had already spent many fruitless years trying to propagate the idea of a revolution against the Rus­sians. Furthermore, he had never had great confidence in Stanislaw, for he doubted the ex-king’s chances for success and strongly dis­trusted both his and his allies’ motives. He considered Stanislaw’s approach to be “a political trick by means of which they (i.e., Stanislaw and his French supporters) want to draw me to their and the English side against Moscow and, taking advantage of me, use me for their own ends.”⁹ Moreover, Stanisiaw had urged Orlyk to remain in the Ottoman Empire while the latter wanted nothing more than to leave it.

But experience had taught the Hetman not to ignore any possi­bilities of support. Therefore, rather than reject Leszczynski’s ad­vances outright, Orlyk tried to string him along with ambiguous responses, hoping to use his influence with the French to help him leave Salonika. Thus, he thanked the ex-king for the information about the new situation in Europe and stated that he would defi­nitely take it into account. But, according to Orlyk, if Stanislaw really wished to help him, he should convince the French to work at the Porte for his release. No mention was made, however, of the revolution in Ukraine.¹⁰

S∞n afterwards, French envoys both in Salonika and in Con­stantinople were instructed to apply pressure on Orlyk to maintain his contacts with Stanislaw.

But no matter how Orlyk maneuvered to avoid a direct reply, Stanisiaw persisted, plying the Hetman with ever more “tempta­tions.” In March, 1727 he informed him:

The local (i.e., French) court and England have taken my recommendation concerning Your Excellency’s status under consideration. Obviously, all the allies united by the Han­nover Treaty see, on the basis of my presentation, what utility Your Excellency’s person and character can have for the com­mon cause for which they are allied. I have also been assured of the possibility of obtaining a subsidy to ease Your Excel­lency’s difficult situation.... From Your Excellency’s side there should be no delay in demonstrating by means of me­morials to the French, English and Dutch envoys (at the Porte) your readiness, for the sake of the public welfare, to create a diversion against Moscow by means of a great Ukrain­ian revolution.¹²

Another specific promise made by Stanislaw was to help Orlyk move either to Bender or Khotyn which, being closer to the Zapo- rozhians and to his family, was preferable to Salonika. Comment­ing on this letter, the Hetman noted that, “It is with such tempta­tions that from all sides, King Stanislaw from France, the French and English ambassadors from Stambul, tempt and sway me. And from the (Austrian) Emperor and the Empress of Russia I have no positive (response) as to my interests.”¹³ Clearly Stanislaw’s per­sistence was beginning to have an effect.

Although Orlyk continued to hope and count on obtaining amnesty, he decided that it might be profitable to give the ex-king a more encouraging reply.

As usual, Orlyk began with profuse expressions of thanks and flowery formulae of gratitude not only for the king’s concern for his personal fate, but also for his wish to help the “Cossack nation” regain its ancient liberties. Then the main theme of this epistle was introduced: “There can be no doubt of the (possibility of a) revolu­tion in Ukraine; its sparks are already smoldering and need only to be fanned.”¹⁵

To substantiate this point, the Hetman presented a catalogue of Ukrainian grievances against Moscow and the deceased Tsar. As soon as the Swedish peace was signed (in 1721), Peter I—contrary to the pact signed between his father and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi— began systematically to liquidate Cossack rights and privileges and eventually hoped to destroy the Hetmanateitself. Ifanyoneresisted, he was “dispatched to the other world, or to Siberia or some other distant place” and this included the heneralna Starshyna, the colo­nels, captains and most of the other people of distinction. In their place, a Kollegia consisting of 12 (sic) Muscovites was assigned to rule Ukraine.¹⁶ Should anyone speak out in protest against this new order, he was given the knout; for this reason, people were afraid to talk to one another openly. This oppression included beatings and other forms of torture and was so widespread that Ukraine became a “place of carnage.” All assemblies were for­bidden and if they did take place, the participants were arrested and taken to Hlukhiv for interrogation. Cossacks were sent to the war in Persia or to the constructions of the canal linking the Volga with the Ladoga where they perished by the thousands.

As a result, great numbers of Cossacks fled from the Hetmanate into the Right Bank, but mostly to the Zaporozhian Sich which was now filled to overflowing with them.

Orlyk’s sources of information about the current situation in Ukraine were, according to him, based on contacts with the Zapo- rozhians and personal visits by Ukrainian monks. On the matter of monks, the Hetman took the opportunity to mention Peter Γs repression of the Ukrainian Church. He complained that the Metro­politan of Kiev was now a Russian and that Russian pressure had led many Ukrainian monks to flee to the Right Bank, Moldavia, Wallachia and Mount Athos. These monks were also supposed to have told Orlyk that:

The clergy as well as the general populace await me as if in limbo and rebuke themselves that they did not want to ally themselves with and follow the deceased Mazepa who, in vivid colors, foretold their present fate to them.... From all this it may be concluded that a revolution in Ukraine is an assured matter and that there is no need to debate the point further.¹⁷

However, Orlyk rejected Stanislaw’s suggestion that the upris­ing be planned in concert with the Tatars and Turks because, “This scum, by enslaving innocent people, would frighten off the populace more than encourage and attract it (to the uprising).”¹⁸ Moreover, the Hetman expressed the fear that Ottoman aid would only give the Porte a pretense to claim overlordship over Ukraine, which would thus, contrary to Orlyk’s fervent hopes, pass from “Scylla to Charybdis,” that is, from the control of Moscow to that of the Porte. If Ottoman aid had to be utilized, it would be best to divert it to the war in Persia, and not to Ukraine.

In conclusion, the Hetman presented three stipulations which he wanted the Hannover League to guarantee before he would commit himself to its side.

How should the purpose and content of this letter be interpreted? In his diary, Orlyk provided his own suggestions. He noted that, after much thought, he had decided to raise Stanislaw’s hopes of a revolution in Ukraine. But, at the same time, he would try to avoid committing himself to the Hannover League. Hence, the unrealistic second stipulation which he knew could not be fulfilled. Appar­ently, what the Hetman sincerely feared was joining again the side of the Tatars and Ottomans. Never again did he want to aid “these infidels,” as it would lead to the ruin of his soul, the harming of innocent people and the spilling of Christian blood. Orlyk makes quite clear that what he wanted to achieve was to return “in obse- quium” to the Russian empire or to the Polish Commonwealth. Referring again to his letter, he remarked: “Let no one be scandal­ized by what I wrote, for politics demanded that I write thus so that, with the aid of God, I might find my way out of this land.”¹⁹

Soon afterwards, however, such disclaimers became unnecessary. With the death of Catherine I on 6 May 1727 and the subsequent fall from favor of Karl Friedrich of Holstein, the Hetman’s chances of receiving an amnesty dwindled. The return to power of Men­shikov, whom Orlyk considered to be his and Ukraine’s sworn enemy, virtually eliminated any hope of pardon.²⁰ Orlyk no longer had any choice; he would now have to cease his flirtations with Leszczynski and commit himself to the cause of the king-in-exile and to the latter’s powerful French patrons.