International Relations

Ukraine’s place in the international order changed dramatically in the first decade of the twenty-first century. From a country of peripheral interest to the West, it moved to the forefront of its concerns.

Although Leonid Kuchma was elected president on a pro-Russian platform in 1994, during his first term in office his administration was surprisingly open to developing contacts with the West in general, and the United States in particular. Indeed, between 1994 and 1999 US-Ukrainian relations enjoyed a kind of honeymoon. This was encouraged by Kuchma’s willingness to carry through on the denuclearization of Ukrainian weapons systems and the growing attention that the Clinton administration began to pay to Ukraine. As a result, several bilateral agreements, notably the Nunn-Lugar Act of 1994 and the Gore-Kuchma Commission of 1996, led to a large increase in US aid to Ukraine.

By 1999, however, a sharp reversal occurred. Washington became disillusioned by events in Ukraine, particularly by the behaviour of Kuchma’s government. It criticized the elections of 1999, in which Kuchma was elected for a second time, as being patently unfair and undemocratic. In 2002 the “Kuchma-gate” scandal erupted when Mykola Melnychenko, a Ukrainian security officer, smuggled tapes to the West that implicated the Ukrainian president in the murder of the reporter Hryhorii Gongadze, in money-laun-dering and electoral fraud. In addition, the tapes indicated that Kuchma, at a time when the United States were enforcing an arms ban on Iraq, secretly sold the “Kolchuga” radar system to the Iraqis.¹ As a result, us-Ukrainian relations rapidly cooled. Aid diminished and consultations were aborted. The Ukrainian and American presidents no longer met. The attempts of the new Bush administration to establish a positive relationship with Putin only encouraged this rapid about-face. Kuchma responded in kind. In 2000 he replaced the pro-Western minister of foreign affairs, Borys Tarasyuk, with Anatolii Zlenko, who was more accommodating to Russia. And he concentrated on developing closer ties with Russia.

As the European Union expanded eastward and accepted Ukraine’s neighbours into its fold, it seemed to Ukrainians, who considered themselves Europeans, that they too should be a part of the Union. This was the view not only of the Ukrainian elite, whose business ties with the West Europeans were growing, but also of the general populace that desired to attain the living standards of European Union members.

Contacts, however, continued to grow. In 1993 the European Union established an office in Kiev and, two years later, Ukraine did the same in Brussels. In 1998, when Kuchma was still in his pro-Western phase, Ukraine proposed a plan for its integration into the European Union. But the European Union again ignored the Ukrainian initiative. There was, however, considerable disagreement on this issue within the Union itself. Reluctant to irritate the Russians, Germany and France were not forthcoming to the Ukrainians. But countries that had experienced the Kremlin’s domination in the past, such as Poland and the Baltic states, were much more encouraging. Consequently, while not mentioning membership, in December 2008 the European Union proposed a limited plan of cooperation with its neighbours to the east called the Eastern Partnership in specific areas such as illegal immigration, energy policy, and weapons control. It also included the possibility of visa-free travel to the West and a tax-free trade zone. For the Ukrainians it was a frustrating situation. It seemed that the European nature of their society was generally acknowledged. Indeed, they were becoming ever more European. Nonetheless, aside from making encouraging gestures, the European Union was not about to accept them into its fold. Enter NATO

Surprisingly, Ukraine’s relations with the West’s military alliance, NATO, were more productive and dynamic than those with the economic and political alliance represented by the European Union. Perhaps it was because issues in this relationship were more focused: worried by a re-emergent Russia, NATO was interested in maintaining stability in the former Communist sphere while Ukraine hoped to use NATO to ensure its own security.

After a series of preparatory meetings, in 1995 Ukraine and NATO signed a Partnership for Peace Agreement that established a framework for cooperation. This led to the participation of Ukrainian peacekeepers in Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the formation of a combined Polish-Ukrainian battalion. In 1997, in Madrid, the Ukraine-NATO Partnership Agreement was signed. This deepened the relationship. It stressed that international law formed the basis for solving disputes, that formation of spheres of influence – clearly aimed at Russia – should be avoided, and that consultations, training of troops, and military exercises should be used to strengthen Ukrainian independence. It did not, however, offer Ukraine membership in the alliance. In 1999, at the Fiftieth Anniversary of NATO celebrated in Washington, Kuchma participated in the formation of the Ukraine-NATO Commission, which was meant to expand the relationship even further.

In late 1999, for the same reasons that caused American disillusionment with Kuchma, an abrupt cooling of relations occurred between Ukraine and NATO. This led the Ukrainian president to emphasize once more Ukraine’s ambiguous “multi-vector” policy. Soon thereafter he turned towards Russia and began discussions on closer economic and military cooperation. This did not mean, however, that he was ready to ignore NATO. On the contrary, even while drawing closer to the Kremlin, Kuchma, to the great annoyance of the Russians, did not want to isolate himself from the West. In 2002 another Action Plan was signed between NATO and Ukraine that was to prepare the latter for potential entry into the military alliance.

At least at first glance, the important role Poland played in Ukraine’s international relations was surprising. Given their long and bitter history, one might have expected there to be a certain coolness between the two states. But the opposite turned out to be the case. From the outset it was clear that, if international problems arose in the future, they would come from Russia. Poles said this openly; Ukrainians did so more cautiously. Consequently, both countries realized that they should concentrate on common interests – safeguarding themselves from Russian aggressiveness – rather than old animosities.

The Poles took the initiative. They were the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence. A cornerstone of their foreign policy became the support of an independent, stable, and democratic (and pro-Western) Ukraine. Indeed, Poland became a primary advocate for Ukraine’s desire to enter the European Union and to join NATO. In many ways, Poland became, as it had been in the past, Ukraine’s “Gateway to the West.” After the initial enthusiasm, when institutional ties with Ukraine expanded rapidly, a more realistic phase began in the mid-1990s. Ukraine’s internal weaknesses, its catastrophic economy, and the possibility of an east/west split in Ukraine, on the one hand, and Poland’s concentration on becoming a member of NATO and the European Union, on the other hand, led to a certain cooling in relations between the two countries. But in the late 1990s and early 2000s the relationship again became dynamic and constructive.

The possibility that Ukraine might follow Belarus into the Russian sphere of influence alarmed the Poles. Moreover, growing Ukrainian-Polish trade reinforced the need to expand contacts. In 1997 President Kwasniewski visited Kiev. A year later the two presidents honoured both Polish and Ukrainian soldiers buried in the Luchakivsky cemetery in Lviv. In following years both sides acknowledged and regretted the massacres and forced resettlements that occurred during and soon after the Second World War. In 2007 Poland and Ukraine were chosen by FIFA, the world soccer federation, to host the European championship in 2012. Minor variations notwithstanding, it was clear that supporting Ukraine in its pro-Western tendencies was a priority of Polish diplomacy. Russia

Of all Ukraine’s foreign relations, those with Russia were the most crucial. They were each other’s closest and most important neighbours. Their economics were largely interdependent, especially in the sphere of energy. And their cultural, historical, and social ties were very close. The fact that about 17% of Ukraine’s population was Russian, about half of the country spoke Russian, and the large Russian Black Sea Fleet was based on Ukrainian territory in Sevastopol only emphasized the obvious point that relations between the two countries required special attention.

Even as he tried to improve relations with the European Union and NATO, Kuchma had to pay close attention to Ukraine’s big northern neighbour. But as his second term in office began and progress in the West was scant, Russia became the most important focal point of Kuchma’s foreign policy. Scandals undermined his relations with the United States and NATO; large, anti-Kuchma demonstrations in Kiev indicated growing weakness at home. Consequently, drawing closer to Russia, now led by the combative Putin, appeared be the most promising option for the Ukrainian president.

Ukraine was quickly drawn into resurgent Russia’s welcoming embrace. Kuchma and Putin met frequently, and after each meeting Russian influence in Ukraine seemed to grow. In 2000 Russian capital began to flood into Ukraine, buying up important enterprises on very favourable terms. In 2001 Pope John Paul II visited Ukraine, but the government’s response, no doubt reflecting Russian influence, was extremely cool. That same year Prime Minister Yushchenko, suspected of pro-West tendencies, was replaced by Anatolii Kinakh, known for his loyalty to Kuchma. A very telling indicator of the radical changes was NATO’S efforts to downplay the Ukrainian president’s awkward presence at its conference in 2002. Soon afterwards, Kuchma openly declared that Russia was Ukraine’s most important partner. In 2003 Ukraine joined the Russian-dominated Eurasian Economic Community. Meanwhile, Kuchma was chosen as the first non-Russian to head the Commonwealth of Independent States. It seemed that Ukraine was now firmly in the bloc of post-Soviet states that Putin was drawing together as a counterbalance to the European Union and the United States.

The shift towards Russia was not total, however. Kuchma was too clever a politician to deprive himself of all options. In 2003 a book appeared under his name entitled Ukraine Is Not Russia. It made the point that drawing closer to its neighbour to the north did not mean that Ukraine was about to surrender its national interests and distinct identity. That same year, when Russia tried to encroach on Ukraine’s borders in Tuzla Island in the Sea of Azov, both Ukrainian public opinion and the president resolutely and successfully resisted. Even while moving ever closer to Putin – personal relations between the two men were very good – Kuchma repeatedly noted that Ukraine still hoped to join the European Union. But where it counted, it was clear that Kuchma was firmly on Putin’s side. Yushchenkos policies

New presidents often mean new policies. However, when Yushchenko was elected president after the Orange Revolution of 2004, his foreign policies differed from those of his predecessor in the extreme. This was not entirely surprising. Putin’s increasingly authoritarian Russia had been an unabashed and committed supporter of Yushchenko’s rival, Yanukovych. Moreover, Yushchenko appeared to represent democratic values like those espoused in the West. Both the United States and the European Union clearly backed him. As a result, the new president quickly abandoned Ukraine’s traditionally ambiguous multi-vector policy with its strong pro-Russian orientation and openly declared that his primary foreign policy goal was to draw closer to the West. Ukraine, he often stated, was an “obviously European country.” This meant drawing closer to the European Union, a position that most Ukrainians supported. It also meant joining NATO, which was a move that the vast majority of the population rejected.

Yushchenko’s desire to see Ukraine become a member of NATO greatly angered Russia, which considered the possibility of the Western military alliance drawing right up to its borders to be a major threat to its security. Despite making a conciliatory initial visit to Moscow in January 2005, the new president’s relations with Russia began badly. And they grew worse. After Moscow, Yushchenko embarked on a series of visits to key capitals in the West where, as a result of positive media exposure, he had, at least initially, celebrity status. A meeting with Secretary-General Javier Solana revived hopes for Ukraine’s closer cooperation with the European Union. And at the European Parliament in Strasbourg Yushchenko argued for Ukraine’s inclusion in the Europe community. In April 2005 Yushchenko visited Washington and met with George Bush. The visit bore concrete results. Not long afterwards, the United States removed Ukraine from the list of former Soviet states to whom the restrictions of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment applied. He also received assurances that the United States would support Ukraine’s efforts to join NATO. The West’s welcoming gestures were clearly very different from the cold shoulder it had shown to his predecessor.

Soon, however, problems emerged. Implicit in the West’s welcoming attitude was the assumption that Ukraine would launch its long-delayed domestic reforms. These reforms, it was hoped, would bring the country closer to European norms and make cooperation easier. It quickly became apparent, however, that the new president would make little progress in this area. Unwilling to threaten the interests of Ukrainian oligarchs, confronted by numerous domestic enemies, especially in the East, and confronted by growing tensions with the popular Tymoshenko, his partner from Orange Revolution days, the new president’s domestic policies soon disillusioned many of his supporters. All this made it difficult for Yushchenko to pursue his foreign policies.

The election to parliament in 2006 complicated matters further. It resulted in the unexpected appointment of Yanukovych as prime minister and the occupation by members of the Donetsk clan of many key government positions. The new prime minister and his Cabinet clearly wished to reduce tensions with Russia. Consequently, the policies of the president and the prime minister diverged sharply. An indication of the mounting tension was Yanukovych’s concerted and successful effort to force the resignation in 2006 of the president’s appointee, Borys Tarasyuk, a pro-West foreign minister, from the Cabinet. This, however, brought little satisfaction to the pro-Russian prime minister. At about the same time, Russia increased its pressure on Ukraine by shutting off deliveries of natural gas. After several days of national and international consternation, the flow of gas resumed. But the price that the Russians demanded from Ukraine for their gas was much higher than before. Internal tensions brought on another parliamentary election in September 2007. This time Yanukovych failed to gain a majority, and Tymoshenko became prime minister with a paper-thin majority. Her Cabinet included Minister of Foreign Affairs Volodymyr Ohrysko, a strong proponent of pro-Western policies.

Why did Yushchenko, despite fierce opposition from Russia and his domestic foes – especially the adherents of Russia who regularly organized anti-NATO demonstrations in Crimea where joint Ukraine-NATO exercises took place – insist on bringing Ukraine into NATO? Like many others, he believed that the military alliance would guarantee Ukraine’s security, especially from potential threats from Russia. Moreover, it would bring Ukraine closer to Europe. The relationship with the West, however, was becoming ever more convoluted and complex. Although Ukraine cooperated with NATO in many ways and received from it encouraging signals, especially while post-Orange Revolution enthusiasm was still high in the West, it made little concrete progress in gaining membership. Lack of meaningful reforms in Ukraine was one reason. Moreover, France and Germany, fearful of irritating Russia, their major supplier of energy, also discouraged progress. Even strong American support could not bring Ukraine into the military alliance. This became evident at the NATO meeting in Brussels in December 2008 when Ukraine was asked, once more, to wait.

Although Ukrainian efforts to gain entry into the European Union did not have the fierce opponents that the pro-NATO camp inspired, the results were similarly unclear and frustrating. In 2005 the European Parliament expressed a desire to expand Ukraine’s economic integration in and political cooperation with the European Union. In that year a joint Action Plan that was to work toward this end was concluded. Certainly, the growing economic contacts were encouraging. Between 2000 and 2007, trade between the European Union and Ukraine grew by more than 300%. Nonetheless, Ukraine still accounted for only 2% of the European Union’s exports. The never-ending political conflicts within Ukraine and lack of reforms continued to raise doubts about Ukraine readiness to enter the European Union. Ever sensitive about what Russian reactions might be, Germany led the other countries of “Old Europe” in urging that no legally binding commitment be made to Ukraine. However, some half measures were allowed. In September 2008 in Paris Ukraine signed an association agreement with the Union. It called for the negotiation of a free trade zone and raised the possibility of a more liberal visa regime. Once again, while stating that “Ukraine’s future was in Europe” the European Union made no commitment regarding membership.

Despite these frustrations, due in large part to Ukraine’s chaotic internal politics, Yushchenko did not abandon his pro-Western policies. This was evident in his active support of pro-Western Georgia in its confrontation with Russia. When the brief conflict broke out between Georgia and Russia in September 2008, Yushchenko joined other East European presidents in rushing to Tbilisi to show his support for the Georgians. The conflict also revealed that Ukraine had, legally but very irritatingly for Russia, provided Georgia with arms. Another expression of Yushchenko’s pro-Georgian stance was the restrictions that the Ukrainian government attempted to impose on the return of the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the area of conflict to its base in Sevastopol.

The Ukrainian president’s pro-Western policies did bring some indirect benefits for Ukraine. In February 2008 it was accepted into the World Trade Organization (WTO) while Russia’s application still remained under consideration. When the global financial crisis struck in the fall of 2008, the International Money Fund (IMF) offered Ukraine a loan of $16.4 billion to help it deal with the financial strains on its banking system. The fact that American influence was strong in both of these international organizations undoubtedly worked to Ukraine’s advantage.

It was, however, the strained relationship with Russia that increasingly overshadowed the Ukrainian president’s foreign policy. It was clear that Ukraine and Russia would, sooner or later, have to find a way to resolve the tensions between them. These confrontations often flared up as a result of the deep-rooted stereotypes that each side had about the other. As Putin’s Russia strove to regain its international prominence and regional dominance, it proved difficult for the Kremlin to accept its former “younger brother” as an independent and equal state (although the inhabitants of both countries had a much more positive view of each other). Indeed, in 2008 Putin clearly stated to Bush that Ukraine was not really a full-fledged state.³ Most Russians did not consider Ukraine a separate nation. For its part, Ukraine’s political elite was extremely sensitive to what it perceived as Russian “bullying” and it used every opportunity to emphasize its national distinctiveness.

There were, however, more concrete reasons for the tensions between the two states. The fact that Russia provided Ukraine with much of its energy and set prices to serve its interests was a constant cause of concern for the Ukrainians. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government’s insistence that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, based in Sevastopol, should leave when its lease ran out in 2017 irritated the Kremlin, leading it to encourage pro-Russian tendencies in the largely Russian-populated Crimea. The sensitive issue of the role of the Russian language and media in Ukraine, aroused not only Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers in the country but involved sharp exchanges between Russian and Ukrainian governments.⁴

As 2008 drew to a close, it was evident that adding to or even maintaining tensions in the highly strained Ukrainian-Russian relationship was unproductive for both sides. Early indications that a more conciliatory approach was needed came from Prime Minister Tymoshenko, who adopted a more balanced view of the Georgia-Russia conflict than President Yushchenko. Moreover, in her negotiations with Putin about energy issues there were further indications of her efforts to find grounds for better understanding between the two states. Meanwhile, Yanukovych travelled to Moscow to participate in United Russia’s party congress and to emphasize, once more, that he stood for improved Ukrainian-Russian relations. The leader of Ukraine’s Communists, Petro Symonenko, did the same. Even Yushchenko himself, disillusioned by lack of progress in his pro-West policies, seemed to be slowly coming to the conclusion that a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia was needed. For this purpose, he created a special commission to study ways in which improved relations could best be achieved. It appeared that major changes in Ukraine’s foreign policy were in the making. The Ukrainian-Russian “Gas War”

As 2009 began, the extremely sensitive and important Ukrainian-Russian relationship engendered a sharp confrontation. Western media called it the “gas war.” The origins of the conflict reached back to Soviet times when natural gas was obtained in Russia and transported to Europe by a transit system that ran primarily through Ukraine. Since 1991 the two countries argued repeatedly about how best to divide the benefits from this energy trade. In 2006, after an altercation with Ukraine that saw Russia briefly shut down its gas deliveries to Europe, it was decided that Ukraine, in return for providing its northern neighbour with cheap transportation facilities, would pay Gazprom, the Russian gas company, $179.50 per 1,000 cubic metres of gas. This was far below the market price. Moreover, at the suggestion of Putin, Gazprom and the Ukrainians established, on very opaque terms, the Rosukrenergo company to act as a middleman in the relationship.

On 1 January 2009, arguing that Russia was no longer willing to provide Ukraine with cheap, subsidized gas, Gazprom demanded that the Ukrainians pay $250 per 1,000 cubic metres. When Kiev protested, Gazprom raised the price to $450. Tense negotiations continued. They became more confrontational when, on 7 January, Gazprom accused Ukraine of siphoning off Europe-bound gas, an accusation that the Ukrainians vehemently denied. Nonetheless, the Russians cut off all gas deliveries to Europe. This meant that European countries, especially those in the eastern and central parts of the continent, were deprived, in the midst of a very cold winter, of the means to heat their homes. Suddenly, an apparently commercial altercation between two countries on the continent’s periphery became an extremely pressing, all-European problem. It was the first time Europe had run into such difficulties and the EU became heavily involved in pressuring both Ukraine and Russia to find a solution as soon as possible.

A well-prepared Russian public relations campaign sought to present Ukraine as the main culprit. The Ukrainians denied all accusations. Meanwhile, the EU, furious and frustrated, blamed both countries. Finally, on 19 January, the two prime ministers, Yulia Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin, met in Moscow and, after exhausting negotiations, reached an agreement. As a result, Ukraine agreed to pay, in 2009, the market price for gas minus a discount of 20%. Thereafter, Ukraine would pay the European average price for gas and Russia would pay market rates for the transportation of the gas in 2010 but at reduced rates in 2009. The agreement was for ten years. Moreover, Tymoshenko obtained the removal of Rosukrenergo, which she accused of corruption, from the commercial relationship. According to the Ukrainian prime minister, the agreement was a victory for Ukraine (her rival, Yushchenko, called it a defeat); the Russians believed that they gained the upper hand. And Europe, disillusioned by both countries, began to consider alternate sources and supply routes for its gas.

From the outset, it was clear that the “gas war” was not only a commercial conflict. Still smarting from his setback in 2004, Putin was clearly eager to punish Yushchenko, by applying pressure on the vulnerable Ukrainian economy, for his pro-Western policies and support of Georgia in the fall of 2008. Moreover, he hoped to widen the gap between Ukraine and the EU. The internal Ukrainian political conflict between Tymoshenko and Yush-chenko also played a role, with the former eager to show that she, unlike the president, was capable of coming to a understanding with Russia. In broader terms, however, the conflict had a crucial impact on the Ukraine-Russia relationship. The long-standing view that Ukrainians and Russians shared a uniquely close and fraternal relationship suffered a major setback. Mean while, the perception that the two peoples lived in separate, sovereign states that should and did pursue their own particular interests grew.