MAZEPA AND THE ZAPOROZHIANS

Not everything went Peter Γs way in Ukraine. Mazepa also scored a major success which caused deep concern for the Russians. In April, 1709, he managed to draw the Zaporozhian Cossacks over to his own and Charles XIΓs side.

There was some irony to this development. For almost twenty years, the Hetman had been constantly at odds with the Zaporo- zhians. The socio-economic and political gap between, on the one hand, the Hetman and the aristocratic elite which controlled the settled Left Bank and, on the other hand, the military fraternity based on its Sich_f a stronghold on an island in the lower stretches of the Dnieper (zα porohamy—beyond the rapids), was vast.³⁷ In their social composition and their sympathies, the Zaporozhians were closely linked with the lower social strata of the Hetmanate. They too resented the Hetman’s and the starshyna's attempts to expand their socio-economic domination.

The Zaporozhians took pride in the fact that they were an associ­ation of free men who followed their own rules and interests. Often the Tsar himself complained that when he was at war with the Tatars or Ottomans, the Zaporozhians would trade and cooperate with them and, vice-versa, when Moscow was at peace with the Muslims, the Zaporozhians often attacked the Crimea or the Otto­man towns on the Black Sea. For their part, the Zaporozhians were incensed when, in the late 1690s, Peter I ordered a series of Russian- manned forts to be built along the lower Dnieper and Samara Rivers, that is, on the boundary of traditionally Zaporozhian lands. Fearing Russian interference in their affairs, the Zaporozhians strongly resented the Russian presence.³⁸ And, one of the strongest grievances the Zaporozhians had against Mazepa was his subser­vience to Moscow which, because of its insistence on absolute obedience, posed a threat to them.

With the arrival of the Swedes in Ukraine, the strategic impor­tance of the Zaporozhians rose perceptibly. The Sich controlled access to the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire—already there was talk that Charles XII was seeking an alliance with the latter—as well as to the Right Bank and the Don. Among the Ukrainian Cos­sacks, the Zaporozhians were known as fierce fighters and the ap­proximately 10,000 men they could muster could be of considerable importance to whichever side they chose to support. Furthermore, the Zaporozhians' influence on the Ukrainian masses was con­siderable. Little wonder, then, that throughout the winter of 1708 and the spring of 1709, both Peter I and Mazepa desperately tried to draw the Zaporozhians into their respective camps.

In wooing the Zaporozhians, both sides used similar tactics. They bombarded the Sich with letters and manifestoes which re­peated the usual rhetoric but with an added twist: Peter I sent copies to the Sieh of letters Mazepa had previously written to him complaining about those “accursed dogs,” i.e., the Zaporozhians. Meanwhile, the Hetman informed the Sieh of how often he had heard the Tsar speak of destroying the “willful Zaporozhians." Both sides sent delegations to address the rada (council) and offered rich bribes to the Zaporozhian leadership.³⁹

As was so often the case, opinion was divided at the Sich. The more established Zaporozhians, called the Staryky_f did not wish to take risks and preferred to stay on the side of the Tsar; however, the molodyky_f the younger, more militant Cossacks favored an anti­Russian policy. In such a case, the view of the Zaporozhian leader, the koshouyi_f was usually decisive.

The Zaporozhian koshovyi at this time was Kost Hordienko,⁴⁰ one of the most colorful figures in the history of the Sich.

The effects of the Zaporozhian decision were soon felt. Anti­Russian unrest flamed up in the southern part of the Hetmanate, especially in the Poltava regiment which was closest to the Sich. Bands of armed peasants and Cossacks, numbering close to 15,000, caused serious disturbances in the area. A number of smaller towns —Perevolochna, Kelerberda, Maiachka, Novyi Sanzhar—sided with the Zaporozhians. In several forts and towns, the Russian garrisons were massacred and three Russian regiments were ambushed and completely smashed by the Zaporozhians (115 prisoners taken dur­ing this encounter were sent to Charles XII as a token of esteem). General Renn, the Russian commander in the area, wrote to the Tsar on March 30 that, “A great conflagration is developing here and it must be put out before it is too late.”⁴²

The Zaporozhians' actions had important diplomatic and stra­tegic repercussions. On the Dnieper, the Cossacks had a large flo­tilla of boats which was capable of transporting 3,000 men at a time. If the Swedes hoped to receive reinforcement from the West, the flotilla would be invaluable in transporting fresh troops. The Zaporozhians also assured Charles XII of g∞d communications with Poland and, very importantly, with Crimea and the Ottomans.

In view of Charles XIΓs growing difficulties, contacts with such potential allies as the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans were becoming increasingly important. In another section of this study, the involvement of the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Porte with the struggle in Ukraine will be analyzed in greater detail. At this point, suffice it to say that, in the spring of 1709, both the Swedes and the Crimean Tatars, urged on by Mazepa, were seriously considering an alliance. Indeed, in mid-March, as the Zaporozhians were trying to decide which side to choose, they received letters from Khan Devlet Girei urging them to join Mazepa and the Swedes and promising them aid in case of need. Once the Zaporo- zhians sided with Charles XII, they immediately sent envoys to the Crimean Tatars to encourage them to follow suit.⁴³

The Zaporozhian-Crimean connection demonstrates the pattern of Charles XIΓs alliances in the East: they had a kind of chain reac­tion, each alliance paving the way to another. Leszczynski estab­lished contacts with Mazepa; the Hetman convinced the Zaporo- zhians to join the Swedes; the Sich made an alliance with the Crimean Khanate possible; this, in turn, would make a treaty with the Ottoman Porte more feasible.

With his broad network of contacts and his experience, Mazepa was especially effective in seeking out new allies. Well aware of the animosity which the people on the periphery of the Tsar’s realm felt toward Moscow, the Hetman envisaged an alliance of all the anti-Russian elements in the south. It was to include his own Cos­sacks, the Zaporozhians, the Crimean Tatars, the Don Cossacks (the Zaporozhians had excellent ties with K. Bulavin’s and, later, with I. Nekrasov’s men), the Bashkirs, the Kalmuks and the Cher- kess of the Kuban.⁴⁴ This ambitious plan was probably the first instance of anyone contemplating the formation of an anti-Moscow bloc of “minorities” in and around the nascent Russian empire.

Access to all these potential allies was provided by the Zaporo- zhians. Not only Mazepa and Charles XII, but also Menshikov and Peter I were well aware of this fact. The Tsar and his field-marshal agreed that, since attempts to hold on to the Zaporozhians “with kindness” had failed, harsher measures would have to be taken to check the damage which their defection had caused. On April 12, a Russian force of about 2,000 men under the command of Brigadier P. Iakovlev was dispatched down the Dnieper to destroy the Sich.

At the outset, the Russians took the Zaporozhian stronghold at Perevolochna where they massacred over a thousand of the inhabi- ta∏ts and destroyed the Zaporozhian flotilla. They then proceeded slowly down the river and, on May 7, began the siege of the Sich. Their initial efforts proved costly and ineffective. Only when Hnat Galagan, who had recently deserted Mazepa and who knew the Sich and its environs very well, arrived with a strong force of Ukrainian Cossacks, did Iakovlev begin to make headway. Realiz­ing that they would be unable to withstand the combined forces of Iakovlev and Galagan, most of the Zaporozhians secretly aban­doned the Sich at night, leaving behind a small holding force of 300 men. The next day, after a bitter struggle, the Sich fell. On the Tsar’s orders, all the buildings and fortifications were destroyed and all the prisoners were executed. Some of the latter were nailed to planks and floated down the Dnieper as a warning to their col­leagues.

The destruction of the Sich had an effect similar to that of the destruction of Baturyn. Again the ability of the Tsar to punish those who offended him and the inability of Charles XII to protect his supporters were demonstrated. And again those Whoconsidered joining the Swedes were discouraged. Khan Devlet Girei, while still professing his willingness to fight the Russians, put off unit­ing his forces with those of Charles. Any hope of attracting the Don Cossacks had disappeared. The Ottoman Porte, promptly informed by the Russians of their victory, became more hesitant than before about aiding the Swedes.

In announcing the victory to the Ukrainian population, the Tsar was careful not to gloat over his success. He realized that for them the Sieh had been a place of refuge from the overbearing de­mands of the starshyna. Therefore, on May 26, Peter I issued a series of manifestoes in which he carefully explained why the Za- porozhians had to be punished and concluded with the statement that, “The Zaporozhians themselves are responsible for the disaster which befell them.”⁴⁷ For Mazepa and his followers the situation before Poltava looked very bleak indeed.

*

* *

June 28, 1708, marked the date of the Battle of Poltava. The results of this battle, one of the most decisive in European history, are well known.⁴⁸ Through his victory, Peter I not only inflicted a crushing military setback on Charles XII but he also simultaneously de­molished the Swedish attempt to create an East European empire. And in doing so the Tsar opened up the way for the expansion of his own nascent empire. Because much has been written about the battle, there is no need to dwell on it here. For our purposes, it is the plight of Charles’s Ukrainian allies after Poltava that will be examined more closely.

One can imagine Mazepa’s shock when it became clear that the battle had been lost: all his carefully wrought plans were ruined and his personal fate, if he were captured by the Russians, was horrible to consider. Little wonder that, when the Swedish King, unable to accept defeat, wished to return to the fray, it was the Hetman who most insistently urged him to flee. The retreat of the surviving Swedish forces and their Cossack allies to the Dnieper crossing at Perevolochna was relatively orderly.⁴⁹ But, at the cross­ing, Menshikov’s cavalry caught up with them. Several hours after Charles, Mazepa and a select force of about 1,000 Swedes and 2,000 Cossacks crossed the Dnieper and continued their flight toward the safety of the Ottoman frontier, approximately 13,000 demoralized Swedes and close to 3,000 Ukrainians surrendered to the Russians. Several hundred Zaporozhians, realizing the fate which awaited them—captured Zaporozhians were impaled on stakes—fought to the death or hurled themselves into the Dnieper and drowned. By the end of the day, the Swedish army had ceased to exist.

Unaware of what had occurred at Perevolochna, Charles and his small force, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry, on July 7, crossed into Ottoman territory near Ochakiv. Had it not been for the aid of Mazepa and the Zaporozhians, the Swedish King would probably have been captured by his pursuers.⁵⁰ After some hesita­tion, the Ottoman authorities extended their hospitality to the refugees and asked them to move closer to Bender, which was the seat of the serasker (governor). This marked the beginning of the so-called Bender Period in the life of Charles XII and his Swedish and Ukrainian associates.