THE BASES OF THE TSAR’S SUPPORT IN UKRAINE

Soon after Mazepa^,s defection, it became evident that most Ukrain­ians were opting for the status quo, that is, for loyalty to the Tsar. An obvious reason for this choice was the fact IhatmostofUkraine was occupied by Russian troops.

Mazepa had never been popular among the peasants and the rank-and-file Cossacks.²⁶ The Cossacks disliked his aristocratic habits and mannerisms and, long before 1708, rumors circulated about his pro-Polish sympathies. It was even rumored that he was secretly a Catholic. This resentment was fueled by more than a mere question of personal style. As everywhere else in Eastern Europe, the Starshyn a-nobi∖ity in Ukraine, especially during Ma­zepa’s 21 year tenure, was in the process of totally subordinating the peasants and even the Cossacks to its socio-economic and political control. As the leader of this elite and as the wealthiest man in the land, Mazepa had been in the forefront of this develop­ment. He was the embodiment of the rising elite and its efforts to dominate the rest of Ukrainian society. Therefore, when the Tsar’s manifestoes described the Hetman’s treaty with Leszczynski as an attempt to “return Ukraine under Polish slavery” they found ready acceptance among the masses. The underlying social tensions in Ukrainian society rebounded, as they had so often in the past, to the Tsar’s advantage.

Also working against the Hetman and his Swedish allies was the natural xenophobia of the masses which was highlighted by their deep religious commitment.

Ironically, it was Peter I who, throughout his reign, had shown very little regard for Orthodoxy. And it was Mazepa who was probably the most generous benefactor that the Orthodox church in Ukraine had ever had.²⁸ There was hardly a major church or monastery in the land which had not been built or renovated by the Hetman. Some reliable estimates indicate that he spent over one million gold pieces for the construction of churches and monas­teries. Moreover, the Hetman’s mother was an abbess; his sister was in a monastery; and his contacts with the Ukrainian hierarchy were excellent. Varlaam Iasinskyi, Lazar Baranovych, Stefan Iavorskyi, and especially Ioasaf Krokovskyi were his personal friends. The Hetman might, therefore, have expected to get some support from the Ukrainian clergy. Yet it was not forthcoming. Since 1686, the Ukrainian church had been subordinated to the Patriarch of Mos­cow and it was from the north that it now took its orders. Moreover, many Ukrainian churchmen did not want to jeopardize their chances of joining many of their colleagues in pursuing brilliant careers in Russia. Finally, the churchmen were scandalized by Mazepa’s co­operation with the heretic Lutherans and hated Catholics. Thus, the Ukrainian clergy obediently obeyed the Tsar’s orders and se­verely castigated its former patron.

The Hetman could also expect little support from the towns­people.²⁹ Again, deep socio-economic tensions inherent in Ukrain­ian society harmed the Mazepist cause.

Both Peter I and Mazepa realized that the crucial social element in Ukraine was the approximately 800-1000 families which com­prised the Starshyna. It was on their support that Mazepa counted most because the Starshyna had benefited greatly from the Het­man’s generous distribution of common lands.³⁰ Moreover, it was concerned with the Tsar’s infringement on Cossack rights and liberties. And the idea of joining the Polish-Lithuanian Common­wealth was attractive to it because it meant that it would obtain the same broad privileges that the Polish szlachta enjoyed. It was not surprising, therefore, that almost all of the high officeholders in the Hetmanate followed Mazepa into the Swedish camp.³¹ However, the vast majority of the starshyna, surprised by the Hetman’s move, adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

Although the Tsar received reports that many of the starshyna favored the Hetman, he decided, after staging the intimidating events at Baturyn, Hlukhiv and Lebedyn, to win the Cossack elite over “with kindness.” To those who remained loyal to him or at least did not follow Mazepa, Peter I gave generous allotments of confiscated lands and appointments to offices formerly held by Mazepists.³² Measures were also taken to entice back those of the starshyna who had gone over to the Swedes. The Tsar declared that all those who returned to his camp within a month of their defec­tion would receive a full pardon and all their lands and offices would be returned to them.

Seeing that matters were developing badly for the Swedes, a number of Mazepa’s closest associates accepted the Tsar’s offer. Danylo Apostol, the colonel of Myrhorod, and Ivan Sulima, the Standard Bearer-General, deserted from the Swedish camp. They were followed soon afterwards by the colonel of the mercenaries, Hnat Galagan, and the colonel of Korsun, Andrii Kandyba. Other members of Mazepa’s entourage also planned to defect (several of them did so during the Battle of Poltava). Even before these mem­bers of the Starshyna left, a large number of the 2-3,000 Cossacks which Mazepa brought along also deserted. Irritated by these defec­tions, the Swedes placed armed guards—under the guise of a guard of honor—around some of the wavering members of the heneralna Starshyna. And Swedish generals began to have their doubts about the reliability of their new allies.

An intriguing episode took place during ApostoFs defection.³³ After a stern warning (“Beware, Apostol, do not play the same trick with me as you did with Charles”), the colonel was well-received by the Tsar. Apostol brought along with him a note from Mazepa in which the latter offered to deliver Charles XII into the Tsar’s hands in return for a full pardon for himself. At first the Russians thought that the offer was genuine and responded favorably. But soon after­wards they captured letters from Mazepa to Leszczynski which indicated that the Hetman had no intention of betraying the Swed­ish king. Convinced that the wily Mazepa was simply trying to confuse them, the Tsar and his ministers broke off their corres­pondence. How serious Mazepa was himself about this offer will probably never be known.

Another indication of the worsening situation of the Swedes was the growing animosity displayed by the Ukrainian peasants. Initi­ally, the Swedes were careful not to antagonize the population and offered to pay for the provisions they needed. However, when the peasants failed to respond to their requests for provisions, the Swedes were forced to take what they needed.

An event which further helped to arouse the peasants against the Swedes was a probing attack which the latter launched into the Slobodas.³⁶ These lands lay between Russia and Ukraine, and al­though they were formally a part of Russia, 100,000 out of their 120,000 inhabitants were Ukrainian. The primary goal of this operation was to reconnoiter the approaches for a planned attack on Moscow. Other benefits were also expected from this operation: it was hoped that such a thrust into the Tsar’s own lands would encourage the Don Cossacks and the non-Russian peoples of the Volga to join the Swedes.

The operation, however, miscarried. Considering the Slobodas to be strictly enemy territory, the Swedish troops entered the land, as they themselves stated, “with fire and sword.” All the villages in a swath seven miles wide were destroyed and many of their inhabi­tants killed. This drove many of the natives to form large partisan units which not only killed off Swedish stragglers, but also attacked patrols and disrupted transport. Moreover, a sudden thaw made further progress nearly impossible. Charles XII was forced to call back the expeditionary force. But the partisans followed it back into the Hetmanate and fueled the anti-Swedish struggle there. Clearly, Ukraine was not providing the Swedes with the rest and support which they had hoped for.