MAZEPA S CONSPIRATORIAL TECHNIQUE

In discussing Mazepa’s conspiratorial-diplomatic arrangements, we have gotten ahead of the actual flow of events; at this point it would be useful to glance back and examine how the Hetman, in the words of the Starshyna_f “constructed his machina.”

While the decision to abandon or overthrow one’s sovereign was taken quite often in 17th century Europe, it was never an easy one.

Rarely was the situation of an anti-royalist leader as complicated as was that of Mazepa. To come out against the Tsar made sense only if Charles XII won or was about to win the war. But the Het­man had no way of knowing what the outcome of the war would be. Therefore, the goal of his dealings with Charles XII and Lesz- czynski was to reach an understanding with the enemy in case they emerged as the victors. Options, not commitments, were what Mazepa hoped to gain through his secret negotiations.

To attain these options, Mazepa decided to pursue, until the last possible moment, his traditional role of being “the Tsar’s most loyal servant.’’ At the same time, he tried to persuade Leszczynski and the Swedes that he was sympathetic to their cause. He ex­plained his plan in these words:

If they (the Poles and Swedes) see an inclination on my part towards them, then they will not treat us as enemies and they will not ravage unfortunate Ukraine with fire and sword. I will, however, remain constant in my loyalty to His Tsarist

Majesty until I see with what forces Stanislaw will come to Ukraine’s borders and what kind of progress the Swedish armies will continue to make in Muscovy.⁴⁰

While this policy of humoring both sides was in itself difficult to follow, Mazepa’s task was complicated by the starshyna.

The Hetman’s greatest success was that, after three years of plot­ting, not a hint of suspicion was raised in the mind of the Tsar. There were several reasons for this. For more than eighteen years the Hetman served the Tsar loyally and well. This fact alone made it difficult for Peter I to believe that the Hetman, in his advanced age, would change his life-long policy. Nevertheless, Mazepa had reason to fear that concrete proof of the conspiracy might surface. In Poland, the Hetman’s contacts with Leszczynski were a poorly- kept secret.⁴¹ And in Ukraine, members of the starshyna were sys­tematically encouraged by Moscow to inform on their superiors. In both places, Mazepa had numerous enemies who would be only too happy to contribute to his demise.

Mazepa’s solution to this problem was ingenious: he simply pre­empted all possible informers.⁴² At every opportunity he warned the Tsar to beware of the Poles in whichever camp they may be, informing him of real or fabricated cases of their disloyalty. A typi­cal example of these tactics was the game Mazepa played with Adam Sieniawski, the most influential (if not reliable) supporter of August II and Peter I in Poland.⁴³

When, in the fall of 1708, Mazepa finally decided to join the Swedes, he desperately wanted to bring Sieniawski over to Charles XII in order to assure victory for his new allies. To do so, the Het­man had to inform Sieniawski of his plans. But this would make him vulnerable to denunciation. In order to ensure that Sieniaw- ski’s potential denunciation would be considered an exaggeration θr a fabrication, Mazepa told the Tsar of the Polish Crown Het­man’s double-dealings. When Sieniawski, after much wavering, decided to remain loyal to Peter I and, as expected, informed on Mazepa, the Tsar refused to believe him.⁴⁴ On the other hand, if Leszczynski had tried to blackmail him by threatening to reveal their secret contacts, the Hetman was ready to point to the Wolski case as evidence of Polish provocations and of his steadfast loyalty.

One Russian who saw through the Hetman’s game was A. I. Dashkov, the Tsar’s envoy to August II. Apparently, he sent several warnings to Moscow about Mazepa, but these were ignored. After Mazepa’s defection, Dashkov stated, with some satisfaction that, “I was right and issued enough warnings but they did not want to listen.”⁴⁵

In dealing with the heneralna Starshyna, the Hetman was at his Machiavellian best. By exaggerating the threat to the interests of the Ukrainian Cossack elite that loomed from Moscow, he pro­voked it into demanding him to seek an understanding with the Swedes. This allowed Mazepa to act as if he were merely an instru­ment of the heneralna Starshynas collective will. When the Tsar demanded that Mazepa link up with the Russian army and the Hetman had already decided not to do so, he nevertheless turned to the heneralna Starshyna for “advice.” As expected, they insisted that the Hetman ignore the Tsar’s order. And when the Swedes approached and Mazepa pretended to waver, the leading colonels frantically pleaded that he join the Swedish King. In this manner, the Hetman skillfully implicated the heneralna Starshyna in his conspiracy and tested its resolve.

But, in “giving in” to the starshyna's wishes, Mazepa insisted on one stipulation: that the planning and execution of the entire con­spiracy be left strictly up to him. Only when he deemed it approp­riate would he reveal the entire machina to the officers. In case any of his associates should consider denouncing him, the Hetman could be brutally direct in his warnings: “Beware, Orlyk,” he told his chancellor, “that you remain faithful to me. You see what favor I enjoy with His Tsarist Majesty. There (in Moscow) they will not take you for me. I am wealthy—you are poor. And Moscow loves money. Nothing will happen to me, but you will perish.”⁴⁶

Despite these precautions, two leading members of the starshy na broke ranks and, in the fall of 1707 and spring of 1708, informed the Tsar about the conspiracy.

Matters came to a head in the fall of 1707 when Kochubei, sup­ported by Iskra, submitted to the Tsar a detailed list of 33 points attesting to Mazepa’s secret contacts with the enemy. ⁹ When the two repeated their accusations the next spring, the Tsar summoned them for questioning. One might easily imagine Mazepa’s fear and panic at this point. Confident that they could prove their case, Kochubei and Iskra left for the Tsar’s headquarters near Smolensk. But they miscalculated badly. Peter I considered the denunciation as just another annoying attempt by the constantly feuding star- shyna to undermine his loyal Hetman. After having Kochubei and Iskra tortured, the Tsar sentenced them to death and, as a sign of special favor, sent them to Mazepa for execution.⁵⁰

Although he emerged unscathed, the Kochubei-Iskra affair shook the Hetman’s confidence badly. He was sure that the Tsar now sus­pected him and was only waiting for the proper time and circum­stance to have him arrested. Therefore, he tried by every means possible to avoid joining the Tsar’s army. He even went so far as to pretend that he was on his deathbed. (Mazepa was, indeed, ill but not as seriously as he made out to be.)

In the fall of 1708, pressure on the Hetman continued to mount. As the Swedish and Russian armies converged on Ukraine, it be­came impossible to equivocate any longer. When on October 23, his nephew, Andrii Voinarovskyi rushed in, breathless, from the Russian camp and informed his uncle that Menshikov with a strong force of cavalry was moving towards him, Mazepa “took off like a whirlwind.” Gathering all the troops available, he moved towards the Swedish lines.

In his negotiations with the Swedes, Mazepa indicated that when he joined Charles XII he would bring 30,000 Cossacks with him. However, as the decisive moment arrived, the Hetman had only about 7,000 men at his disposal. The rest were scattered, on the Tsar’s orders, on several fronts.⁵¹ Leaving 3,000 men to defend his beloved Baturyn, Mazepa moved to the Swedish camp with only about 4,000 men.

Just before making contact with the Swedes, the Cossacks were drawn up and, for the first time, informed of the Hetman’s inten­tions. In his speech, Mazepa again outlined the wrongs inflicted upon the Ukrainians by Moscow—the reduction of Cossack rights and liberties, the plans to alter the Cossack order, and the alleged plan to resettle the Ukrainians beyond the Volga. The Hetman stated:

The only solution for us is to rely on the compassion of the Swedish king. He has promised to respect our rights and liberties and to protect them from all those who would threat­en them now or in the future. BrothersI Our time has come! Let us use this opportunity to avenge ourselves on the Mus­covites for their longstanding oppression, for all injustices and cruelties they inflicted. Let us preserve for the future our liberty and our Cossack rights from their incursions.⁵²

The Cossacks responded with silence; they were totally confused. To curse or grumble against the Muscovites was one thing, but to join foreigners, and “heretics” to boot, Wasanothermatter. Hereit became evident that the success of the conspiracy—its relatively well-guarded secrecy—was also its drawback: the Cossacks and, as it appeared later, the mass of Ukrainians were totally unprepared for such a radical turn of events. Although the Cossacks with the Hetman followed him, they maintained a wait-and-see attitude.

If Charles XII was disappointed with the small number of Cos­sacks who joined him, he did not show it. Mazepa and the other Cossack dignitaries—most of the heneralna Starshyna and the major colonels—were received with all due respect. At a ceremonial supper, Swedish generals and ministers crowded around to catch a glimpse of the famous Mazepa. The Hetman, a polished courtier in the European (Polish) style, created a favorable impression. Swed­ish observers commented that, judging from the style and content of the conversation he carried on in Latin, the Hetman was a man of education and intelligence.⁵³ Charles XII could console himself that he had obtained, if not a large allied army, at least an experi­enced advisor and expert in Ukrainian and Russian affairs.