PETER ΓS INITIAL REACTION

The Russians recovered quickly. Menshikov’s quick, energetic measures were especially effective. Arriving in Baturyn within a day of the Hetman’s departure, Menshikov realized what had oc­curred and, without delay, ordered his men to storm the town.

As things settled after the initial confusion, Peter I realized that not as many of the Starshyna had defected as he had feared at the outset. Nonetheless, he dispatched ten dragoon regiments to Ukraine.² Unlike the garrison troops, these regiments were quar­tered among the Cossacks in rural areas. And they stayed in the land permanently. Their commanders were given the right to interfere, under the pretext of searching out sedition and treason, in local affiairs and to bypass Cossack authorities.

Within weeks of their arrival in Ukraine, the Russian regimental commanders initiated a reign of terror in the land. Confiscations of property, interrogations, executions, and exile were the fate of anyone not only slightly associated with Mazepa’s izmena (treason) but even suspected of uttering an uncomplimentary remark about the Tsar. Real or suspected Mazepists were brought to the town of Lebedyn where they were first interrogated by the officials of the Field Chancellary and then by those of the Posolskaia kantselaria³ Also collected at Lebedyn and eventually exiled to Moscow were the extended families of all known Mazepists.

But simultaneously with these intimidating measures, the Tsar applied a soft approach to the Ukrainian elite. In the first week of November, Peter I instructed his commanders “to summon cour­teously as many of the colonels and Starshyna as possible... for the completely free election of a new hetman which will be conducted according to their ancient rights and privileges.”⁴ On 11 Novem­ber, at Hlukhiv, the Starshyna elected Ivan Skoropadskyi, the aged colonel of Starodub, as their Hetman. Because of Skoropadskyi’s formerly close ties with Mazepa, the Tsar was not pleased with the selection, but, not wishing to irritate the loyal starshyna, accepted their choice.⁵ Immediately after the victory at Poltava, however, the old Malorossiiskii prikaz method of supervising the Hetman was altered. On 29 July 1709, a permanent Russian resident (initially he was called a minister in order to give him greater authority in dealing with the Hetman) was assigned to the Hetman’s court. The first such official, the stolnik, A. Ismailov, was accompanied by a small staff and one, sometimes two, dragoon regiments.

Ismailov brought along two sets of instructions, one formal and the other secret.⁶ In the former set of instructions, the resident was ordered to be at the side of Skoropadskyi, “for the sake of the Great Gosudarⁱs affairs and counsels... and, together with the Gospodin Hetman... to see to it that the entire Little Russian land remains calm and loyal to the Great Gosudar. ”⁷ Furthermore, Ismailov was told to observe all of the Hetman’s foreign contacts, to receive with the Hetman, all messengers and letters from abroad, to send copies of these letters to the Tsar, and under no circumstances to allow the Hetman to reply to these letters without the Tsar’s orders. Mean­while, in his secret instructions, the resident was enjoined to “ob­serve most carefully that neither the Hetman nor the Starshyna and the colonels evince any inclination to treason or agitation of the masses.”⁸ In case of need, Ismailov was informed that he could use the Russian regiments in Ukraine at his own discretion. This, however, is getting ahead of the flow of events. It should be pointed out again that before the Battle of Poltava Peter I, while punishing the clearly identifiable supporters of Mazepa, was careful not to give the impression that he planned to limit Ukrainian rights and privileges.