Peter Woroby The Role of the City in Ukrainian History

A. Scope of the Problem

The common feature of the three papers presented is the subject of urbanization in Ukraine with special emphasis on the role of the major urban centres.

The role of the city is highly diversified; it includes economic (commercial, industrial), cultural and administrative-political functions. Measured by this yardstick, Herlihy^,s paper is most satisfactory in its scope, though there is perhaps too much stress δn the economic development and not enough on ethno-political activity. The latter criticism is particularly valid for the city of Lviv. Guthief and Szporluk focus on the political-national aspects of urbanization."' Both writers support their findings with numerous demographical-statistical data and omit discussion of the economic and cultural performance.

The historical periodization of the analysed subject is quite acceptable.

B. General Comments

All three papers lack a definition of urban centres, which was the subject of significant variation throughout the analysed period. This statement is valid not only for the transition of pre-revolutionary Russia into the political structure of the USSR but also within both systems.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the legal status of urban centres applied to settlements, “residents of which had a right to trade according to the urban privilege and which were inhabited by persons with urban occupation.”¹ Here belonged cities (mista), towns (mistechka) and a few special settlements (posady) and suburbs (peredmistia). In 1858 the Russian territory of Ukraine possessed 113 cities, 547 towns and 12 other urban localities. Their combined population amounted to 2,564,000 which was equivalent to 21.4 per cent of the total population in 1863.² The urban population was evenly split between cities and towns.³ By 1897, the year of the first imperial census, the urban population of Ukraine had almost doubled without altering its relative weight (21.3 per cent). This was caused by a significant decline in the number of towns (reduced to 463) which were administratively denied urban status; at the same time there were no actual additions to the category of cities (total number 114). Significant changes in reclassification, however, occurred in the period that followed. Thus in 1913 only cities were considered as urban centres, the number of which had increased to 139, while all remaining towns were thrown into the rural category.

The Soviet regime brought additional alterations to the urban concept, some of which were diametrically opposed to the previously existing scheme. Spread over a period of time and continuously modified, it classified the urban communities into cities and towns, the latter officially called “settlements with urban character.” To become “urban” the community was required to have a minimum of five hundred persons (later raised to one thousand), half of whom should be employed in non-agricultural activities (later raised to 60 per cent). The city, in turn, had to have a higher minimum population (two thousand persons) and a higher percentage of non-agricultural occupations (75 per cent).⁵ These changes were reflected in the 1926 census, which re-established 402 settlements as “urban,” abrogated the privilege of cities to forty-seven centres and elevated seven settlements to the rank of city.⁶

It is obvious that administrative changes of urban status which are applicable to both periods must affect the material results—the number of urban centres and their population. This issue becomes further complicated when one considers the size of the comparable territory (Ukraine in imperial Russia, Ukraine in the USSR before 1939 and present-day Ukraine). The adjustment in urban definitions will still produce a general variation for each specific political constituency.

Similarly, one has to be careful in assessing the effects of urban growth. It includes not only the natural increase in the population of the existing urban centres but also the transfer into the urban category (upgrading) of some rural settlements. Depending on the circumstances of the general development and regional conditions, the share of the latter component could be quite significant. For example, in the period between 1959 and 1970, which was marked by the growth of already established urban centres, the increase of 6.5 million in urban population consisted of 2.5 million persons attributed to natural growth, 3.0 million rural-urban migrants and 1.0 million persons identified with the reclassification of the existing communities.⁷

Another aspect common to all three papers is the frequent reference to the ethno-national composition of urban centres.

Historical evidence and common sense suggest that this is a very dangerous inference which does not always hold true. Many Russian-speaking Ukrainians joined the ranks of the nationally conscious Ukrainians and supported their goals. This was the case during the 1917-20 struggle for independence and in the successive Soviet period. If one considers mastering the Ukrainian language a dominant criterion of national identity, then one would have to strike out of this group some illustrious exponents of the Ukrainian political movement. It is no secret that Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky and General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko spoke with heavy Russian accents even in the late years of their exemplary lives. It is also known that prominent emigre Ukrainian scholars conversed in Russian among themselves to facilitate technical communication.

The third issue recurring in all three papers is that of the Russification of Ukraine and particularly of her urban centres. Before discussing this problem in detail one should consider its general magnitude and significance. The reference to the relatively high ratio of Ukrainians in the republic (74.9 per cent in 1970; 76.8 per cent in 1959 and 80.0 per cent in 1926) does not reflect the true effects of Russification since it applies to varying territorial dimensions and minority group compositions.’ Focusing on the Russian ethnic group, one obtains entirely different results: a tremendous increase in the Russian population, from 2,978,000 persons in 1926 to 9,126,000 in 1970.

C. Specific Aspects

1) Patricia Herlihy

While one should not quarrel with the author's choice of a monographic method, which can be regarded as a suitable and powerful medium of presentation, one may have certain reservations regarding her selection of analysed centres. There is no dissension regarding the inclusion of such principal centres of Ukraine as Kiev, Kharkiv, Odessa and Lviv. One only wonders about the accidental or deliberate omission of Katerynoslav (Dnipropetrovske), which was the fourth ranking centre of Ukraine at the end of the nineteenth century with a population of 218,000 in 1912. It might also have been advisable to have substituted Iuzivka (Donetske) for Luhanske (Voroshylovhrad) in view of the contemporary size of this centre. Historically, both these places were resource-based—“one factory” towns—experiencing approximately the same pattern of economic development.

The other point that can be questioned is the role of industry as a city-building factor. Although its favourable effect cannot be denied, there is insufficient support for the thesis that “industry played a greater role than trade in the urbanization process.” With the exception of the mining towns of Luhanske and Yuzivka, the remaining centres appear to have derived their primary strength from commercial, administrative and cultural activities. An above average contribution of industry was only evident in the growth of Katerynoslav. The majority of manufacturing in the major cities belonged to the category of food processing (sugar refineries, flour mills), which can be successfully performed in various plant sizes.

The third problem requiring additional qualifications is that of urban-rural migration and closely related Russification. There is a widespread belief that the Ukrainians disliked the urban life and preferred the rural occupations (farming), and that this created a vacuum in urban development which has been filled by Russian immigrants. Although there might be a grain of truth in this generalization, the economic conditions in nineteenth-century cities were such that they could not absorb the surplus population from rural areas. This was simply a matter of the quantitative gap between supply and demand and the insufficient development of industries in urban centres, as a consequence of which the Ukrainian peasants had to look for agricultural employment in the virgin lands of Siberia or North America.

If there were “vacancies” in the urban sphere they were in occupations for which the rural residents were not adequately qualified (civil servants, clergy, educators and military men). There is no doubt that a significant number of people in this group, particularly in higher ranks, were transplanted Russians. In total, the urban-rural mobility, inclusive of non-autochthonous elements, was not very significant. The 1897 census reveals the following about the birthplace of urban residents. What is noteworthy in this tabulation is the relatively high level of local

TABLE I. BIRTHPLACE OF URBAN RESIDENTS IN 1897

source: A. 1. Dotsenko, ⁿHeohrafichni osoblyvosti ρrotsesiv Urbanizatsii na Ukraini (xix-xx st.),” Ukrainskyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk 2 (Kiev, 1972), 47.

residents (the first two categories which comprise 81.2 per cent) and the low level of immigrants from other provinces (17.2 per cent). The latter figure is not identical with the inflow of Russians since it also includes urban newcomers from Ukrainian territory. Without minimizing the effect of Russification during the pre-revolutionary era, one should point to the magnitude of the changes that occurred thirty years later. Thus in the census year 1926 the number of urban dwellers born outside the boundaries of the Ukrainian republic assumed the enormous proportion of 40.9 per cent and in the mining region of Donetske (the Donets basin) it reached 57.3 per cent.¹⁰

2) Steven L. Guthier

This is a penetrating, analytical paper which focuses its attention on the ethno-political role of Ukrainian cities. It discusses the chosen subject within a framework of the general aspects of urbanization such as the regional development and the effect of community sizes. The economic development of the cities, however, has not been adequately stressed. The assessment of urban problems in the decade preceding the Second World War can also be criticized. It comprises less than one-fifth of the paper and does not reach the depth of presentation which applies to the period of the First World War and the succeeding years.

There is an interesting interpretation of the decrease of Ukrainian population in cities during the Civil War. The author attributes this to the general decline of urban population caused by “the food shortages, unemployment and political insecurity which plagued the cities from 1918 to 1921.” He concludes that “hundreds of thousands of people sought relief in the countryside” and since the Ukrainians had “rural” roots in the surrounding area the “outflow was particularly heavy among Ukrainian nationals.” Accepting this line of reasoning, one should understand why the percentage of Ukrainians in Kiev dropped from 16.4 in 1917 to 14.3 in 1920, since the general population declined from around 470,000 to approximately 365,000. The author also refers to the significant reduction of the Ukrainian proportion between 1897 and 1917 (from 22.2 to 16.4 per cent). He attributes it to “the dual effects of relatively small-scale Ukrainian influx to Kiev and the Russification of Ukrainians who did settle there.” In other words the Ukrainians in Kiev were losers under both conditions of city growth and decline. In documenting statements of this kind with statistical figures, the author forgets to mention that there was also a decline between 1913, when the city reached a peak of 600,000 persons, and 1917. Had it been war-induced and characterized by a disproportionate exodus of Ukrainians into rural areas, then it would have started from a higher level of Ukrainian participation than 16.4 per cent. This, in turn, indicates that the Russification of Ukrainians during the urban growth was not as intense as the speaker suggests.

The paper contains a very revealing ethno-political analysis of the municipal election in Kiev in 1917. It shows that Ukrainian parties received 20.8 per cent of the total civil vote. This was, no doubt, a very favourable outcome when one recalls that the Ukrainian population in the city amounted only to 16.4 per cent, a quarter of which regarded them­selves as “Little Russians.” The author does not interpret further this very interesting phenomenon which reveals that there were numerous Russian-speaking Ukrainians who supported the aspirations of the “national” Ukrainians. In other words, the Ukrainian population by ethnic origin must have considerably exceeded the linguistic group and, contrary to the prevailing opinion, was not yet politically assimilated. At the time when it counted most, this group returned to the ethno-national fold. This conclusion appears to be very probable since it is doubtful that the Russian nationals, or other minority groups that identified their interests with those of the dominant Russian nation, voted for Ukrainian parties. Further, the above results do not take into account the fact that some Ukrainians must have also supported the rising Bolshevik movement, or other Russian parties.

In addition to the linguistic enumeration, the 1926 census introduced the identification by ethnic origin. This considerably increased the number of Ukrainians in urban centres (specifically, from 36.0 to 47.3 per cent). It also showed that out of four persons who regarded themselves as Ukrainian three had a full command of the Ukrainian language. In four principal centres, Kiev, Odessa, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovske, which comprised 29.4 per cent of the total urban population, the share of the Ukrainian population was considerably lower (33.8 per cent) and so was the ratio of the Ukrainian-speaking nationals to their ethnic brothers who used Russian as a language of communication (approximately a 2:1 ratio).

Accepting the linguistic classification as a suitable basis for historical evaluation, the author reaches the conclusion that between 1897 and 1926 there was little change in the ethnic composition of urban centres. The cor­responding figures for the urban Ukrainian population in 1926 and 1897 are virtually the same, 36.0 and 35.1 per cent. The results are not surprising; owing to the war, there was little urban growth over the thirty years. Although Soviet statistics show an apparent increase (5,359,000 versus 2,696,000 persons, equivalent to 18.5 versus 13.0 per cent), the re­sults are not conclusive. One should recall the fact that the Soviets have considerably widened the definition of urban centres to include many rural communities (previously disregarded towns and newly industrializing villages). The Ukrainians recorded gains, however, in the centres that experienced the growth. Thus, the four principal cities mentioned above, which increased their population from 938,000 in 1897 to 1,578,000 in 1926, indicate a strengthening of the Ukrainian-speaking element from 16.6 to 21.0 per cent.

The significant changes in the ethnic composition of urban centres must have occurred in the 1930s, which were characterized by tremendous urban growth (33.5 per cent urban population in 1939) and in the postwar period (45.7 per cent in 1959). Unfortunately, the author does not discuss and document these effects thoroughly. Relating the 1926 to 1959 data the number of Ukrainians in urban centres increased from 47.3 to 61.5 per cent. This development was also accompanied by an improvement in the proportion of the Ukrainian-speaking population which moved from a 3:1 ratio (36.0 per cent) to a 6:1 relationship (52.1 per cent).

3) Roman Szporluk

The author presents a well-researched and documented paper. He differs from the others in that he deals with contemporary problems and is able to emphasize current trends and prognosticate future development. His generalizations, which are bold and thought-provoking, contain much subjective judgment. There are some shortcomings in the arrangement of the statistical material and in its evaluation. For example, the absolute numbers that supply the basis for the author’s calculations are often omit­ted and the rates of change, based on actual growth, are listed in the tables that show the structural composition.

The paper shows the ethno-political effects of urbanization in the 1959-70 period. When the urban proportion of the population advanced to 54.5 per cent in 1970 the Ukrainian representation was 62.9 per cent, an increase of only 1.4 points over the eleven year period. Linguistically, it maintained the same relations as in the year 1959 (52.1 per cent). Obviously, the above figures are aggregate results subject to local variations. The author exemplifies this by the suitable choice of two contrasting regions, namely the oblasts of Kiev and Lviv on one hand, and Donetske and Voroshylovhrad on the other. They comprise urban and rural population. Table 2 consolidates and rearranges his findings.

TABLE 2. ASSIMILATION OF UKRAINIAN POPULATION IN SELECTED REGIONS OF UKRAINE (PERCENTAGES)

The above figures show the weakening of the Ukrainian element in the Donets basin and the growth of its strength in Western Ukraine. This over­all trend was accelerated among Ukrainian-speaking nationals and decelerated in the Russian-speaking group (erroneously designated by the author as non-assimilated and assimilated Ukrainians).

Results of this kind cause the author to pose the question: which one of the two models of development will prevail in the future? He is optimistically excited about the positive changes in the West, particularly with the national rebirth of the capital city (an increase of the “unassimilated” Ukrainians from 43.2 per cent in 1959 to 50.1 per cent in 1970 and a decrease of “assimilated” Ukrainians from 16.9 per cent in 1959 to 14.6 per cent in 1970). This can be attributed, according to the author, to the westward expansion of the Ukrainian SSR with its ethnically homogeneous Ukrainian hinterland and to the role of Kiev as a political, cultural and educational centre.

While one can hardly disagree with the author’s arguments and conclusions, the paper leaves out one important aspect of the urban analysis, i.e., direct effects of Russification. This problem contains more

than the question of assimilation, it is concerned with the distribution and growth of Russian immigrants who were selectively directed into specific areas of Ukraine.

The heaviest concentration of Russians in 1970 was in the Donets basin, where they accounted for 41.0 per cent of the total population (the Ukrainian share was 53.7 per cent). It is also worthwhile to note that they experienced a very high gain in the 1926-70 period, from the original 26.1 per cent. Adjoining this area are the three industrial oblasts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovske and Zaporizhzhia. Their Russian population of 25.7 per cent exceeded the republic’s average of 19.4 per cent; it approached 30.0 per cent in the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts and declined to some 20.0 per cent in the oblast of Dnipropetrovske. The salutary fact in this relationship is the relatively high number of Ukrainians in the three oblasts (69.7 per cent) although the Russian ethnic group experienced a signifi­cant growth from 16.0 per cent in 1926.

The third settlement zone of Russians is the Black Sea region which is anchored between two strongholds: the Crimean peninsula and the city of Odessa. In the Crimea in 1970 the Russians commanded an absolute majority of 67.3 per cent, a significant increase from 42.2 per cent in 1926. The Ukrainians, who amounted to 26.5 per cent, also showed a definite strengthening (from 10.8 per cent in 1926). Both groups were beneficiaries of the decline in the Tatar population which was expelled from the territory in the postwar years. The Russians in the urban and rural centres of Odessa oblast made up 24.2 per cent of the population whereas the Ukrainians were more than twice as strong (55.0 per cent). The latter started from a relatively strong basis in 1926 (17.0 per cent) with a more than adequate growth. The two oblasts, Kherson and Mykolaiv, positioned between the Crimea and Odessa regions, recorded 18.1 per cent and 16.1 per cent of Russians respectively, with relatively large Ukrainian populations (78.3 and 78.9 per cent). What is important, however, is the healthy increase of the Russian population (1926 basis being 11.4 and 9.0 per cent) in the sparsely settled region; the total population of these two oblasts barely exceeds two million.

Summarizing, one finds that in the specified area, which comprises slightly less than one-half of the republic’s population (46.6 per cent), the proportion of Russians (urban and rural) is one-third (33.4 per cent). The remaining half of Ukraine (53.4 per cent), in turn, possesses only 7.1 per cent Russian settlers. Within this territory Kiev oblast records 14.0 per cent while Western Ukraine, which was annexed in 1939-45, has only 5.1 per cent.

This situation does not show any signs of improvement at the present. A careful examination of the data for the 1959-70 period reveals the intensive effort to Russify the population by increasing Russian immigration into the traditionally established areas. Thus, the increase in the republic’s population, which amounted to 5,257,000, included 38.7 per cent Russians—which is twice as strong as their present status (19.4 per cent). Differentiating this inflow by spheres of influence, the Russians made up 49.2 per cent of the population increases in the Donets basin, industrial Dnieper and Black Sea regions and 17.9 per cent (less than one-half the ratio of the overall participation in the incremental growth) in the remaining areas. In the relatively neglected territories the highest pro­portion of Russians was in Kiev oblast (23.2 per cent) and the lowest in Western Ukraine (4.5 per cent).

One can conclude from this that the relative strengthening of the Ukrainian element in the West, although very positive in itself, was accompanied by a deliberate attempt to ease the pressure of RussiBcation in these areas. This could well have been a temporary delay, caused, as some people argue, by the shortage of labour in other areas of the USSR. Whatever reasoning one may assume, one cannot deny that the emigration of Russians into Ukraine was carefully planned and directed into the strategically important territories. This trend, if continued, will have the effect of amputating and choking the traditional spheres of Ukrainian influence by depriving them of the resources in the Donets basin and denying access to the Black Sea.

Szporluk’s paper brings forward another interesting subject, the strengthening of Kiev as a primate centre within a framework of urban hierarchy. This is an undeniable and welcome development. The economic reach of Kiev ranges between four and five hundred kilometres and can be circumscribed by the location of such cities as Minsk in Belorussia and Lviv, Odessa and Dnipropetrovske in Ukraine. In the East the correspond­ing counterpart could be found in the city of Kharkiv, which in the past was abnormally large and formed its own narrowly spaced system (two to three hundred kilometres wide) with the subordinate centres of Dnipropetrovske, Donetske and Voronezh. The latter city is located outside the ethnic and political boundaries of Ukraine. Thus, Ukraine inherited a twin hierarchy that persisted for some time and only started to diminish significantly in the years following the Second World War. Its traces are still visible and will likely remain, although this is not the author’s opinion. The judgments here can vary considerably. What is important is that the full emergence of primacy might not be regarded as politically desirable. The accelerated growth of Kiev and the relative stagnation of Kharkiv would weaken the hierarchical ties in Eastern Ukraine. This could adversely affect the city of Donetske which, while maintaining its role as a secondary centre, would become appended to the capital city through the city of similar rank. The functioning of Dnipropetrovske would not be altered much because of its proximity to Kiev.

4) Conclusion

Critically appraising the last two papers, one has to mention some important omissions such as reference to the slower pace of urbanization in Ukraine when compared with the Russian republic, which is 7.8 percentage points ahead (54.5 versus 62.3 per cent in 1970); uneven distri­bution of urban centres in Ukraine that is characterized by a very strong concentration in the Donets basin and Dnieper regions and lack of urban development in Western Ukraine which can be delineated by a Kiev-Odessa axis; and the insufficient number and strength of two categories of the medium-sized centres, one with the population of 50,000-100,000 persons and the other with 20,000-50,000 persons.¹¹

Most of the discussion (this is also to some extent true of the first paper) has been devoted to the ethno-political problems which were covered in considerable depth. One can hardly repudiate the well documented findings, although one may disagree with the authors’ interpretations. The Russian-speaking Ukrainians are not “assimilated” Ukrainians yet, and their role as such has been quantitatively and qualitatively exaggerated.

All the papers have failed to stress the direct effect of RussiHcation which, as pointed out above, represents a real danger to the Ukrainian nation. To illustrate the practical implication of this process one should step outside the USSR and refer to the political pronouncements of the anti-communist Russian exiles. Recently, in his third volume of The Gulag Archipelago, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, donning the robe of magnanimity, suggests a local referendum regarding the separation of Ukraine from Russia.¹² Curiously enough he confines his proposal to the present political boundaries of Ukraine (excluding ethnic territories outside these limits), and moreover he advocates the tabulation of votes for individual oblasts. By following this procedure he expects and hopes that some of them, par­ticularly those located east of the Dnieper, will decide to stay within Russia. Obviously, moral issues aside, he would not endorse such a project if he could not refer to the significant number of Russians in this area.

Notes

1. A. I. Dotsenko, ^uHeohrafichni osoblyvosti protsesiv Urbanizatsii na Ukraini (XIX-XX st.),” in Ukrainskyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk 2 (Kiev 1972), 47.

2. Ibid., 50.

3. According to Dotsenko (page 49), in 1858 the applicable proportions were as follows: inhabitants of cities 47.4 per cent, towns 50.3 per cent, other urban areas 2.3 per cent.

4. Ibid., 50.

5. Akademiia Nauk UkRSR, Ukrainska Radianska Entsyklopediia (Kiev, 1959-65), 9: 238-40, 13: 33; Entsykopediia narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrainskoi RSR (Kiev, 1972), 4: 50.

6. Dotsenko, ^uHeohrafichni osoblyvosti,” 57.

7. Radianska Ukraina, no. 94 (1971): 2.

8. See Szporluk’s paper.

9. Present-day Ukraine with considerably reduced Polish, German and Jewish minorities and the Ukrainian republic in 1926 without the Crimea and Western Ukraine.

10. Dotsenko, ^uHeohrafichni osoblyvosti,” 51.

11. For details, see P. Woroby, “Effects of Urbanization in the Ukraine,” The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States 13, no. 35-60 (1973-7): 51-115.

12. A. I. Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation, trans. H. Willets, 3 vols. (New York, 1976), 3: 46.