Reconstruction

Four years of the most destructive war in history left the Soviet Union with the colossal task of economic reconstruction. Industrial production in Ukraine in 1945, for example, was only 26% of the 1940 level.

As in the 1930s, the fourth Five-Year Plan produced uneven results. In heavy industry, which received 85% of investment, the reconstruction effort was remarkably successful. By 1950 the industrial output of Ukraine was 15% higher than in 1940. In Western Ukraine, which had practically no heavy industry before the war, progress was especially impressive: by 1950 the industrial output of the region rose by 230%. In the 1950s Ukraine once again became one of the leading industrial countries of Europe. It produced more pig iron per capita than did Great Britain, West Germany, and France (only West Germany smelted more steel), and it mined almost as much coal as West Germany. But although Ukrainian industry became even stronger than it had been before the war, its share of total Soviet production declined because the new industrial centers that had arisen beyond the Urals grew at an even faster rate.

More and bigger factories, however, did not lead to a significant improvement in the standard of living. The traditional Soviet neglect of consumer goods reached such extremes that the purchase of a pair of shoes, a tooth-brush, or even a loaf of bread was fraught with difficulty. By 1950 light industry had reached only 80% of its prewar level. Buying consumer goods became even more difficult because of a currency “reform” in 1947 that devalued the ruble and wiped out personal savings.

Nowhere were the failings of the reconstruction effort more evident than in agriculture, a chronic weak point of the Soviet economy. True, with the loss of most of the livestock and equipment during the war, agriculture was damaged to an even greater degree than industry. But the low priority it was accorded by Soviet planners and the counterproductive agricultural policies applied by Soviet officials greatly impeded improvements in the countryside. To make matters worse, there was a catastrophic drought in 1946 and, for the third time under Soviet rule, Ukrainian peasants experienced famine.

Despite its obvious and chronic problems, Soviet leaders were committed to restoring collectivization and even intensifying it. In 1946 steps were taken to take back from the peasants the land and equipment they had managed to “privatize” during the war. The next year, Nikita Khrushchev first launched in Ukraine, the Soviet Union’s agricultural laboratory, an ambitious project to solve agricultural problems. It called for the consolidation of small collective farms into huge “agrocities” that, in theory, would make most efficient use of the very scarce farm machinery, while providing the approximately 5000 inhabitants with all the amenities of city life. The project also called for the elimination of the private garden plots on which peasants had grown much of their food. Finally, it promised to give the regime even greater control over the rural population. But the proposed elimination of their tiny but crucial plots was too much for the peasants: so widespread were their passive resistance and vocal protests that the government had to drop the “agro-city” scheme.

The Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) weathered the war suprisingly well, although, at the outset of the conflict, its condition was grim indeed. Much of the onus for the early defeats, mistakes, and staggering losses was laid at the feet of the party, resulting in a drastic decline in its prestige and authority. Mobilization and casualties reduced the number of Ukraine’s Communists from over 600,000 in 1940 to less than 200,000 in 1945. Most had been evacuated during the Soviet retreat so that only about 15,000 actually remained in Ukraine during much of the war. However, as Soviet fortunes improved, so also did those of Ukraine’s Communists.

A striking characteristic of the party members, especially their leadership, who concentrated on Ukrainian affairs during the war, was the strong sense of solidarity they developed. To a great extent this effect was a result of the camaraderie that flourished in the ranks of the partisan movement that many of them had organized and led. This close-knit coterie of Ukraine’s top Communists was often called the “Partisan clan” and many of them later became members of the Ukrainian “mafias” associated with Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

After the war, as Communists returned from military service or evacuation and as new recruits poured in, the party’s membership in Ukraine shot up again, and by 1950 it was over 700,000. Still, the number of Communists in Ukraine remained comparatively low: only 20 out of 1000 people belonged to the party, while the all-union average was 30 out of 1000. Significant changes also occurred in the CPU’s ethnic composition. Anxious to be part of the victorious Soviet regime, ambitious Ukrainians showed a greater interest than ever in joining the party.

The Ukrainian Communists may have been pleased with their quick resurgence after the war, but Stalin expected more of them. Compared to that of other areas of the Soviet Union, Ukraine’s industrial reconstruction had progressed slowly; its all-important agricultural sector was in catastrophic condition, and nationalism, especially in Western Ukraine, was far from extinguished. Therefore, in March 1947, Stalin again dispatched his troubleshooter Kaganovich to replace Khrushchev as leader of the CPU. Apparently the unpopular Kaganovich had little success and Nikita Khrushchev, who, although a Russian, exhibited some signs of local patriotism, returned to Kiev once more.

On the governmental level, the most noteworthy effect of the war was the unexpected – although very limited – emergence of Ukraine on the international stage. At Stalin’s insistence, in April 1945, Ukraine and Belorussia, along with the USSR, were included among the forty-seven founding states of the United Nations. It is commonly accepted that the main reason for Stalin’s position was his desire to obtain extra votes in the UN (originally he had demanded that each of the sixteen Soviet republics have a vote). However, there are indications that the move was also Stalin’s way of responding to the Ukrainians’ pride in their role in defeating Nazi Germany.

In evaluating the potential significance of Ukraine’s international exposure, Yaroslav Bilinsky writes: “The international representation of the Ukrainian SSR, complete with anthem, national flag, and foreign minister undoubtedly belongs to the category of Soviet constitutional trappings… Should the regime prove successful in emasculating Ukrainian nationalism, no constitutional provisions will be able to reinvigorate it. Should it fail in doing so, such colorful trappings as an international representation will provide food for thought and, under favorable circumstances, may also provide a spark for action.”²