THE CAMPAIGN’S DISASTROUS CONCLUSION
The historiography of the Cossack period abounds in descriptions of situations in which, at a decisive point, the Tatars suddenly abandoned their Cossack allies, often pillaging their lands and families in the wake of their retreat.
Explanations of such events are customarily presented in terms of treachery or betrayal on the part of the Khan or some other Tatar leader. Although often valid, such explanations are incomplete. One reason for this is that the internal problems of the Tatars themselves were never taken into account.In analyzing the case at hand, one must realize that there were conflicts of interest at work within the Tatar camp itself. While there is no doubt that Devlet Girei was interested in the success of the offensive and that, as far as military cooperation was concerned, his commitments to the Cossacks were genuine, the Khan—even a strong one like Devlet Girei—was unable to guarantee a similar attitude on the part of the leading mirzas and the nomadic Nogai clans.41 Thus, the Khan and his son, Sultan Mehmet, realized that, from the point of view of the Khanate’s political interests, they should support Orlyk and seek the good faith of the Ukrainian populace. However, the leaders of the Tatar and especially the Nogai clans had narrower and more concrete interests. Their authority and position depended on their ability to lead their followers to booty and iasyr, the staples of the Tatar and Nogai economy.
The campaign of 1711 came at the end of a long and economically difficult period for the Tatars.42 A principal reason why the combined Tatar and Nogai participation in the campaign was so great (well over 100,000 men) was their need for booty and iasyr. Optimally, they would have preferred to take this booty from the Russians and their Ukrainian allies. But, if this proved t∞ difficult, the Tatars were easily tempted to seek compensation for their services by turning on the Ukrainian population within their reach, regardless of whether it had sided with Orlyk or not.
Apparently, the leaders of the Nogais who constituted the majority of the Mehmet Sultan’s Horde, first applied pressure on the Sultan to guarantee them some profit from the campaign.43 The latter referred them to Orlyk who had the unpleasant experience of hearing the following question presented by a certain BeubekAga: “Should there be no gain (from the campaign) will it not be possible to take as iasyr the townspeople of Berdychiv and other (towns) as well as those in the vicinity of Kiev? ”44 Muratca Aga, the vizir of Mehmet Sultan, and Cantimir Mirza were even more insistent in demanding, in open negation of the recent treaty, that the Hetman assign them several Ukrainian towns to pillage as recompense for their military aid.
In desperation, Orlyk pointed out the promises which the Khan had made before Charles XII that only the enemy would be taken as iasyr and that the taking of Ukrainian captives was expressly forbidden by the treaty. These arguments did not make an impression on the mirzas. In fact, the Tatars’ own position was becoming more precarious. Their horses were exhausted by the fast pace of the offensive and they had great difficulties in obtaining provisions for them. Even worse, the thaw was due, bringing with it mud and rising rivers which would rob them of their strongest weapon— their mobility. In addition, news arrived that strong Russian reinforcements were on the way. The mιrzas again applied pressure on the young Sultan, demanding that he order a retreat. According to Nordberg, the Sultan then summoned Orlyk and Potocki and informed them that, although he personally wanted to continue the operation, it was impossible to force his troops to do so since they were accustomed to campaigns of no more than three months’ duration. In order to appease Orlyk and Potocki somewhat, the Sultan promised to leave 6,000 men behind with the allies. Within two or three days, however, this number dwindled to fewer than 2,000 men and no responsible Tatar leader could be found to lead them. Orlyk later described this episode more melodramatically, stating that the Sultan had fled incognito during the night, without breaking his ride until he reached the Boh River.45
It was during this withdrawal that the Tatars tossed aside their promises and obligations to the Cossacks and commenced wholesale l∞ting and taking of iasyr, precisely in those areas from which most of Orlyk’s support had come.
In the political, military and personal sense, this was a moment of deep anguish and disillusionment for Orlyk. In a report sent to Charles at this time, the genuinely humane and deeply pious Hetman described the catastrophe: The Tatars ravaged churches, turning some of them into stalls for their horses. They raped young girls, killing and robbing their parents. From the Dniester to the River Ros they took priests, Cossacks, women and children into captivity, leading them off to the Bucak, Bilhorod and Nogai steppe. Then, from the Ros River to the Dnieper and Teterev Rivers, they destroyed all the large and small towns even though some of them had the Hetman’s guarantees of safety. In the town of Hermanivka, which exhibited all three universals from Orlyk, the Sultan and Potocki, a miτza called Canibeg perpetrated a great calamity. Although he was greeted by the townspeople as a friend, he attacked them and took more than 5,000 captives. The districts of Uman, Kalnyk and Targytsia wek also completely devastated, while those of Korsun and Bratslav escaped with partial damage.46 Even the members of Orlyk’s chancellery were not safe. He complained that Tatars had kidnapped three boys from it and, at the time of writing, he had managed to get only two of them back. Also, some Polish envoys, carrying letters from Wisniowiecki to Charles XII, were captured and Orlyk and Potocki managed to free them only with the greatest of difficulty.47It was not only to Charles XII that the Hetman presented his
protests; he also directed them to the highest Muslim authority— the Ottoman Sultan, Ahmet III. On 3 July, the Sultan responded favorably to the Hetman’s grievances.48 In an edict sent to Mehmet Pasha, the serasker of Bender, Sultan Ahmet first emphasized the friendly reception which the Cossacks had given the Tatars and then, after severely reprimanding the Tatars for their actions, he ordered the serasker to return all the Ukrainian captives found in Bender, Kilia, Ismail and Bilhorod to their homes.
By then, however, it was much too late to salvage the political and military advantages which had been lost.As the Cossacks rushed back to protect their homes and families from the Tatars, Orlyk’s army, which had been so quickly and impressively swollen by the great numbers of Right Bank Cossacks who had joined it, dissolved just as quickly. Again Orlyk was left with the three or four thousand Zaporozhians with which he had started. In contrast to their previously gloomy messages, Russian officials reported with satisfaction that not only the Cossacks, but even the peasants had turned against the Tatars.49 Justasearlieron the Left Bank, Orlyk was blamed for the terrible depredations of his allies on the Right Bank. For many decades thereafter, especially in the towns and settled areas of the Right Bank, Orlyk’s name was associated with all the unpleasant memories linked with the Horde.50 Obviously, in the eyes of the Ukrainian population, the cause and political alternatives represented by the Hetman and his fellow emigres suffered irreparable damage. By the same token, this disaster could not but have had a profound effect on Orlyk himself, on his future political plans and on his attitudes toward his Muslim allies. Indeed, the coming period of Orlyk’s relations with the Khan and his Ottoman suzerain would reveal the bitter fruits of this experience.