THE ALLIED CAMPAIGN OF 1711
The winter campaign, so imaginatively planned by Charles XII, was launched near the end of January.32 The Khan, Ieadinga force of about 50,000 men (among whom were several hundred Zaporo- zhians), set out from the Crimea, moved along the lower Dnieper and then swerved towards Kharkiv.
The Tatars met with little resistance. In fact, some towns in the Hetmanate handed over their Russian garrisons to the invaders and welcomed them with the traditional bread and salt.33 However, just before reaching Kharkiv, the Khan abruptly ordered his men back to the Crimea. Apparently, the Tatars feared that the deep snows and the possibility of a sudden thaw might paralyze their cavalry. Therefore, the Horde retreated without having come close to Voronezh, its main objective.The raid led by the Sultan of Kuban, one of Devlet Girei’s sons, was quite similar both in its progress and its results. No attempt was made to capture Azov, the major objective of this action. It seems that, in both cases, it was Charles XII who made a crucial error in assigning the capture of strong fortresses to light Tatar cavalry, a task for which the Tatars were totally unsuited. They were, however, eminently successful in performing the secondary objective of the raid—pillaging the land.34 In fact, in their enthusiasm, they not only ravaged Russian territories but also did much damage within the Hetmanate, especially in the Poltava regiment. Apart from the fact that little military benefit derived from the pillage, Russian propaganda saw to it that the blame for it devolved on Orlyk.
Meanwhile, that part of the offensive on which Charles XII and his allies had placed their greatest hopes—the force of 20-30,000 Bucak Tatars and Nogais under Sultan Mehmet combined with about 3,000 Zaporozhians led by Orlyk, and 2-3,000 Poles commanded by Potocki—set out from the vicinity of Bender on 31 January.35 Unlike their compatriots operating to the east, this force produced some very encouraging successes as it pushed into Right- Bank Ukraine during the month of February.
Charles XII had hoped that this thrust into the Right Bank would, first of all, rouse the Poles to open support of Stanislaw. But this did not happen. Orlyk, on the other hand, began to draw very impressive popular support right from the beginning of his incursion into ethnically Ukrainian territories. Evidently, after Mazepa’s debacle, Charles XII was somewhat skeptical about the ability of Mazepa’s successor to mobilize popular support. Therefore, it was not without some surprise that all sides, including Peter I, began to note that almost all of Right-Bank Ukraine was joining Orlyk and his allies.36 Orlyk proudly reported to the Swedish King that his forces had increased more than five-fold.37 And, indeed, entire regiments of Right Bank Cossacks were moving to join him.Although the Hetman, especially in later and less fortunate moments in his life, was guilty of grossly exaggerating the size of his army at this point, there is no doubt that his chances l∞ked very good at this stage of the campaign. Several factors induced the populace to support or at least tolerate Orlyk. Dissatisfaction with the Russian military administration and with its Cossack appointees was widespread, and the Russians had had little time to entrench themselves in the area.38 In addition, theallies’ propaganda had clearly had at least some effect. Moreover, at Orlyk’s constant urging, the allies, especially the Tatars, managed for the moment to restrain their tr∞ps from antagonizing the inhabitants of the area, as the Russian garrisons had done earlier.
The impact of these early successes was great, particularly on Orlyk. For the first time, the followers of Mazepa had succeeded in mobilizing the masses even though their success was limited to areas outside the Hetmanate. This fact would be used by Orlyk in the future as concrete proof of his allegations that Ukraine wished and always had wished to break away from Moscow. At the same time, it strengthened Orlyk’s position among his allies, giving him leverage to maneuver more independently in the unexpected political situations which were to arise.
For Orlyk personally, this moment marked the high point of his career as Hetman-in-exile.Orlyk’s allies, especially the Tatars and Ottomans, also noted the Hetman’s support, and began to draw their own conclusions. For the Porte, these events seem to have rekindled visions similar to those it had once had in connection with Doroshenko—projects of a Ukrainian principality, an almost natural addition to the Moldavian and Wallachian principalities, acting as a bulwark against Muscovite expansion and as a safeguard of the Black Sea coast. For Peter I, on the other hand, Orlyk’s success acted as a warning of the constant danger of the Mazepist emigres, reinforcing his hatred of them and his resolve to eliminate them at all costs. And for the Poles, both the supporters of August II and of Stanislaw, any Cossack successes in the Right Bank could only fill them with a sense of foreboding.
But, during February 1711, precisely at the point when Orlyk’s fortunes looked brightest, internal problems appeared within the allied camp. As enemy opposition stiffened and provisions became more difficult to procure, differences developed between the commanders of the allies’ forces, in particular, between Orlyk and Potocki. While Orlyk, in line with Charles’ instructions and his own preferences, wished to advance directly towards Kiev, the Polish wojewoda of Kiev, still hoping to attract supporters in Poland and Lithuania, insisted that the offensive be directed toward the borders of Poland. Undoubtedly, the differences between the Polish and Cossack leaders went even deeper. In their correspondence, Orlyk accused Potocki of allowing his tr∞ps to pillage the land and even of abducting some Cossacks who had been on their way to join him.39
Despite these difficulties, however, Orlyk managed to emerge victorious from his first major confrontation with the enemy. On or about 15 March, Orlyk met and defeated a force led by Stefan Butovych, Skoropadskyi’s Adjutant-General. By now, most of the regiments of the Right Bank, except that of Bila Tserkva and the wavering Chyhyryn regiment, had gone over to Orlyk. The only major obstacle which lay between the Hetman and his objective, Kiev, was the strong fortress of Bila Tserkva. Apparently against the advice of Potocki, who pointed to the allies’ lack of proper siege artillery, Orlyk decided to besiege the fortress. On 25 March, Orlyk began the siege, expecting a quick and easy victory. But he had miscalculated. The garrison, commanded by Colonel Annenkov and consisting of 500 Muscovites plus several hundred Cossacks under Colonel Tanskyi, repulsed the allies’ attacks.40 In the face of determined opposition, the allies’ offensive stalled. A critical moment arose and, as had so often happened in the past, the Cossacks’ Tatar allies failed them under pressure.